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The publication of this excellent volume could not take
place at a more appropriate time. With the collapse of the
Soviet empire and the emergence of Eurasia as a central
focus of world politics, the authors – all experts in their
respective fields - address the question of the nature of this
new global system and security problems. The central
question addressed is whether or not Western values and
institutional forms are appropriate for an international
system including Central and East Asian states with political
and diplomatic traditions differing from the post-West-
phalian European order. No question is more central to
international peace and global security in the 21st century.
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UNIVERSITY
L IMITING INSTITUTIONS? examines the security threats in Eurasia andthe role of institutions in the post-Cold War international environment.
It looks at both the crucial aspect of foreign policy as well as a theoretical
area of security studies.
The book addresses the important and varied range of security threats to
this area of the world, and examines the range of responses open to
European countries and to the United States. Threats such as ethnic
conflict, transnational crime, and environmental and energy security issues
are examined in depth. It also considers the important theoretical issue of
the role that international institutions can perhaps play as arbiters of
conflict and facilitators of cooperation in a region abutting the European
political space. The current and prospective roles of the OSCE, NATO, the
European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation Council are addressed as is the potential
emergence of a new great power concert.
The contributors are scholars with international reputations, and the book
will be of benefit to students of international relations and conflict
analysis.
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Preface and acknowledgements
The unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union nullified
the oft-remarked upon geopolitical and strategic certitude that had evolved
after 1945. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, in particular, erased the
geopolitical demarcation of the eastern boundary of the ‘West’ and the
southern boundary separating greater Europe from the Middle East.
Similarly, the Soviet-American competition had produced a de facto distinc-
tion between the geopolitics of Asia and the geopolitics of Europe. Eurasia, as
a geopolitical designation, lost the currency it had enjoyed in the early twen-
tieth century owing to the consolidation of the internal and external Soviet
imperium, the post-civil war consolidation of China, and the Atlantic orien-
tation of postwar American foreign policy. 
Eurasia remains a rather ill-defined geostrategic space in two respects.
First, any line of demarcation along its southern periphery can be as easily
claimed as a part of the northern periphery of the Middle East. Second, the
accent placed on the Asian or the European in Eurasia will perforce reflect an
individual’s mental map, which is in turn shaped by idiosyncratic variables
(intellectual habit and national origin) and substantive ones (the nature of
the security threat examined and the membership of the regional institu-
tion(s) engaged in the critical task of security governance). It is our hope that
Limiting Institutions? makes a contribution to the debate over the source and
nature of the security threats facing the European security order in the early
twenty-first century and the role formal institutions can play in the task of
regional (and by extension global) security governance, however Eurasia is
eventually delimited. 
The chapters in this book took final shape after draft papers were
presented at an international conference sponsored by the Lyman L.
Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies at Kent State
University. The conference, ‘Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of
Eurasian Security’, was held on 28–29 September 2001. We initially
xi
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planned to address the emerging need for new research and analysis of the
Eurasian region, particularly the requirements of security governance,
when our discussions to hold the conference began the preceding September.
It became quickly evident that the meeting’s significance heightened in the
aftermath of 11 September 2001, but we also had to consider cancelling the
conference owing to the widespread (and understandable) reticence to board
an airplane so soon after the attack on the Pentagon and the destruction of
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. When we asked the conference
participants whether we should postpone or even cancel the event entirely,
they all agreed the conference needed to go forward as scheduled. Limiting
Institutions? is the product of that meeting. 
Mention must be made of individuals, other than the authors, who
contributed to the conference’s success. Lawrence S. Kaplan, director emeri-
tus of the Lemnitzer Center, who has vigorously maintained his productive
relationship with it, offered a characteristically stimulating luncheon
address, ‘Reflections on the Lemnitzer Center’s Relevance to the History of
the Atlantic Alliance’. Participants also benefited greatly from the insightful
and timely observations delivered by Ambassador Charles Dunbar (retired)
in his evening presentation, ‘US Policy in Eurasia and Beyond’. Thanks are
also owed to a number of individuals who served as panel chairs and discus-
sants, including Andrew Barnes, Boleslaw Boczek, Patrick Clawson, Joseph
H. Danks, Hanna Freij, Jonathan Helmreich, John Logue, Steven Oluic,
Argyrios Pisiotis and Mark R. Rubin. 
S. Victor Papacosma would like to express his gratitude to the staff from
the Lemnitzer Center and Kent State University’s Center for International
and Comparative Programs, who provided important administrative serv-
ices in the organisation of the conference: Alan Coe, Sandy Baker, Judith
Carroll and John Gannon. Sean Kay would like to thank his departmental
secretary, Pam Laucher, for her help and Bill Louthan. James Sperling would
like to thank his long-suffering research assistant, Keery Walker, for her
cheerful disposition and occasional willingness to do what is asked of her.
The editors dedicate this book to their wives, Joy Sperling, Anna-Marie
Kay and Evie Papacosma, who have gracefully endured the academic and
other eccentricities of their American spouses.
James Sperling
Sean Kay
S. Victor Papacosma
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1Eurasian security governance:
new threats, institutional adaptations
James Sperling 
Halford Mackinder developed the geostrategic formulation recognising that
international politics encompasses the globe. His simple formulation, which
guided early twentieth-century policy-makers and theorists in North
America and continental Europe alike, held that the state that controls the
Eurasian heartland controls the periphery, and the state that controls the
periphery controls the world.1 More so than in the first decade of the twenti-
eth century, the European system has ceased to be ‘European’ – the great
powers are no longer solely European in the cultural or geographical sense.
The end of the Cold War eradicated the cordon sanitaire provided by the Soviet
empire that largely protected the prosperous western half of Europe from the
dysfunctional social, ideological or religious, political and economic systems
of Eurasia. Paradoxically, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO),
the institution that best served the security interests of the West in its
competition with the Soviet Union, is now relatively ill-equipped to defend
against or resolve the threats emanating from Eurasia to the Atlantic
system of security governance, which had emerged over the course of the
postwar period and is now facing a difficult transition to the post-Cold War
environment. 
The changing nature of the security agenda and security dilemmas facing
the states of Europe and North America make the transatlantic community
increasingly vulnerable to threats originating outside its immediate
geographic ambit, a point brought home to the United States on September
11 2001. The openness of the European states to external influences, the free
movement of peoples and goods, and domestic political liberalism have made
these states soft targets. The international system described by Mackinder
remains operative in the still-important military sense: states remain defined
by their territoriality and the existential threat posed to them by a direct mili-
tary attack by another state. At the same time, however, the European states
are less concerned about territoriality (and the threat of war) and more
3
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concerned with sustaining the western system of security governance and
extending it as far eastward into Eurasia as necessary. The western
European states and the United States wish to reproduce in Eurasia their
norms of statecraft, particularly the prohibitionary norm against the use of
weapons of mass destruction, as well as to impose dispute- and conflict-
resolution mechanisms of western design. To put it benignly, the Americans
and western Europeans hope to manufacture the conditions necessary to
project the security community created in the Atlantic area in the postwar
period into the eastern periphery of Eurasia.2
A question arises as to whether this system of security governance, which
is being progressively extended from western to eastern Europe, can be even-
tually projected farther into Eurasia. The concern is not simply that the
‘Great Game’ of diplomacy played out by Great Britain and Tsarist Russia in
the nineteenth century will be replicated as a triangular competition
between the United States, Russia and China. Central Asia and the Balkans,
in particular, have regained a lost geostrategic or geoeconomic significance
in the twenty-first century. These areas’ importance is linked to their pivotal
geographical position as a nexus between the Atlantic security zone and the
Middle East and Asia and as potential buffers or transit points between the
Islamic Middle East and Christian Europe. Central Asia will play an espe-
cially critical role as an alternative source of energy supply for Europe and
Northeast Asia, will either help repair or deepen the environmental distress
occasioned by climatic change, will serve either as a sanctuary for terrorism
against the West or as a staging ground for its eradication, and may become
transformed into a region defined by weak state structures and ethnic irre-
dentism or by strong states with democratic institutions. 
Perhaps as important, the evolution of Islam in this region – whether it
will assume a relatively non-intrusive secular role as in Turkey or a radical
variant of Islamic fundamentalism as in the Taliban’s Afghanistan – will
have important implications for the security of Europe’s southern flank, the
prospect for deep and secure economic ties between Eurasia and Europe, and
the geostrategic relationships between Eurasia’s greater and lesser powers.
Three important policy-relevant questions with theoretical implications are
of interest: what are the nature of the security threats posed to Europe that
originate in Eurasia? Can the ‘West’ incorporate Eurasia into the western
system of security governance? Will the future system of security gover-
nance be cooperative or will it evolve into a competitive system of balancing
and shifting alliances? Limiting Institutions? focuses on the security dilemmas
facing the states of Eurasia, the sources and kinds of threats posed to the
European political space by Eurasia, and the role that international institu-
tions are playing and may play in the creation of a sustainable system of
security governance encompassing the Eurasian land mass. 
Introduction
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Security governance in Eurasia 
Security governance is the policy problem confronting the great Eurasian
powers in the contemporary international system. The postwar security
system encompassing the Eurasian landmass was governed by the stable
crisis produced by the bipolar distribution of power and the alliance system it
spawned. Conflicts between the two superpowers, the United States and
Soviet Union, were played out in the deadly logic of nuclear deterrence,
limited wars along the periphery of Asia, and proxy wars in Africa and Latin
America. The ideological Manichaeism and structural rigidity of the postwar
period have now yielded to structural fluidity and ill-defined civilisational
disputations. 
The postwar system of countervailing power created by NATO and the
Warsaw Pact unraveled with the latter’s dissolution and the progressive
transformation of NATO from a military alliance with an Atlantic perspec-
tive into a pan-European political organisation with an increasingly residual
military role. The challenge of security governance for the West reflects
neither the transformation of NATO into a political organisation nor the
nascent emergence of a Euro-American security community extending east-
ward and encompassing the Russian Federation. The challenge is located in
the absence of and difficulty of constructing an effective system of gover-
nance encompassing the whole of Eurasia. 
Security governance has received increasing attention since 1989.3 Its
rising conceptual salience is derived in large measure from the challenges
presented by the ‘new’ security agenda. Security governance has been
defined as ‘an international system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of a
majority of states (or at least the major powers) that are affected, which
through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and informal), governs activi-
ties across a range of security and security-related issue areas’.4 This defini-
tion of security governance is largely consistent with that of those analysts
who insist that: institutions are mechanisms employed by states to further
their own goals;5 states are the primary actors in international relations and
some states are more equal than others;6 power relationships are not only
material but normative;7 and states are constrained by institutions with
respect to proscribed and prescribed behaviour.8 This broad conceptual defi-
nition of security governance allows scholars to investigate the role institu-
tions play from any number of methodological perspectives. As importantly,
it allows us to ask if the necessary conditions exist in Eurasia for the success-
ful eastward extension of the Atlantic security community into Eurasia or if
the dynamics of the Eurasian state system are incompatible with it. It leaves
open the possibility that the system can be extended into Eurasia as well as
the prospect that the Eurasian state system will embrace the logic of anarchy
and manifest its by-products, the balancing of power and perfidious alliance
partners. 
Eurasian  security governance
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Both Robert O. Keohane and Robert Jervis have addressed the require-
ments of security governance in the contemporary international system.9
Jervis has argued that the western system of security governance produced a
security community that was contingent upon five necessary and sufficient
conditions. The first two concern beliefs about war and the cost of waging it.
The first requires national elites generally to eschew wars of conquest, and
war as an instrument of statecraft, at least with one another; the second that
the costs of waging such a war outweigh any conceivable benefits, material
or other. The second two conditions are the embrace of political and
economic liberalism. The first requires national elites to accept that the best
path to national prosperity is peaceful economic intercourse rather than
conquest or empire, in order to eliminate the rationale for war and economic
closure. The second calls for the existence of domestic democratic gover-
nance, in order that the domestic practice of compromise, negotiation and
rule of law characterises relations between states. The final condition stipu-
lates that states be satsified with the territorial status quo, a condition that
mitigates the security dilemma.10
All five conditions are met in the Atlantic security community; they are
lacking in most of Eurasia. Keohane recognises this problem in his discussion
of the barriers to global governance.11 Keohane’s expressed scepticism about
constructing a system of global governance is instructive in the context of
extending the Atlantic system of security governance. He identified three
barriers to global governance that can usefully be adapted to the problem of
security governance in Eurasia. The first is the cultural, religious and civili-
sational heterogeneity of Eurasia, which probably prohibits the wholesale
adoption of the European norms and principles that animate the existing
Atlantic system of security governance. European norms are as likely to be
particular as they are universal. The second and related barrier is the
absence of a consensus about beliefs and norms, which would make the like-
lihood of extending the Atlantic system of security governance into Eurasia
virtually non-existent.12 The third barrier to a Eurasian system of security
governance is the absence of an institutional fabric that is both thick enough
to meet the challenge of governance and consistent with indigenous (rather
than European) norms and beliefs about the practice of statecraft and even
national governance. 
Both Jervis and Keohane expressed concern about the sustainability of the
western systems of governance and the prospects for their eventual globali-
sation. Jervis asked the question, ‘What are the implications of the existence
of the security community for international politics in the rest of the world?’
That query is not the one addressed in this book. Instead, we pose an alter-
native question, ‘What are the implications of an anarchical Eurasia for the
Atlantic security community?’ The problem facing the states of Eurasia is a
simple one: will the efforts to extend or impose western values and institu-
tional forms into Central and East Asia produce a convergence or divergence
Introduction
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of behaviour around the pre-existing European norm, some normative
compromise between the Occident and Orient, or a lapse into the corrosive
competition inherent to international anarchy? Will a failed effort to extend
the western system of security governance into Eurasia delegitimise it? Will
the heterogeneity of the states occupying the geopolitical space of ‘Eurasia’
push all states towards a renewed embrace of the sovereignty norm and the
system of alliances it inevitably engenders?
These questions are important because the evolution of international
politics in Eurasia is not peripheral to European security and is central to the
successful expansion of the Atlantic security community into eastern
Europe, including the Russian Federation. The postwar security order spon-
sored by the United States was a system of security governance suffused by
three norms: democratic governance and conformity with the market,
collective defence, and multilateralism.13 As long as bipolarity characterised
the European state system and as long as the requirements of nuclear deter-
rence and conventional balance dominated the security calculus, there was
little debate among elites about the fundamental threat posed to Europe or
how to meet that threat. The absorption or participation of the Eurasian
states into this institutionalised system of security governance presents an
important challenge to continuing systemic stability. The very heterogene-
ity of this grouping of states – a geopolitical heterogeneity internal to the
states of the Atlantic community and a normative heterogeneity between
the states of Eurasia and the Atlantic community – raises at least five ques-
tions about the institutionalisation of security in Eurasia: why is Eurasia
relevant to the security concerns of the Atlantic Community? What are the
security dilemmas faced by the states of Eurasia? What relevance does
alliance theory have for the evolution of Eurasian security? What are the
boundaries of a Eurasian system of security governance and how high are
the barriers for assimilating non-European states into a European order?
What role can institutions play in creating a Eurasian system of security
governance? 
Diffusion and the new security agenda 
The absence of a Eurasian system of security governance is given special
meaning and force owing to the changing nature of the security threats
facing the states of prosperous Europe. The long-lived distinctions between
the ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics of international affairs and between domestic
and foreign policy have been increasingly rendered obsolete by the changed
context of state action and changing nature of the European state.14 The
‘high’ politics of diplomacy and the ‘low’ politics of commerce had largely
obscured the now transparent interdependence between these two fields of
action. The line between foreign and domestic policy has become so blurred
that the distinction has lost much of its conceptual force. The emergence of
Eurasian  security governance
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new arenas and sources of conflict – weak state structures, ethnic conflict,
environmental threats – and new technologies that render state boundaries
increasingly porous – particularly cyberspace and the internationalisation of
commerce and capital – have broadened the systemic requirements of secu-
rity.15 The new security agenda raises two important questions: why have
these new security threats risen to prominence in the post-Cold War period?
Do the Eurasian states pose a putative threat to the systemic or milieu goals
of the Atlantic states, to the integrity of the central and eastern European
states and authority structures, or to the societal integrity of those states
individually and collectively? Put differently, can the security threats posed
by Eurasia to itself and to Europe be treated as the relatively simple problem
of identifying state-to-state threats that unequivocally represent a state-
centric security calculus where the state is both the subject and object of
analysis? The answers to these questions are central to the chapters in Part
II of Limiting Institutions?.
The most promising conceptual category of response focuses on the
altered structure of the European state system and the changing nature of
the European state.16 The emergence of new security threats in Europe
suggests that we can no longer conceive of security in terms of a policy
choice restricted to specific dyads of states. Threats can no longer be simply
dissaggregated into the capabilities and intentions of states; primacy can no
longer be attributed to the state as either agent or object.17 A definition of
security restricted to the traditional concern with territorial integrity or the
protection of ill-defined but well-understood ‘national interests’ would
exclude threats to the social fabric of domestic or international societies or
threats emanating from states with imperfect control over their territory,
weakened legitimacy, or persistent interethnic conflicts. Moreover, the
growing irrelevance of territoriality and the continuing importance of juris-
dicational sovereignty have left states vulnerable to these new categories of
threat: national responses are no longer adequate, yet the division of politi-
cal space into states jealously guarding their sovereignty inhibits collective
responses to these diffused threats. The sovereignty norm of the Westphalian
system, therefore, has placed a barrier to cooperative outcomes – even in the
Atlantic security community. 
The key characteristic of the Westphalian state is its ‘territoriality’.
Described by John H. Herz as a ‘hard shell’ protecting states and societies
from the external environment, territoriality is increasingly irrelevant, not
only in Europe but in the newly formed states of Eurasia. States no longer
enjoy the luxury of a ‘wall of defensibility’ that leaves them relatively
immune to external penetration. As noted by Wolfram Hanrieder, even
though Herz later changed his mind about the demise of the territorial state,
‘his argument on the changed meaning and importance of territoriality was
clearly valid’.18 It not only forces us to change our conception of power –
shifting attention from the military-strategic to the economic – but should
Introduction
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also change our understanding of threat. As the boundaries between the
state and the external environment have become increasingly blurred, it
leaves open the possibility that the new security threats may operate along
channels dissimilar to the traditional threats posed to the territorial state.
The ‘interconnectedness’ of the post-Westphalian state system, most
visible in western Europe, was facilitated and reinforced by the success of the
postwar institutions of American design as well as by European economic
and political integration.19 Geography, technological innovations, the
convergence around the norms of political and economic openness, and a
rising ‘dynamic density’ of the Atlantic political space have progressively
stripped away the prerogatives of sovereignty and eliminated the autonomy
once afforded powerful states by territoriality.20 These elements of the
contemporary European state system appear to have linked the states of
Europe together irrevocably, are spreading outwards into Eurasia, and now
facilitate the transformation of domestic and foreign policy disequilibria in
the Eurasian states into security threats for the affluent states of Europe. 
The porousness of national boundaries in the contemporary European
state system has made it more likely that ‘domestic’ disturbances – particu-
larly those that are either economic or environmental in origin – are not
easily contained within a single state and are easily diffused throughout the
European system. The postulated ease with which domestic disturbances are
transmitted across national boundaries and the difficulty of defending
against those disturbances underline the strength and vulnerability of the
contemporary state system: the openness of these states and societies along
an ever expanding spectrum of interaction provides greater levels of collec-
tive welfare than would otherwise be possible, yet the very transmission belts
facilitating that welfare also serve as diffusion mechanisms hindering the
ability of the state to inoculate itself against disturbances within the subsys-
tem. The concept of diffusion is highly suggestive in this context.21
The different elements of the new security agenda explored in the chap-
ters that follow are spread by at least four readily identifiable diffusion mech-
anisms: the growing dynamic density of the Eurasian political space; flawed
or underdeveloped civil societies or political institutions of democracy;
geographic propinquity; and the ubiquitousness of cyberspace. Cyberspace,
for example, has helped erase national boundaries and signified the potential
irrelevance of geographic space. It still escapes effective state control and
provides the perfect instrument for non-state and societal actors seeking to
destabilise any particular state or aspect of a society. Geographic propinquity
and the absence of effective interstate barriers to migration mean that
domestic disturbances anywhere in the Eurasian political space, be it from
ethnic strife, environmental degradation, or the criminalisation of national
economies or of state structures, could be externalised and initiate destabilis-
ing migratory flows. 
It is the growing dynamic density of the Eurasian security space in
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conjunction with the estabished dynamic density of the Atlantic security
space that provides the most pervasive and nettlesome mechanisms of diffu-
sion. The dynamic density of the Atlantic security space gives the European
state system its distinctive character, particularly the erosion of meaningful
national boundaries and the progressive loss of state control over the deci-
sions of individuals, markedly within the sphere of the economy. The very
transmission belts of economic prosperity – largely unrestricted capital
markets, high levels of trade, and the absence of exchange controls – also
provide the mechanisms for facilitating the criminalisation of national
economies, for initiating the erosion of the authority and legitimacy of weak
states in transition, and for generating exogenous shocks to national
economies that states can no longer effectively control, especially as Eurasia
becomes integrated into the Atlantic economy. Moreover, the states along
the periphery of affluent Europe are plagued by weak civil societies, ineffec-
tive or corrupted judiciaries and other democratic structures, and economies
that are either criminalised or escape the effective jurisdiction of national
authority. Not only are these states hostage to their interdependence with
the rest of Europe, but that interdependence has the potential to transform
Eurasian disequilibria – domestic or regional – into potential security threats
for the states of affluent Europe.
National authorities in the Atlantic area can no longer discharge their
responsibilities by simply maintaining territorial integrity and ensuring
economic growth. The broadening of the security agenda has increased the
tasks and difficulties of governance, while the transformation of the
European state has made it increasingly difficult to achieve its security goals.
Security threats now require a joint rather than unilateral resolution.
Security threats cannot be simply disaggregated into the capabilities and
intentions of states; primacy can no longer be attributed to the state as either
agent or object. Rather, security threats have acquired a system-wide signif-
icance that demands an alternative conceptualisation of the security dilem-
mas facing states and the institutional responses to them.
The old and new security dilemmas: the Eurasian paradox 
Does the traditional security dilemma continue to constrain state choice in
the Eurasian context? Yes and no. Unlike the European security space, where
there is growing agreement that the dilemma has been resolved and a secu-
rity community has emerged, the security dilemma continues to plague
interstate relations throughout most of Eurasia.22 Robert Jervis located the
security dilemma in the unhappy circumstance that ‘many of the means by
which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others’.23
Many Eurasian states remain fixated with issues of territorial integrity and
face acute territorial challenges (e.g., China and the Xinjiang province or
Russia and Chechnya). These states also remain relatively unencumbered by
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the widespread norm against the use of military force to resolve outstanding
territorial disputes among one another (e.g., India and Pakistan); these
states remain challenged in many cases by internal threats to legitimacy
(e.g., Azerbaijan and Karabagh). 
Whereas amity has become the contextual hallmark of interstate rela-
tions within a wider Europe, enmity remains the hallmark of a large number
of bilateral relationships in Eurasia. This unfavourable external context
should therefore lead us to expect significant barriers to cooperation and
consequently to the effective institutionalisation of security relations
between the Eurasian states. Moreover, the continued (and rational) preoc-
cupation with relative gains calculations by the Eurasian states guarantees
that their prime objective will be to ensure that cooperation does not lead to
a disadvantageous change in the hierarchy of regional power. These states
remain, in Joseph Grieco’s felicitous phrase, ‘defensively positional’ – states
are more concerned with their relative power position (however defined)
than with assuring the maximum absolute gain derived from cooperation.24
Thus, the context of state action is not particularly supportive of institution-
alised security cooperation or the wholesale embrace of the European system
of security governance.
At the same time, this security dilemma has become less intense and
inverted along Eurasia’s western frontier. Within Europe, the postwar secu-
rity dilemma of military insecurity has been replaced by the post-Cold War
security dilemma of ensuring political and economic stability along its
borders. The nations of western Europe fear the negative consequences of
political and economic insecurity in eastern Europe and beyond.
Consequently, any measures taken by the nations along Europe’s eastern
periphery that enhance national security, defined broadly in its military or
economic dimensions, are viewed as a positive contribution to European
security rather than as a threat to it. This new security dilemma, derived
from the contest over the allocation of scarce national resources between
policies that generate domestic plenty and those that generate external
stability, also provides an incentive and possibility for the nations of western
Europe to cooperate with their eastern neighbours even at the risk of being
exploited: security free-riding by these nations poses a lesser threat to the
NATO states than does the re-emergence of authoritarian regimes or
economic collapse that could disrupt the reconciliation of the two halves of
Europe. This change in the perception of threat is illustrated by: the transfor-
mation of NATO into a political alliance encompassing both halves of
Europe; the creation of the NATO–Russian Council that may be the first step
towards full Russian membership in NATO; the Ukrainian application for
NATO membership, which, if accepted, will project the alliance in the
Eurasian ‘heartland’; and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme,
which has made critical inroads into ordering civil–military relations and
fostering security cooperation along the entire southern Eurasian periphery,
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from Albania to Tajikistan. For the founding states of the European Union
(EU) and NATO, therefore, the concern is not with its neighbours seeking too
much security, but with its neighbours being too insecure.
The Eurasian states face both security dilemmas and a policy paradox: the
security dilemma identified by Jervis requires each state to guard against any
disadvantageous change in the military status quo while pursuing an
advantageous change in its position along the regional hierarchy; and poli-
cies redressing the new security dilemma, which is preoccupied with foster-
ing states that are domestically secure and economically prosperous, could
produce a disadvantageous change in the regional hierarchy of states. In the
absence of a system of security governance, particularly the institutionalisa-
tion of the norms and rules of European statecraft, Eurasia will remain a
source of instability for the Atlantic security community. Stability in Eurasia
– as in eastern and southern Europe – remains dependent upon a stable
economic and military environment, but in much less favourable circum-
stances. Unlike eastern and southern Europe, however, it is likely that the
transitions to democracy and the market economy will remain generally
intractable owing to unfavourable economic, cultural, ethnic and political
factors domestically and a competitive military-strategic calculus interna-
tionally. Institutions have none the less made inroads into Eurasia, but will
they facilitate the transition to the European-sponsored security commu-
nity, or simply move Eurasia towards a less conflict-riven international
society? 
Alliance theory and Eurasia: help or hindrance to understanding? 
Alliances are perhaps the most ‘primitive’ form of international institution.
They have also been the most important historically. Alliances, as either
formal or informal institutions, are regarded as effective mechanisms for
regulating disequilibria in the international system.25 A weak system of
security governance in Eurasia could be founded upon a system of alliances.
An alliance-based system of security governance, however, suffers from one
important disability: military alliances are not particularly well-equipped to
address the security challenges currently facing these states. The sources, as
opposed to the symptoms, of conflicts arising from ethnic irredentism, weak
state structures, energy shortages and environmental dislocations, to name
a few, are not easily resolved by military means. A reliance upon alliances,
both as a policy instrument and as a conceptual device for ordering inter-
state relations, could well prove a dangerous choice in the changed Eurasian
security environment.
Alliance theory has provided the framework for understanding not only
the evolution of the postwar European security order, but that of the
European state system since 1648. The contemporary debate has been
largely framed by the question of whether states balance power, interests or
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threats.26 There are two ancillary questions driving this debate. The first
asks whether states, in forming those alliances, balance or bandwagon.27
The second revolves around the appropriate assumption to make about state
preferences; viz., do states maximise absolute or relative gains? (While this
particular debate over preferences is largely spent, it is clear that a system of
security governance along the European model would require an external
environment that would allow states to maximise absolute rather than rela-
tive gains.)28 The problem of bandwagoning and balancing remains salient
in a condition of anarchy. Stephen Walt has provided a relatively uncompli-
cated and useful definition of both: ‘Balancing is defined as allying with
others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with
the source of danger . . . balancing is alignment with the weaker side, band-
wagoning is with the stronger.’29 However, the relative fluidity of the
contemporary international system, the evolution of a security community
among the states of democratic Europe and North America, and the changed
status of the state, particularly the limitations on state autonomy in meeting
many of the new security threats, have made this debate potentially less
relevant to the problem of security governance.30
One insight from the alliance debate that continues to have relevance is
the problem of buck-passing and chain-gangs, two byproducts of alliance
behaviour in a multipolar system.31 While contemporary Eurasia cannot be
considered multipolar in any meaningful sense, the Eurasian system is more
fluid today than at any time since the 1930s. Consequently, the behaviour
associated with buck-passing and chain-gangs may remain relevant to the
challenges posed by the new security agenda.32 Buck-passing, as a reformu-
lation of the free-rider problem, arises because states ‘wish to avoid bearing
unncessary costs or because they expect their relative position to be
strengthened by standing aloof from the mutual bloodletting’.33 In the
Eurasian setting, buck-passing occurs at two levels: first, the Americans
have made a concerted effort to shift the costs of eliminating the underlying
causes of the new security threats to the Europeans; and second, the
Europeans (and the Americans) have also made an effort to shift the political
and financial costs of redressing the structural disabilities of the states in
transition to international and regional institutions, particularly NATO, the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU.
Chain-gangs are more problematic, because they can only arise when
states experience ‘a high degree of security interdependence within an
alliance . . . each state feels that its own security is integrally intertwined
with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any state that marches
to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it.’34 Once again, the
parallels between this formulation and the Eurasian state system are
inexact, but highly suggestive. If geographic propinquity, the ubquitious-
ness of cyberspace, a growing interaction density, ethnic conflict and weak
state structures do function as agents of diffusion, then it would follow that
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the security of the Eurasian states is ‘integrally intertwined’. Consequently,
if the states of prosperous Europe – the full members of NATO and the EU in
particular – wish to control their external environment and minimise the
risks posed to the existing system of governance, they cannot allow those
states along Europe’s periphery to remain outside or excluded from the EU-
and NATO-dominated system of security governance. This requirement
raises two additional questions: what are the outer boundaries of the
European system of security governance? Can the Eurasian states be assimi-
lated into a system of security governance that reflects European norms,
values and identities? 
Boundaries and assimilation 
Extending the western system of security governance into Eurasia raises the
problem of identifying the criteria that will demarcate the outer boundary of
the future European system of security governance. Within the context of EU
or NATO enlargement, the question has turned on whether Europe is defined
as having two tiers of states (the assimilated and the unassimilated) or as
having two speeds (assimilated but with differentiated membership in the
various institutions of economic and military security).35 Within the context
of Eurasia, the question turns on the relevance of the region to the European
security order, the precise delination of what geographic space Eurasia occu-
pies, and the limits placed on any institution or group of institutions govern-
ing this geopolitical area. NATO has emerged as the key security institution
governing and maintaining order in the European geostrategic space; and
the EU has emerged as the key economic institution governing and main-
taining order in the European geoeconomic space.
Other security institutions explored in Limiting Institutions? – the OSCE,
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and others
– may eventually play a more prominent role than NATO or the EU in
governing Eurasian security, but each is handicapped by a potentially debil-
itating heterogentity of membership (OSCE), exclusivity by design (CIS), a
volatile membership (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova
grouping [GUUAM]), disparate interests and expectations for the institution
among the member-states (SCO) or a relative lack of legitimacy (BSEC). The
overlapping membership of these Eurasian security institutions may
contribute to the creation of a single set of norms governing statecraft in the
region, but there is no guarantee that those norms will be consistent with
those of the Atlantic community. Moreover, the final boundaries of these
institutions, including NATO and the EU, remain ill-defined and undeter-
mined. The problem of establishing the appropriate boundaries of each insti-
tution (not to mention their appropriate scope and function) complicates the
difficult challenge of coping with the ‘politics of inclusion’ and the require-
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ment of assimilation if a stable and peaceful security order is to evolve in
Eurasia.36 The transition to the politics of inclusion initiated by the end of
the Cold War has opened up the European political space and accelerated the
growing cultural, political, military-strategic and societal intermingling of
Europe and Eurasia. However promising and pleasing this development is
from a normative point of view, it does deepen the potential for the external-
isation and diffusion of domestic disequilibira and complicates the task of
security governance in both Europe and Eurasia.
The politics of inclusion is complicated by the absence of a ready-made
geographical boundary like the one the United States (and the Soviet Union)
faced in 1947. We are reminded that, in an unconstrained environment,
geographic space and institutional size will matter. As club theorists like to
point out, clubs are viable only so long as the benefits of membership are not
outweighed by its costs. In the context of a system of security governance,
the enlargement of any of these institutions can lower their value for any
individual state. And unlike previous international systems, which could be
effectively governed by the powerful few, the contemporary international
system can be effectively disrupted by the weak many. 
The boundary conditions of the Eurasian and European systems – geopo-
litical, institutional-legal, transactional and cultural – have likewise
changed.37 While there has been a dismantling of the boundary conditions
that separated the eastern and western halves of Europe, many of the critical
boundary conditions remain in place between Europe and Eurasia, particu-
larly civilisational disputations, divergent geostrategic challenges, and the
practice of multilateralism within institutional frameworks. Only the trans-
actional boundary has been lowered. One consequence of this development
has been the need to address the problem of Eurasian security governance.
Whereas the Cold War’s end revealed the false cultural boundary dividing
central, eastern and western Europe, the lowering of the transactional
boundary within Eurasia has brought into sharp relief the persistent and
divisive cultural boundary between Christian Europe and its Islamic periph-
ery. While the changed boundary conditions of the European political space
pushed the OSCE, EU and BSEC to practise a ‘politics of inclusion’, NATO was
initially handicapped in this regard since the ‘politics of exclusion’ was its
raison d’être. Yet we have the paradoxical outcome that it is NATO that has
practised most effectively the ‘politics of inclusion’ with the institutional
innovations of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Euro-Atlantic
Political Cooperation, and the PfP programme, as well as the creation of the
NATO–Russian Council in 2002. Security institutions of Eurasian origin,
particularly the CIS and SCO, clearly practise the politics of exclusion, but
even in the case of the SCO, the Chinese have belatedly recognised that its
final membership and agenda should remain open.38 The politics of inclu-
sion initiated by the changed boundary conditions of post-Cold War Europe
and Eurasia indicates that the progressive and all-inclusive eastward
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extension of the western system of security governance is all but inevitable.
Yet the precise form and content of such a development remain undeter-
mined, and the effort may ultimately fail, particularly as that system is based
on European values and norms which are not negotiable and treated as
universal rather than as particular. 
The role of institutions in alleviating conflict and promoting cooperation 
What role can international institutions play in mediating conflict and
fostering cooperation? Recent scholarship has focused on issues of institu-
tional design and on the roles that international institutions play in manag-
ing conflicts of interest in constrained environments, in fostering
cooperation by lowering transaction costs or by promoting confidence-
building measures, and in facilitating conflict resolution mechanisms that
deter war. Much of the scholarship has also focused on the necessary and
sufficient conditions required for international institutions to perform that
task.39 Two alternative theories of international relations, neo-liberal insti-
tutionalism and social constructivism, have generated particularly promis-
ing propositions for understanding the role of institutions as facilitators of
cooperation and conflict management. One variant of neo-liberal institu-
tionalism focuses on the functions performed by institutions to mitigate
conflicts of interest and facilitate cooperation, while another has linked the
utility of international institutions to categories of strategic interaction. In
either case, international institutions allow states to overcome or mitigate
the defensive and uncooperative logic of anarchy.40 Social constructivism,
which postulates that identity and normative belief systems shape material
interests, view institutions as evidence that states are governed by a norma-
tive system and that the requirements for collective identity formation are
being met.41
In the past, studies of international institutions have generally investi-
gated the patterns of conflict and cooperation in the transatlantic political
system that emerged after World War II. This preoccupation with the
western security and economic systems left scholars open to the initial
charge that they were only looking where institutions appeared to exert
some impact on preference formation – namely in the Atlantic area.42 A
second and more fundamental problem with the empirical analyses of insti-
tutions has been that Europe in particular has proven an ‘easy’ case, because
a unique set of historical circumstances, the bloodshed and devastation of
the two ‘world’ wars, convinced the Europeans to relax their sovereign
prerogatives in the interest of peace and prosperity. More important, the
focus on Europe carries with it an inherent European bias with respect to the
preference for a multilateralised and institutionalised statecraft as well as the
essential content of the norms necessary to govern those states’ behaviour.
The security dilemmas facing the arc of Eurasian states that stretches from
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the Balkans to China provide a good empirical test of the proposition that
formal or informal institutions and the norm of multilateralism are not
particular to Euro-Atlantic states, in either a cultural or a geographic sense,
and can be successfully and fruitfully extended into the Eurasian landmass. 
The discussion so far has focused on the structural and contextual
changes in the European political space which have made it necessary to
broaden the definition of security. Systemic stability and the prospect for a
peaceful and cooperative pan-European security order are largely contin-
gent upon the successful transition to the market and multiparty democracy
in Europe and along its periphery. And those transitions, in turn, are contin-
gent upon a stable economic and military environment.43
The precise role of institutions in the post-Cold War security architecture
remains contested. This unsettled state of affairs raises the question of insti-
tutional choice and design, a matter complicated by the necessity of accom-
modating an expanded conception of security that extends beyond the
traditional concern of assuring territorial integrity and the physical protec-
tion of national assets from military threat. The interrelationships between
the institutions governing the ‘new’ and traditional elements of the security
calculus, as well as the interaction or interdependencies between them,
remain uncharted. Yet it is the management of the institutional interde-
pendence of the EU, NATO, OSCE, BSEC, CIS, GUUAM44 and SCO, in particu-
lar, which may eventually define the contours of the future Eurasian
security order and Eurasia’s place in the European and North American defi-
nition of interest and calculus of action. 
There are good reasons to suspect that these security institutions can and
do play a prominent and constructive role in Eurasia. First, the provision of
multiple fora to resolve outstanding conflicts of interest or to meet common
threats will serve the security interests of the European states, at least from a
systemic perspective. A closer relationship to NATO, for example, may
provide Eurasian states with a reassuring security guarantee (regardless of
whether it is debased or not). Likewise, a closer relationship with the EU
could enhance these nations’ economic prospects by providing privileged
access to the largest market in the world. The evolution of the CIS and the
BSEC into viable markets could provide alternative routes to economic pros-
perity and the eradication of poverty, an underlying source of conflict. The
SCO, as an institutional form of Eurasian origin, may provide normative and
cultural reassurance for the Eurasian states and thereby facilitate coopera-
tion with Europe, or it may serve as a potential counterweight to NATO so
long as Russia is denied full membership. Second, the deeper engagement of
these institutions could support the normative and belief system presently
suffusing the European system of security governance: the importance of
democratic governance domestically, the rejection of war as a mechanism
for dispute resolution, the legitimacy of existing dispute- and conflict-
resolution mechanisms, and the preference for multilateral solutions to
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common security challenges. Finally, these norms and beliefs generate two
other important externalities: they create a common frame of reference for
identifying and resolving conflicts of interest; and they create a community
of interest and values critical to meeting the external conditions necessary
for sustained cooperation and diffuse reciprocity. If these norms and beliefs
took root in Eurasia, it would facilitate the extension of the western system of
security governance or at least engender its onset. 
Conclusion
It would not be unduly optimistic to claim that institutions could perform
limited, but regionally restricted, security governance roles in Eurasia; scep-
ticism must none the less be reserved for any claim that a single set of insti-
tutions will coalesce into a Eurasian system of security governance in the
near future. There are significant barriers to a lock-step eastward enlarge-
ment of the Atlantic system of governance or the emergence of a Eurasian
system of governance congruous with the European normative and belief
system. One barrier is located in the asymmetrical evolution of the European
and Eurasian state, namely the transition from a warfare to a welfare state.
Another is the context of international politics in Eurasia, which presently
compels states to focus on relative rather than absolute gains in the calcula-
tion of state policy. A third is located in the inability to foster a collective
identity encompassing the European and Eurasian states, which, in turn,
will impair international cooperation and institution building.
The European and Eurasian states are at different stages of evolution: the
European state has lost or willingly abandoned sovereign prerogatives in the
interest of maximising either national welfare or security. This progressive
erosion of national sovereignty is the result of two tendencies: the voluntary
transfer of sovereignty to international or supranational institutions to
resolve outstanding conflicts between states or manage dilemmas of collec-
tive action; and the involuntary loss of sovereignty to the market and the
subsequent efforts to recapture that sovereignty via multilateral gover-
nance. Within Eurasia, many new states jealously guard their decade-old
sovereignty, and their less sophisticated national economies are not integral
parts of the international economy. Thus, the perceived need for interna-
tional institutions is correspondingly lower. 
A relatively high level of enmity in interstate relations, sharpened by the
externalisation of intra-state ethnic conflicts, provides the second barrier to
a unified system of security governance. The context of state action has a
major impact on the formulation of national preferences, which are not
immutable but are linked quite closely to the external constraints facing a
state, particularly the level of amity and enmity in the international
system.45 Where there are high levels of enmity, cooperative outcomes
are unlikely; where there are high levels of amity, cooperative outcomes are
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facilitated. An extension of the western system of security governance
requires that amity characterise the Eurasian system – the last decade,
however, has not pointed in that direction. The barriers to collective identity
formation are the most problematic and are derived, in part, from the first
two. One solution to the dilemma of collective action – a motor propelling the
institutionalised cooperation in the Atlantic community – is located in the
process of collective identity formation that has arguably occurred in the
Atlantic security system.46 There are two distinct aspects of interstate rela-
tions that vary positively with collective identity formation and the emer-
gence of a security community more generally: the level of economic
interdependence and the extent to which there has been a convergence of
domestic values. On the first measure, the relatively low level of economic
interdependence within Eurasia and between Eurasia and Europe makes
collective identity formation, and the wholesale Eurasian adoption of the
western system of security governance, less likely. The convergence of
Eurasian domestic values around the European norm is also lacking and
unlikely. There has been a progressive convergence of domestic values in the
states comprising the Atlantic area: they have embraced the twin virtues of
the market economy and multiparty democracy as well as a preference for
multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to common problems.47 In
Eurasia, there is a wide variety of regime types conjoined to ethnic and reli-
gious animosities, and multilateralism remains a relatively alien form of
statecraft. As compared to Europe, Eurasia is a highly heterogeneous secu-
rity space and the prospects for a collective identity are correspondingly low.
Moreover, there is neither an effective institutional mechanism for enforcing
the convergence of domestic values on a pan-regional basis, nor a certainty
that the values underpinning the western system of security governance are
either universal or compatible with existing indigeneous belief systems and
normative values. 
The chapters constituting this volume are generally supportive of this
sceptical assessment. Yet, there is also evidence that elements of the western
system of security governance have mitigated conflict, shaped expectations
and engendered security cooperation in Eurasia. The following chapters
provide answers to a common set of questions: what are the boundaries of
the European security order and what role does Eurasia play in that order?
What are the content of the new security agenda, the nature of the security
dilemmas facing the Eurasian states, and the opportunities for externalising
regional conflicts? What role can European and indigenous institutions be
expected to play in mediating conflict and facilitating security cooperation in
this region of the world? Limiting Institutions? is divided into four parts. Part
II investigates the contemporary security challenges facing Eurasia that may
also impinge upon the future stability of the existing European security
order; Part III investigates the current roles played by institutions seeking a
governance role in Eurasia and the success those institutions have had in
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fostering security cooperation and mitigating conflict in Eurasia. 
Part II examines a broad range of threats to Eurasian stability and the
European security order. Douglas Blum, in Chapter 2, investigates the
important role played by identity politics in the shaping of the Eurasian secu-
rity environment. Blum focuses on the potentially combustible mix of
contested national identities and weak state structures that have emerged in
the successor states of the former Soviet Union. He highlights in particular
the negative impact that malformed or contested ethnic and national identi-
ties have upon state capacity. His analysis provides three important insights:
weak states with contested national identities are unlikely to prove depend-
able partners within multilateral frameworks; some Eurasian states are
unlikely to develop national identities compatible with the western system of
security governance; and the delegitimisation of already weak state struc-
tures could prove to be a fundamental source of instability and conflict in
this region largely beyond the reach of the European powers or European-
sponsored institutions. Stuart Kaufman, in Chapter 3, looks at the conse-
quences of ethnic conflict for intra-state and interstate war. His investigation
of ethnic conflict in Bosnia, Macedonia and Mountainous Karabagh leads to
a number of important conclusions for those wishing to extend the reach of
western institutions of security governance. First, ethnic conflict is not only
a cause of international insecurity, but may also be the result of security
competition between states. Second, an important source of ethnic conflict is
how vital interests are constructed, particularly the way in which competing
ethnic groups make mutually exclusive claims to the same territory. Third,
this construction of vital interests is responsible for the persistence of secu-
rity dilemmas in Eurasia. His contribution is particularly relevant for those
claiming that security institutions like NATO or the OSCE can play a
constructive and decisive role in this region. 
Weak national identities and ethnic conflict have found expression in
transnational terrorism. Phil Williams, in Chapter 4, examines a novel
dimension of transnational terrorism, namely, the rising role played by
transnational criminal organisations, either as domestic sources of instabil-
ity and delegitimisation or as an ‘off-shore’ source of instability for Europe.
Williams, who details the elements of the new security paradigm, argues
that sources of the terrorist threat to Europe originate along or beyond the
European periphery. His analysis, which documents the links between weak
state capacity and the phenomenon of transnational terrorism, focuses upon
the success enjoyed by organised crime in rolling back the state and weaken-
ing the existing system of security governance. 
Part II concludes with two chapters investigating two specific security
threats, one drawn from the ‘new’ and the other from the traditional security
agenda. Stuart Horsman, in Chapter 5, investigates the prospect for inter-
state violence arising from environmental conflict, specifically the allocation
of riverine water in Central Asia. His chapter underscores the historical
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importance of water allocation as a source of conflict and war, and argues
that water allocation conflicts in the twenty-first century are likely to func-
tion as an indirect or contributory cause of regional instability. Horsman
provides a sceptical assessment of both the existing institutional solutions to
water allocation conflicts amongst the Central Asian states and the potential
for conflict between those states and China. Jaewoo Choo then addresses the
importance of Caspian Sea oil and natural gas reserves outside the familiar
concern with the creation of an integrated transport network augmenting
the energy security requirements of western Europe. Instead, he places
Caspian Sea oil reserves into the more volatile geopolitical context of Sino-
American competition in the region. Choo argues that the Chinese and
American competition for Central Asian energy reserves has important
implications not only for the energy security of the Occident and Orient, but
also for the geopolitical evolution of the Asia-Pacific. He details the interac-
tion of the American response in Central Asia to the September 11 terrorist
attacks, the intertwined issues of development, exploitation and transport
networks for Caspian Sea oil, and China’s desire to reverse the growing
American influence in its own backyard. 
Part III identifies and examines the key regional institutional actors that
have an established security governance role in Eurasia. These chapters
address a set of specific questions: what role has each institution sought for
itself in the region? How well has each institution achieved its objectives
there? What are the limits and relevance of each institution to regional secu-
rity governance? Sean Kay, in Chapter 7, investigates the traditional preoc-
cupation with security dilemmas, the protection of territorial integrity,
alliance formation and the pursuit of geostrategic advantage. He identifies
the problems attending alliance formation in the region and the patterns of
balancing and bandwagoning that are likely to emerge. Kay’s chapter
focuses on the confluence of national interests that led to the creation of the
CIS, GUUAM and SCO, and concludes that these institutions have largely
failed to cultivate cooperative multilateralism or abate the security dilemmas
that function as barriers to it. 
P. Terrence Hopmann and Joshua B. Spero, in Chapters 8 and 9, investi-
gate the roles played by arguably the two most important regional security
organisations, the OSCE and NATO, respectively. The OSCE and NATO’s PfP
programme assumed the important role of institutionalising western norms
on a pan-European basis during the 1990s. Hopmann and Spero question
whether the OSCE and NATO will be capable of playing a similar role in
Eurasia. Hopmann details the evolving role assumed by the OSCE in Eurasia,
the regional institution with the most inclusive membership. The OSCE has
been charged with the important task of conflict prevention in Europe and
Eurasia. Hopmann assesses the OSCE’s performance in the last decade and
concludes that the OSCE’s record in the region is difficult to ascertain
precisely because the institution’s success is measured by the immeasurable
Eurasian  security governance
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‘dogs that don’t bark’. Spero, who was directly involved in the creation of the
PfP programme, details its institutional and political evolution. He places the
demand by Eurasian states for membership in PfP within the framework of
alliance theory, focuses on how the western model of civil–military relations
was institutionalised in this region, suggests that the expansion of PfP into
this region has strengthened the NATO-based security order, and demon-
strates that it has alleviated the security dilemmas these states would face in
its absence. 
John Willerton and Geoffrey Cockerham, in Chapter 10, explore the CIS,
one of the two quasi-constitutional actors in the region. The CIS, which
remains an underdeveloped institution, has the potential to reintegrate the
arc of states along the southern border of the Russian Federation into a not
unimportant economic actor for Europe. Willerton and Cockerham focus
particularly on the CIS’s unrealised potential as an instititution central to
the tasks of security provision, economic integration and political stability in
Eurasia. They address three important questions: will the efforts of the
Russian Federation to bind these states into a single institutional framework
harm or benefit the security interests of the West? Is the CIS something more
(or less) than the institutionalisation of a renewed Russian bid for Eurasian
hegemony? Will the CIS evolve into something more than a paper confeder-
ation? Panagiota Manoli, in Chapter 11, appraises the potential role of the
BSEC as an effective regional security institution. Turkey’s sponsorship of
the BSEC served the largely unrealised Turkish strategy of ‘cooperative hege-
mony’ in the Black Sea region. It was designed as a mechanism that would
institutionalise a leadership role for Turkey in the region, enhance Turkey’s
importance for Europe, and foster cooperation along Europe’s southern
periphery. Manoli investigates whether the BSEC has performed any or all of
these functions. She finds that it has neither provided a regional security
umbrella nor constituted an economic bloc. Instead, the institution’s contin-
uing raison d’être has been the creation and strengthening of a ‘diplomatic
community’ that provides the basis for regional conflict resolution and coop-
eration across an increasing number of issue areas.
Simon Serfaty, in Chapter 12, looks at the security governance role of the
EU, the second quasi-constitutional actor in Eurasia. He charts the evolution
of the EU as a prominent facilitator of the transition process in central and
eastern Europe as well as the succesor states of the former Soviet Union, and
addresses the security ramifications of the EU’s projected enlargement,
which will, inter alia, leave the EU abutting the western boundary of Eurasia.
Serfaty raises three important questions: what role can the EU  reasonably be
expected to play in Eurasian security governance? Will the process of
enlargement and the difficulties of security governance along the immediate
southern and eastern peripheries of Europe preclude an important role for
the EU? How will the process of deepening affect the EU’s security and foreign
policy ambitions and capabilites? He reaches the pessimistic conclusion that
Introduction
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the EU will be a severely constrained actor in Eurasian security governance
owing to the immediate challenges of deepening and the eastern enlarge-
ment. 
In Part IV, David P. Calleo concludes Limiting Institutions? with a sweep-
ing overview of the geostrategic developments in Eurasia since 1989 and the
consequences of those developments for the evolution of the Atlantic and
Pacific systems of security governance. Calleo poses and answers the funda-
mental question: how should these states arrange their power relationships
to guarantee stability and order best in the twenty-first century? He argues
for the deliberate construction of a ‘self-consciously plural system’ that
would strike a balanced relationship between the United States, Europe,
Russia and China. Yet the establishment of a global Westphalian order,
Calleo’s preferred solution to the challenge of global peace and stability, faces
the significant barrier posed by the unilateralist impulses and unipolar
fantasies of American diplomacy. 
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2Contested national identities
and weak state structures in Eurasia
Douglas Blum
Since their very inception, many of the Soviet successor states have been
beset by ethnic violence, crime, trafficking – in arms, drugs and people –
terrorism, poverty, pollution and migration.1 Most have also faced deeper
problems of legitimacy and ideological drift. To a significant extent these
pathologies can be traced back to the delegitimisation of the entire Soviet
world view, and the lack of any viable replacement. The existence of an insti-
tutional vacuum in the post-Soviet geopolitical space has both contributed
to such problems and impeded their successful resolution. The post-Soviet
states have been forced to rebuild themselves by establishing basic institu-
tions of governance and administration. At the same time the massive legit-
imacy problems they face call for nation building, along either inclusive/
civic or exclusive/ethnic lines. Moreover, the post-Soviet transition is further
complicated by its taking place in the context of globalisation and as such is
marked by heightened economic interdependence, technology development
and diffusion. A critical question, then, is how the state – understood here in
traditional Weberian terms – responds to such challenges, and what the
results are for its ability to achieve developmental and political goals while
consolidating its own sovereignty. 
The literature on globalisation and the state has generally addressed this
question from a functional standpoint, considering the competence of
centralised states to manage their responsibilities alone. Recent works in this
vein have analysed the complex pattern of ‘bargains’, ‘reconfigurations’ and
‘delegations’ of sovereign authority as part of the state’s response to globali-
sation. Less attention has been paid to the role of the state in promoting and
defending the reproduction of a favoured national identity. This analytical
indifference is puzzling, inasmuch as constructions of national identity are
crucial for internal organisation and cohesion as well as for relations with
external actors. Consequently the ongoing reproduction of identity is essen-
tial for maintaining group boundaries, or the ‘self-Other nexus’ in Fredrik
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Barth’s terms.2 It is precisely the validity of these boundaries which is chal-
lenged under globalisation. Central to understanding the role of the state in
post-Soviet Eurasian security is the recognition of its embeddedness in the
overlapping and contradictory processes of cultural flux, state building and
nation building.
This chapter investigates both the state in post-Soviet Eurasia as the
primary site of institutionalisation and the state’s concerted international
action in the sphere of security. This investigation requires a major caveat:
state-centric approaches to security impose analytical costs by obscuring
substate and transnational actors and processes. In particular, state-centric
conceptualisations are inadequate for grasping fully the decentralised
aspects of control and organisation, because they overlook the social and
discursive dimensions of these processes.3 While this approach is limited in
theoretical depth and analytical scope, it is useful for the specific purpose of
highlighting the state in its traditional Weberian form, as a uniquely privi-
leged, central, bureaucratic agent driving regional political dynamics and
(potentially) managing shared security dilemmas.4
It has already become well-accepted to note that nations are, as Benedict
Anderson famously argued, ‘imagined communities’.5 Not only do its
members have to imagine their essential commonality with others, but the
characteristics and boundaries of the group must be discursively created.
Thus while the term ‘nation’ implies the existence of some group as a pre-
existing referent, the group cannot be understood as having a primordial
solidarity based on intrinsic characteristics. Rather, national identity
consists of the ostensibly shared characteristics which are constructed as
being representative of the nation.6 National identity is rather an intersub-
jective fiction, because identity formation is not an objective fact based on
some manifest material foundation. Thus, its ontological standing is
unavoidably flimsy. This in turn makes it essential for national identity to be
socially reproduced by its holders. 
This ‘reproduction’ of national identity takes place through an ongoing
social discourse which centers on two key markers: historical constitution
and normative qualities. The first marker includes claims about who belongs
to the group or on what objective social basis the nation coheres; that is,
particular ethnic versus all-inclusive civic identity as the basis of citizenship
– membership may be defined in terms of specific markers such as language
or religion which are more inclusive than ethnicity. Such criteria are more
restrictive than a civic identity, which would apply to anyone born within
the geographic boundaries of the state. However it is defined, national iden-
tity competes with more parochial criteria for membership, such as region,
clan or tribe. The obverse of membership inclusion is the delineation of differ-
ence and the construction of Others, whether as friends, enemies, or specific
value-neutral outsiders.7
The second, normative marker concerns the fundamental social values of
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the group as a whole. Such categorisations of identity go beyond the ‘who’ of
membership to include the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of political life: honour, role or
purpose, power and so forth. Whether or not such values are actually
achieved is of course less important than the shared sense of meaning they
impart and the social cohesion this fosters. Indeed, broad social internalisa-
tion of officially articulated national identity is crucial for the state’s legiti-
macy, and thus for its exercise of authority and its ability to mobilise willing
compliance.8 It is perhaps most accurate to say that national identity
constrains and at the same time enables government action, thus helping to
shape the ultimate trajectory of state building and international conduct.9
This process of national identity formation and active reproduction is clearly
evident in the post-Soviet Eurasian states.
Nation building in Eurasia: the fusion of civic and ethnic identities
By 1991 the Soviet practice of ethnicising politics (and promoting ethnic
identification along historical-cultural lines) had become deeply entrenched.
Thus despite their largely fictitious origins in Stalin’s nationalities policy of
divide and rule, these constructions provided one important basis for the
separatist unrest that brought down the Soviet Union, an irony which has
not gone unremarked.10 Post-Soviet nation building has also continued the
practice of officially prescribed historiography. Scholars and cultural elites
have dutifully laboured to produce ‘homeland myths’, as well as myths of
ancient origin, glorious descent and intrinsic national character.11 For the
most part ethnic, not religious, identities have been especially salient and
highly politicised, leading some observers to refer to the ‘ethnification of reli-
gion’ in former Soviet Eurasia. Inasmuch as religion provides an important
source of cultural solidarity, its expression has been officially manipulated
and adapted to current social and political needs.12
At the same time a curious dualism is evident in the policies of the post-
Soviet states. Officially, exclusivist ethnic nationalism is rejected by all (with
the partial exception of Armenia); instead tolerance is espoused and the
dangers of ethnic extremism are repeatedly stressed in multinational states
such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia. Yet in practice, in all of the
Eurasian countries except Russia, national identity projects have been
pursued predominantly in ethnic terms.13 For example in Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan, the titular nationality has accrued substantial advantages in
political representation and cultural rights, but is tempered somewhat by the
official self-image of multinationalism. This very ambivalence, as well as the
overriding prominence of ethnic nationalist constructs, comes into play in
the choice of foreign policies and institutional affiliations. While ethnic
attachments are central to ongoing notions of national purpose, and for
designation of Others, civic and even universalist ideas come to the fore as a
product of heightened international interaction. 
Contested national identities
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Eurasian identity narratives
What are the nature and significance of prevailing national identities in
post-Soviet Eurasia? The evolution of national identity has produced three
broad categories of states: those with a well-consolidated national identity;
those where national identity remains contested, but where key cleavages
are not ethnic; and those where there is significant identity fragmentation
along ethnic lines. What follows is a brief overview which delineates the key
similarities and differences among the Eurasian states, particularly with
regard to the relationship between national identity and foreign policy orien-
tation. 
The first group includes Armenia and, at least superficially, Turkmenistan;
that is, states with well-consolidated national identities. Clearly at one end of
the spectrum is Armenia, which has a nearly homogeneous population and a
unified national identity based on common cultural symbols and an image of
historical suffering.14 The war with Azerbaijan has led to a situation in which
ethnic identity far outweighs any meaningful civic alternative. Along with
Armenia, at least judging from surface appearances, it may be possible to
include Turkmenistan in this category. Certainly the official national identity
is pronounced, including an ethnicised self-representation replete with various
Turkic and Islamic cultural symbols and inventions.15 However, the Niyazov
regime is so closed and so highly authoritarian that it is impossible to gauge
accurately whether the apparent consensus over national identity is real, and
anecdotal reports suggest it may not be. 
The second group to be distinguished consists of Russia, Moldova and
Azerbaijan: the national identity discourse in each remains essentially
contested, but the key identity cleavages are not drawn along ethnic lines.
Chechnya, Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh are obviously glaring
exceptions to this rule, but they make up only a small part of each country’s
total geographic space and identity discourse. 
Analysts have stressed the multiplicity of competing narratives within the
Russian polity, ranging from liberal-westerniser to unreconstructed neo-
Soviet.16 Between 1991 and 2000, this welter of opposing voices prevented
consolidation of an ideological basis for mobilisation. However, Vladimir
Putin’s emergence signals an effort to rebuild and strengthen the nation-
state by invigorating a pragmatic statist discourse. While no definitive
answer has emerged in the quest to define a unifying ‘Russian idea’, the
mainstream debate has narrowed significantly as extreme right- and left-
wing views have been marginalised. 
One prominent theme involves the re-emergence of distancing from the
West, along with an exceptionalist self-image as the embodiment of some
transcendent truth or goodness, increasingly linked to Christian
Orthodoxy.17 This is often connected with an image of Russia as essentially
a Eurasian ‘great power’. In contrast, an equally important tendency identi-
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fies Russia as fully European, and as such set apart from America with regard
to culture and security concerns.18 Both narratives, however, share a
predominantly geopolitical orientation to world politics. Another common
feature is an insistence on maintaining preponderant influence in the ‘near
abroad’, which appears to reflect an extension of native geopolitical space in
Russian national consciousness.19
Moldova has experienced a modern history of incorporation into the
Russian empire and later annexation by the Soviet Union (with loss of terri-
tory to Ukraine). During perestroika a recrudescence of national identity
took place, mainly through the rediscovery of Romanian roots. Since
gaining independence, however, there has been a powerful resurgence of
Moldovan identity, initially constructed along ethnic lines as Latin and
historically Roman, including perhaps above all an assertion of non-Russian
cultural particularity. This too changed, however, following the sharp reac-
tions of the sizeable Gagauz and Ukrainian populations, resulting in the
articulation of a civic Moldovan identity which has persisted alongside the
ethnic variant.20 The ultimate willingness of Moldovans to allow Gagauz
autonomy has resulted in a relatively stable domestic order, aside from the
smouldering conflict in Transdniestria.21 Even here, as Stuart Kaufman has
cogently argued, the conflict has been essentially elite-led, in contrast to
Nagorno-Karabakh, where extensive and especially vicious ethnic violence
has resulted in conflict being mass-led and self-perpetuating.22
Finally, Azerbaijan presents a somewhat more ambiguous picture. It
boasts a well-established official national identity associated with claims of a
unique heritage based on an improbable blend of Turkism, Zoroastrianism,
moderate Islam, and its historical function as ‘bridge’ between Asia and
Europe along the Silk Road.23 At the same time there remain strong local
allegiances and ethnic distinctions, including submerged tensions between
Azeris, Russians, and also Lezgins and Talysh (besides Armenians), as well
as stubborn religious cleavages (roughly two thirds of the Islamic population
is Shi’ite, one third Sunni).24 This persistence of parochialism is hardly
surprising inasmuch as there has been little historical basis for national
identity formation among Azeri elites, who were significantly affected by
russification and are still generally lukewarm in their expressions of pan-
Turkism.25 Perhaps the most powerful source of social cohesion and state
legitimacy is the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which has at least generated
some degree of collective identity as victim of Armenian aggression26 –
perhaps a slender reed on which to construct a national identity conducive
to developmental state building in the future. 
The third group of states includes Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, each
of which is characterised by a substantial degree of identity fragmentation
along ethnic lines. The most extreme example is Georgia, which provides
something of a cautionary tale. Here civil war has been the legacy of virulent
strains of ethnic nationalism and a refusal to accommodate difference, a
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pattern which emerged under Gorbachev and continued into the post-Soviet
period. Intense identity fragmentation has resulted among ethnic Georgians,
Abkhaz and Ossetians, each now residing within separate territorial
enclaves.27 This unfortunate outcome has been shaped by conscious strate-
gies pursued by elites as well as by the nature of public institutions created to
meet political demands. 
A similar geographic patchwork quilt of identity formation can be observed
in Ukraine, although with relatively greater mutual tolerance. From an ethnic
perspective Ukraine includes some 21 million Ukrainophone Ukrainians, 17
million Russophone Ukrainians, and 11 million Russians.28 These ethnic and
linguistic categories generally correspond to distinct discourses of ethnic iden-
tity, including Ukrainophile, pan-Slavic and Russophile.29 Here the absence of
ethnic war owes largely to astute leadership and the existence of political insti-
tutions capable of giving voice to opposing demands, thus providing a context
in which working compromises can tentatively be reached.30 Yet the result has
been a continued absence of an overarching national identity, aside from that
which is officially proclaimed. Early efforts to impose a unifying ‘national idea’
from the top down by western Ukrainian decision-making and intellectual
elites had clearly failed by 1994. It proved impossible to generate broad support
for a national self-image as culturally and historically unique, based on an
inclusivist civic conception, while at the same time mollifying pan-Slavic,
Russophile and neo-Soviet identity holders.31
Kazakhstan also offers an essentially comparable picture. While numer-
ous smaller groups are scattered throughout the country, by far the largest
nationalities are Kazakhs and Russians, the latter of which totals nearly 30
per cent of the population and is concentrated in the north. While the
Russian diaspora remains highly problematic, it has not resulted in overt
conflict or led to a stark polarisation of identities between Kazakhs and
Russians in general.32 This outcome can be traced to a prevailing official
discourse that seeks to reconcile parallel identity projects. On the one hand,
Nazarbaev’s regime has worked hard to construct a national identity for the
titular group through the familiar pattern of promoting the indigenous
language and creating or reinventing national histories, cultural narratives
and symbols in order to counter alternative identities of clan, tribe and
region. While the delegation of this process to substate actors and their
subsequent struggle for resources has actually led to some renewal of tribal
identifications, Nazarbaev has succeeded in promoting a self-image of
Kazakhstan as a Eurasian bridge.33 On the other hand, Nazarbaev has been
able to balance ethnic and civic variants of nation building, simultaneously
championing the ideals of cultural traditionalism and republican multina-
tionalism. He also allotted Russian an important role as the language of
‘interethnic communication’. His success in these efforts is attributable in
part to strategy and in part to his own leadership skill.34
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Others in national identity
The construction of Others in Eurasia has taken place through intertwined
processes which Graham Smith has called essentialisation, historicisation,
and ‘totalisation’ or the use of absolute categories.35 Here the use of disposi-
tionally hostile and extreme imagery reproduces a situation of irreconcilable
differences, which have proven extremely resistant to outside mediation.
Essentialisation and totalisation have also tended to occur along ethnic lines.
Such exaggerated and virulent myths of the Other are evident in Armenian
and Azerbaijanian constructions of each other related to Nagorno-
Karabakh36 or in Georgia between ethnic Georgians and South Ossetians.37
Historicisation can be seen, for example, in the tendency of cultural elites
in Russia and western Ukraine to construct myths of national inception and
development which are consistent with their preferred mutual relations. For
western Ukrainians this means asserting the existence of an ‘original’
Ukrainian state as well as the depiction of later Russian domination, while
Russians have tended to stress traditional cultural commonalities between
the two communities.38 Consequently, although western Ukrainian elites
often strategically employ the rhetoric of Slavic brotherhood for Moscow’s
consumption and to include Russophiles in the east, the everyday discourse
in this part of the country delineates Russian imperialists (and alien Asians)
as incompatible Others.39 In Russia, the discourse of national identity repro-
duction overwhelmingly includes the explicit identification of hostile Others
abroad, such as Islamic fundamentalists and organised criminal gangs.40
This increasingly includes anti-Americanism as well, since frustration over
Russia’s inability to achieve claims to geopolitical influence in Eurasia and to
resurgent great power status are connected with an image of America as
arrogant and imperialist.41 Elsewhere, deep historical expressions of enmity
towards Turkey figure prominently in Armenian identity narratives, which
as already mentioned centre on a self-image of suffering and grief inflicted at
the hands of the Turks.42 Without belabouring the point further, such
constructions of the Other are fundamental aspects of the overall identity
formations prevailing in all of the Eurasian states.
Not surprisingly, Russia itself is the most important Other for all the
remaining Eurasian states, with an unenviable image ranging from imperi-
alist aggressor (as core of the Soviet Union) to cunning wielder of influence.
For Armenia, Russia embodies a melange of identity traits including
Christian Orthodox, enemy of Islam, and regional hegemon. Such identifica-
tion provides the basis for military cooperation, especially vis-à-vis Nagorno-
Karabakh. In Kazakhstan, Russia is widely viewed in starkly different terms
among the Russian ethnic and non-Russian ethnic populations, as Slavic
defender and potentially (but not dispositionally) threatening hegemon. The
latter image figures prominently in official discourse and is used to ratio-
nalise a policy of close institutional networking and sensitivity to Russian
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security concerns. The ethnicised variant of nationalist discourse in
Moldova treats Russia in far more nefarious terms as historical antagonist to
Moldovan self-assertion. Whether constructed as benign or hostile,
however, the Russian Other invariably looms over Eurasian elites as a vast
presence, central to the reproduction of national identity.43
An important additional set of Others is transnational Islam and its
regional state representatives, especially Afghanistan and Iran as well as the
breakaway Russian region of Chechnya. For Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, Islam is an important constitutive feature of national identity as
well as an external force. For each also, Islam is constructed primarily in
ethnic and secular terms, and is therefore made compatible with the parallel
civic national discourse. Azerbaijan under Aliev, like Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, has turned to Islam mainly for appropriation as an instrument
of state building.44 Thus, like the remaining Central Asian states, they joined
the Economic Cooperation Organisation and Islamic Confederation
Organisation soon after the fall of the Soviet Union.45 And yet Islam has also
been tempered somewhat variously by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Martha Brill Olcott observes that Turkmenistan has a larger devout popula-
tion and has therefore pursued closer political and economic ties with the
Islamic states of the Middle East than has Kazakhstan, which, given its image
of Russia as potentially hostile, is committed to maintaining balanced rela-
tions with Moscow.46 This has naturally influenced the nature of the
imagery as well as the extent to which Islamic themes are included in
national identity formation. Still, all three states share a deep concern over
the prospect of fundamentalist unrest, which could undermine the dominant
identity discourse and the state’s social foundation. 
In contrast Armenia and Russia, both of which border predominantly
Islamic countries, share an image of an Islamic radicalism. This hostile
Islamic Other has been linked closely to the process of identity formation in
each state, producing constructs of the nation as Christian and ‘Defender of
Europe’. In Armenia one important identity narrative concerns historical
conflicts with Ottoman foes; indeed the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is
frequently depicted as the latest in a long series of historical battles with ‘the
Turks’. A similar observation applies to a lesser extent in Russia as well.
Nevertheless, especially within Russian political discourse, this demonic
imagery is rivalled by competing narratives of Islam. Many Russian
commentaries distinguish between aggressive and peaceful variants of
Islam, reflecting the fact that roughly twenty million citizens profess Islam as
their religion.47
In addition to negatively constructed Others, many Eurasian identity
narratives include an array of potentially benignant Others in international
society. Thus, for example, Turkey has played a key role in influencing
Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet identity formation and in providing more concrete
forms of cooperation as well.48 By far the most salient Other, however, is the
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West and in particular the United States (although there is a salient strain of
ambivalence towards America as well). Elites in all of the states of western
Eurasia have sought to cultivate a ‘European’ identity in a broad cultural
sense. This cultivation of a European identity serves domestic legitimating
goals, in part by helping regimes distance themselves from the Soviet past. It
has also been useful for gaining acceptance as members of the fraternity of
‘advanced’ states.49 For some elites, normative gravitation towards the West
is a way of demonstrating the political affinity needed to obtain military and
economic assistance. This orientation is true in Ukraine, Georgia and
Azerbaijan, where Russian imperial images are rife and where leadership
elites have at times sought American security guarantees and even lobbied
for admission to NATO. Yet identification with the West is more than merely
instrumental. Western economic and political practices are often described
as inherently positive and are typically equated with ‘civilised’ ways. Thus,
across Eurasia national identity formation clearly includes not only nativist
but also cosmopolitan features.
State capacity
In addition to analysing the way in which national identity determines the
direction of foreign policy, it is necessary to consider state strength (or weak-
ness). State capacity directly bears on the viability of state-brokered interna-
tional institutions. It is useful to follow Michael Mann’s conceptualisation of
‘infrastructural power’ as ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil
society, and to implement logistically political decisions’.50 State weakness,
then, in addition to meaning simply the absence of infrastructural power,
involves a condition in which non-state elites retain their own cross-cutting
segments of social control and may even operate through nominal state
institutions.51 The term also implies an absence of coordinated monitoring
and policing mechanisms for managing diffuse security threats.52 While
institutional coherence and control over resources are thus important
determinants of state capacity, so too is the existence of a prevailing and
well-institutionalised national identity. The state’s ability to promote – and
link itself with – a consolidated national identity is vital to its exercise of
authority. 
The clear outlier with respect to state capacity in Eurasia is Turk-
menistan, with its highly authoritarian and frequently coercive regime.
While similar charges are sometimes levelled against the Aliev and
Nazarbaev regimes in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, respectively, the latter do
allow considerable room for dissenting opinion and independent civil society
organisation. Indeed, on this score even Belarus appears relatively liberal in
comparison with Turkmenistan. In any case the exercise of coercion and
manipulation of fear in Turkmenistan makes it difficult to evaluate apparent
state strength in some areas, such as the depth of consensus on core political
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matters. Yet the Niyazov regime does not seem to have a great deal of overall
infrastructural strength regarding implementation or the ability to realise
stated goals, owing largely to the fact that it remains so woefully poor that its
physical and institutional capacity is limited.
The other states provide easier objects for interpretation. In Armenia the
corollary of a unified national identity is indeed a strong state, one able to
achieve popular mobilisation and implementation of central directives. This
outcome is especially striking given the fact that state-building elites in
Armenia faced the same problems of internal fragmentation that elites in
Georgia and Azerbaijan did. While the resulting embattled identity has
impeded development, most dramatically in blocking consideration of a
‘peace pipeline’ carrying Caspian oil from Azerbaijan, the state has
succeeded in stabilising itself through close association with ethnic national-
ist goals in Nagorno-Karabakh.53
Elsewhere, states experiencing at least substantial identity contestation
do appear to have compromised state strength as a result. In Russia, for
example, Putin’s preferred means of accomplishing his state-building goals
involves the introduction of fairly authoritarian practices, including central-
isation of political authority, establishing direct ties with the regions, and
putting pressure on the independent press.54 These measures are intended to
repair a condition of marked state weakness which has existed since 1991,
in which central institutions have been repeatedly challenged by local
organs and ‘oligarchs’, and have generally lacked extractive and enforce-
ment capacity.55 This picture appears to be changing, however, as Putin’s
emergence signals an effort to rebuild and strengthen the nation-state by
invigorating a pragmatic statist discourse. Yet state weakness clearly
remains a problem in autonomous ethnic republics, particularly in the
Caucasus, where a jumbled assortment of unstable regions is either in the
midst or on the verge of civil war.56
Similarly in Azerbaijan the state, highly personalised in the figure of
Heydar Aliev, is extensively associated with official representations of
national identity, such as showy parades and folk festivals. This strategy is
part of an evident bid to enhance state legitimacy and authority.
Nevertheless, the centre remains limited in its ability to coordinate and
respond quickly to developments in the periphery.57 Much the same might
be said of Kazakhstan, where Nazarbaev has gone to great lengths to present
the state as the very embodiment of national identity. Yet here too, in
Almaty and especially in the Russian ethnic regions of the north, the centre
struggles to achieve its developmental and organisational goals. 
Georgia, finally, appears to be fast approaching the extreme of failed state-
hood. At the time of writing, the Shevardnadze regime had lost control over
Abkhazia, Ajaria and much of South Ossetia, faced potentially major opposi-
tion in Javakhetia and Mingrelia, and was under siege in Tbilisi itself.
Moreover, a massive Russian troop presence along the Abkhazian frontier
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and in several military bases underlined the ineffectual nature of the
regime’s domestic and foreign policies. In this context even to speak of a
prevailing ‘Georgian’ identity is something of a misnomer. Instead, such
references pertain to ideas held by those within the central heartlands
around the capital. Certainly, the holders of such an identity are limited in
their ability to contribute to any hypothetical Eurasian security institutions.
Conclusion: implications for institution building in Eurasia
Of course, the process of nation building is relevant not only for state build-
ing but also for establishing international institutions. The viability of such
institutions is determined not only by their design or abstract functional
capacity, but also by the degree to which the purposes they serve conform to
the identities of their members.58
For example, exploring identity formation helps explain the operational
tendency in Russia to conceptualise the ‘near abroad’ as its exclusive sphere
of influence. The prevailing tendencies in discourse have expressed the self-
image of an embattled great power surrounded by hostile or opportunistic
Others. Accordingly, Russian approaches to the CIS generally incorporated
assumptions of Russocentric control as well as a blurring of economic and
security spheres. 
In return, shared images of the Russian imperialist Other were instru-
mental in leading most states to reject this Russian approach and to resist
joining, or fully participating in, the CIS structure.59 Instead, informed by
their Eurasian or European self-understandings and Other-images, they
moved to join the EU-backed Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
(TRACECA) plan for energy integration in order to by-pass Russia, despite
the fact that on strictly pragmatic grounds such a notion was largely illu-
sory.60 Similarly, the combination of imperial understandings of Russia and
self-understandings as European countries on the part of Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldova facilitated the creation of GUAM, an economic and
political association which has made overtures to the West. Even prior to
GUAM, the reproduction of a European identity has played an important role
in Ukraine’s dealings with the West.61 In the security sphere, this has
included early entry into NATO’s PfP Programme and obtaining western
guarantees in return for joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty and eliminat-
ing its nuclear weapons; in the economic sphere, it has meant a Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement with the EU as well as the provision of
American development aid.62 At the other extreme is Turkmenistan, which
has steadfastly refused to join post-Soviet institutions, citing principled
neutrality.
An exception is Kazakhstan, which under Nazarbaev has pursued an
institutional membership policy that mirrors its complex identity discourse.
As discussed above, Nazarbaev has pursued a skilful balancing act of
Contested national identities
39
2504Chap2  7/4/03  12:38 pm  Page 39
promoting national identity on Kazakh ethnic lines while also embracing
civic identity themes designed to assuage the fears of Russian ethnics and
their protectors in Moscow. This wish to propitiate Russia and China, while
still cultivating western investment, has resulted in an extremely flexible, if
not protean, foreign policy. As one element of this overall balancing strat-
egy, Nazarbaev has consistently pushed for a formal institutionalisation of
Kazakhstan’s interdependence with Russia. Not only did he support Mikhail
Gorbachev’s All Union Treaty concept, but after the fall of the Soviet Union
he championed the formation of a ‘Eurasian Union’, which would resurrect
some degree of trade integration and which prefigured the formation in
2000 of a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (along with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan).63 This notion of Eurasianism, however, has always had
broader implications as well, including bringing together East and West
through traditional trade routes and perhaps offering a vehicle for bridging
and even reconciling their different sociopolitical systems.64
How much analytical purchase do we get, ultimately, through such an
understanding of national identity formation? One valid response would be
that it provides a partial corrective to approaches that would attribute the
foreign policy conduct of Eurasian states to organisational and/or material
conditions alone. Assuming that current constructs are not displaced by
globalisation, a crucial factor will be national identity. Thus, the prevailing
discourse in (heartland) Georgia under Shevardnadze has revealed a
markedly European identity, consistent with its foreign policy orientation. In
contrast, Kazakhstan – with an essentially similar geopolitical position – has
been characterised by a Eurasianist discourse, and has taken a far more
balanced approach than Georgia, including a willingness to commit to
regional economic and security institutions. 
It bears repeating that the above observations are not equivalent to an
assertion that identity formation caused such policy outcomes. Making such
a case formally would require ruling out liberal structural explanations at
the domestic level as well as demonstrating causal directionality (identity
shapes policy rather than the reverse) through careful content analysis
and process tracing. Nevertheless, the consolidation of national identities,
and their institutionalisation as part of state building, is consequential for
understanding the current and prospective dynamic of interstate relations in
post-Soviet space. 
Where does this leave us with regard to the outlook for security institu-
tions? Of course, the obvious first answer is that it depends on the type of
institutional arrangement envisioned. After all, the range of multilateral
institutions extends from issue-specific and pragmatic regimes all the way to
general and highly principled security communities. At the low end of the
gradient, relatively limited forms of functional cooperation do not require
the existence of common or collective identities (except perhaps at the most
basic level, such as the shared identity of sovereign statehood).65 At the
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other end of the cooperative spectrum, however, shared identities are indis-
pensable, especially in the security sphere. Even short of full-blown commu-
nity formation, a significant degree of trust or perceived commonality would
seem to be essential in order for shared security arrangements to emerge.66
The foregoing analysis of the Eurasian identity terrain suggests that there
is currently no common, overarching identity among the post-Soviet succes-
sor states in Eurasia that might provide a sound basis for stable collective
security institutionalisation. On the contrary, a general absence of shared
identities bodes poorly for third-party-induced organisation, except perhaps
among smaller groups of states which hold imperial or enemy images of
Russia. Even in this case, however, a common identity foundation for coop-
eration may not suffice in the absence of state capacity. In Georgia and
Moldova, for example, problems of state weakness have not only contributed
to ethnic conflict but also impaired international peacekeeping efforts.67
The outlook for stable economic cooperation is probably not much
brighter. An exception is the states of the EEU, which are either partly co-
identified with Russia (Belarus) or dependent economically and militarily
(Armenia and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan). Yet even here the disjunction
between identity formation and institutional purpose suggests that the
degree and duration of cooperative organisation may not be great. For that
matter, the prospects for Eurasian involvement in international trade and
investment flows remains poor, and few are strong candidates for future
WTO membership besides Russia and Kazakhstan. Conditions for liberal
development and interdependence are generally absent, while mercantilism
is made more likely by prevailing threat perceptions and security anxieties.68
Judging from prevailing identity narratives, then, the most likely prospect is
for a continuation of weakly institutionalised economic and security space
throughout post-Soviet Eurasia, at least for the foreseeable future.
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3Ethnic conflict
and Eurasian security
Stuart Kaufman
What role does ethnic conflict play in Eurasian security affairs? Just breaking
this question down into its component parts uncovers a vast array of appar-
ent influences. Ethnic conflict is, first of all, clearly a cause of internal conflict
and insecurity, as demonstrated by the problems in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Cyprus, Georgia, Chechnya and Mountainous Karabagh.
Furthermore, it is a key cause of international security problems, as the
above list of ethnic civil wars illustrates: most of these conflicts have
attracted involvement by neighbouring countries, and some have all along
been as much interstate as intra-state disputes. But ethnic conflicts do not
only cause international insecurity; they may also be in part a result of secu-
rity competition. Bosnia’s conflict, for example, was driven in large part by
rivalry between Serbia and Croatia; Macedonia’s violence is largely a
spillover from the Kosovo conflict; and separatist conflicts continue in
Azerbaijan and Georgia due in large part to Russian support for the sepa-
ratists.
All of these dynamics combine with other sorts of security competition in
the region to create significant security dilemma problems. Russian states-
men feel, for example, that a more or less exclusive Russian sphere of influ-
ence in the Caspian region, and especially in the Caucasus, is essential for
Russian security. Indeed, they blame their Chechnya problems in large part
on the absence of such predominance. Obviously, however, these hegemonic
ambitions clash with the basic goals of security, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the states in the region, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan. The
existence of those clashes, in turn, threatens the American and Turkish
security interests of stabilising the Caucasus so they can obtain access to the
energy resources of the region.
The key to sorting out these complex influences lies in rethinking the
source and nature of the security dilemma both internally and internation-
ally. In international relations theory, the debate has been primarily
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between neo-realists, who argue that international anarchy ipso facto causes
security dilemmas, and neo-liberal institutionalists, who argue that institu-
tions can help head off security dilemmas. Both sides have also tried to apply
their ideas to internal ethnic conflicts. Self-identified constructivists cover
this whole range of possible arguments, and much more territory besides.
Many of these arguments can be reconciled using a particular construc-
tivist approach. As Randall Schweller has argued, the existence of an inter-
national security dilemma requires the existence of revisionist states –
requires, that is, that states construct their security interests to require
expansion.1 When states construct their security needs in mutually accom-
modating ways, as within the western security community, there is no secu-
rity dilemma.2 The same insight applies to ethnic conflict: the critical cause
of ethnic conflict is the construction of ethnic groups’ vital interests in
conflicting ways, typically in terms of mutually exclusive claims to the same
territory. Where states or groups construct their interests in ways that are
mutually reconcilable, neo-liberal institutionalist prescriptions for conflict
management and conflict resolution can work. Where security interests are
constructed in mutually exclusive ways, neo-realist objections to neo-liberal
arguments apply.
In the hot spots of Eurasia, security dilemmas continue to exist within and
between states because states and groups define their security in mutually
exclusive ways. In ethnic conflicts such as those in the Balkans, institutional
arrangements to manage conflict will remain fragile as long as and to the
degree that ethnic attitudes and goals remain mutually hostile. Furthermore,
even the fragile effectiveness of existing institutions will continue only as long
as the distribution of power discourages the dissatisfied from trying again –
which means, in large measure, only as long as the US remains engaged. In the
Caucasus, the parties have constructed their interests to rule out compromise:
those elites who might be inclined to seek a compromise settlement are prohib-
ited by public opinion from reaching any agreements. There, renewed war is
prevented only by the continuing military superiority of the victors of the last
rounds of fighting. Effective institutional arrangements for conflict manage-
ment do not exist and cannot be built in current circumstances. In both places,
‘peace-building’ efforts aimed at shifting public attitudes are necessary, and are
the only available policy tools that can contribute to stability in the long run.
However, peace-building efforts would face tough sledding in any case, and the
Bush administration’s ‘realist’ foreign policy has not contributed to the mitiga-
tion of the regional security dilemmas, especially in the Caucasus and the
Balkan states. 
Understanding Eurasia’s ethnic wars 
Scholars, practitioners and journalists have developed a number of different
ideas about how to explain the ethnic violence in Eurasia. The most
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prominent of these include the ‘ancient hatreds’ argument most popular
among journalists,3 the ‘elite manipulation’ story favoured by most rational
choice theorists,4 the security dilemma argument focused on internal insta-
bility,5 and arguments focused on foreign influences – ‘bad neighbours’ and
‘bad neighbourhoods’.6 These diagnoses can lead to starkly different policy
prescriptions. Misha Glenny, whose work tilts toward the ancient hatreds
school, argues that the violence can stop only if outside powers intervene by
force,7 while Robert Kaplan, who represents the same school of thought,
argues that such intervention can stop the violence only temporarily.
Rational choice theorists focused on elite behavior and institutional struc-
ture tend to argue that the solutions are found in appropriate institutional
arrangements supplemented by international action as guarantors.8
Security dilemma theorists argue that power-sharing institutions are hope-
lessly ineffective, so only partition can resolve or at least reduce violent
conflicts.9 And those who study international factors focus on the impor-
tance of deterring ‘bad neighbours’ from destructive interventions.10
All of these arguments, however, miss the central source of the problem:
where do ethnic hatreds – which are not, in fact, ‘ancient’ – come from? Why
do mass publics follow manipulative elites into war? Why do intermingled
ethnic groups sometimes fight with each other when government is weak,
but more typically avoid such fighting?11
The answers are found, in large part, in ethnic or nationalist mythologies
and the manipulation of emotional symbols identified in those myths.12
Ethnic groups are, as Benedict Anderson has said of nations, ‘imagined
communities’; they exist only because of a body of ethnic myths that define
them. These myths, as Anthony Smith argues, typically identify who is in the
group, how members are distinguished from non-members, a common set of
cultural beliefs, a common name and history, what it means to be a group
member, and, often, who the group’s enemies are.13 These divisions and
identifications are always to some extent arbitrary. Serbs and Croats, for
example, share a language but count each other as enemies on religious and
historical grounds. Abkhazians, in contrast, though divided religiously,
make common cause against the linguistically different Georgians, and ally
with Russia to do so even though Russia was the perpetrator of Abkhazia’s
great historical tragedy, an ethnic cleansing campaign in the late nineteenth
century.
What matters is the degree to which ethnic or nationalist myths justify
hostility against other groups. Nationalist Serbs, for example, identify Croats
with the World War II-era Ustashe fascists, and they identify Muslim
Bosnians and Albanians with the hated Ottoman Turks – so they fought
these groups in Bosnia and Kosovo. On the other hand, Serbs and
Macedonians, though not particularly friendly towards each other, have
tried to cooperate against the Muslim Albanians, who are seen by both
groups as the national enemy.
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These myths, and the hostility or hatred they generate, are not, however,
ancient; they are modern. While Serbian mythology dates Serbs’ hostility to
Muslims to the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Field, for example, there was little
popular ethnic tension before the myths of Kosovo were resurrected in the
nineteenth century by Serbian propagandists, many working for the newly
independent Serbian state.14 And Serbs’ hostility to Croats is based primarily
on the symbolism of Croats as Ustashe fascists, which dates only to World
War II and to postwar mythologising. Similarly, while Armenian mythology
traces the roots of the nation to ancient times, and singles out Turks as
historical enemies, Armenian national consciousness – and their national
conflict with the Turks – dates only to the 1890–1915 period, when the
Armenian national ‘awakening’ led to several rounds of ethnic violence
between Armenians and Turks (including Azerbaijani Turks), culminating
in the 1915 genocide.15
Such hostile myths are, however, more common than ethnic violence. If
severe violence is to occur, hostile ethnic myths must be activated by some
threat that leads members of at least one group to fear ethnic extinction.
Thus the problem that set Yugoslavia ablaze was that Milosevic’s grab for
Serb domination provoked a countervailing Croatian nationalism, which in
turn led the Serbs of Croatia to fear ethnic cleansing or genocide by a neo-
fascist Croatian regime. The Armenians of Mountainous Karabagh in
Azerbaijan, similarly, feared a creeping ethnic cleansing or ‘white genocide’
as a result of continuing, long-term Azerbaijani discrimination, while their
response – a secessionist movement – threatened the dismemberment of
Azerbaijan.
It is only in the context of such myths and fears that ethnic elites can
mobilise popular opinion behind ethnic extremism, once they have the
opportunity to do so. In some cases, most famously Milosevic’s, incumbent
leaders can manipulate myths like the Battle of Kosovo and symbols like
Prince Lazar, doomed hero of that battle, by using their control over the
media to dominate public debate and thereby promote an extreme national-
ist program. The extremist program is key: ethnic war occurs only if the sides
define their groups’ security in mutually exclusive ways. Croats, for
example, felt unsafe in a Yugoslavia dominated by Milosevic, so they decided
to secede, while the Serbs of Croatia felt unsafe under an independent
nationalist Croatian government, so they tried to split from Croatia. These
conflicting security demands impelled both sides to fight.
Ethnic mobilisation does not, however, have to come as the result of elite
manipulation. In some cases, popular myths and fears are strong enough for
a street-corner agitator who harps on nationalist themes to become a
nationalist hero, at least briefly. In Georgia, for example, the Communist
Party leadership under First Secretary Jumber Patiashvili tried hard to
suppress rising nationalist sentiment in the late 1980s, but was unable to
arrest the rise of dissident journalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia to power, or to
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prevent the eruption of ethnic violence between Georgians and the minority
South Ossetians. Georgian mythology painted the South Ossetians as
‘recent’ (seventeenth-century) migrants to Georgia with no right to their
autonomous region; the South Ossetians, feeling threatened, counter-
mobilised and the result, eventually, was war.16
Finally, foreign actors may play a critical role in turning ethnic conflict
into war regardless of whether mobilisation is mass-led or elite-led. In the
absence of external help, rebels or secessionists typically have little hope
against the armed might of the state. With it, however, they are more likely
to try to fight and more likely to win. Victims of ‘bad neighbours’ include
Moldova and Georgia, whose secessionist groups would have lacked the
ability to fight without Russian help, and Mountainous Karabagh, where the
Armenians’ victory over Azerbaijan was equally the result of Russian assis-
tance. And the fights in Croatia and Bosnia occurred mostly because of the
influence of Belgrade on their Serbian minorities. Macedonia’s current trou-
bles are more a case of a ‘bad neighbourhood’: no government in the region
is trying to destabilise Macedonia, but the conflict there is none the less the
result of spillover from Kosovo next door.
In sum, all four of the rival theories of ethnic violence offer insights, but
none of them accounts for the whole picture. Journalists are right that
violent ethnic conflicts are driven by popular hostility and hatred, but those
attitudes are modern, not ‘ancient’. Rational choice theorists are right that
mass publics are often manipulated by ethnic elites, but they overlook the
degree to which pre-existing myths and attitudes are needed to make such
manipulation possible, and they ignore the importance of emotional symbol-
ism in enabling leaders to manipulate their followers. Security dilemma
theorists are right that ethnic violence escalates because of a security
dilemma, but most underestimate the degree to which the insecurity is
driven by simple hostile intent – the predatory goal of domination over the
other group – rather than uncertainty.17 Finally, international relations
theorists are right that bad neighbours and bad neighbourhoods can have a
critical influence, but they do not claim that such influences matter in the
absence of the right (or wrong) internal conditions.
Furthermore, in evaluating the effects of foreign intervention in ethnic
conflicts, it is important to take into account the various and powerful
motives outsiders may have for such action. Ethnic chauvinism was
Milosevic’s ruling strategy, so he would have been pushed to intervene in
Croatia and Bosnia even if he had not wanted to do so. The intervention of
Russia’s Fourteenth Army in Moldova’s ethnic conflict in 1991–92, in
contrast, was driven not so much by Moscow as by its officers who wanted to
protect their own families resident in the region.18 Russia continues to
support the Abkhazian separatists against Georgia largely because they
consider increased influence in Georgia essential for Russian security –
including in Russia’s fight against Chechnya, which borders on Georgia. The
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NATO interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 expressed the
Euro-American security policy of rebuilding NATO as the premier security
organisation in Europe. Continued Russian intervention in the Caucasus
can, in this light, be understood as a Russian effort, driven by the security
dilemma, to prevent such NATO hegemony on its southern border.
Encouraging constructive international intervention and heading off the
destructive kind is, in this light, harder than it looks.
The dilemmas of policy intervention
Because all of these theorists are in part right, their prescriptions for conflict
resolution all have merit. Rational choice theorists are right that designing
workable institutions is critical if ethnically divided states are to be rebuilt,
and that external intervention can play a critical role in setting up those
institutions. But ancient hatreds theorists, and security dilemma theorists
such as Chaim Kaufmann, are also right that neither intervention nor new
institutions can change ethnic hatreds, especially after they have been
renewed and entrenched by a recent round of violence. Furthermore, there
are many different sorts of foreign intervention: helping one side win the
fight, for example, may lead to a quick ceasefire but also cause a long-lasting
political stalemate. Sometimes military intervention seems necessary to
establish a secure environment; in other cases, mediation and other peaceful
interventions suffice. In some cases, the key is to deter destructive external
intervention. What mix of approaches is right, and how can the sides get
past the hurdle of lasting hostility?
Thinking about ethnic conflicts in terms of a symbolic politics trap helps
to fill in one of the key missing pieces. Interethnic stalemates stay in place
not only because of the dynamics between the two groups, but because of the
dynamics within them. Once extremist leaders have used extremist ethnic
symbols to gain and hold power, they often become captive to those symbols.
Thus even if leaders recognise that continued ethnic confrontation may no
longer be in their group’s interest, they may be unable to agree to a peace
settlement because of the danger of being outflanked by even more extreme
opposition figures who can use those same symbols against them.
Escape from the symbolic politics trap requires yet another set of tools for
outside intervention. If the problem is hostile attitudes and social dynamics
that make it hard to change them, the solution has to be policies aimed at
changing those attitudes and social dynamics. This is the realm of ‘peace-
building’ and ‘conflict transformation’ – efforts at encouraging non-hostile
interethnic attitudes and cooperative relationships across communal
lines.19 Most typically, peace building programmes focus on dialogue
between members of different ethnic groups aimed at undercutting their
‘enemy image’ of each other, helping participants find enough mutual
empathy so that they find compromise not only thinkable but preferable to
continued conflict. While such efforts work at the individual level, however,
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their effects are usually limited owing to the re-entry problem: when partici-
pants return home, they find their friends and associates unsympathetic to
their new moderation, so they feel obliged to keep their views quiet.20 This
points towards the need for more ambitious targets – changes in government
rhetoric, media coverage and school curricula aimed at creating an atmos-
phere that encourages moderate attitudes, plus well-crafted efforts at
promoting economic reintegration to create tangible incentives for a
compromise peace.
Eurasia’s ethnic conflicts
To consider further all of these problems, I turn now to several of the more
prominent ethnic conflicts in Eurasia. I start with the internal dynamics of
the conflicts themselves, exploring the ethnic myths and symbols at the root
of the groups’ conflicting identities. I then show how in each case the partic-
ipants are caught in a symbolic politics trap, and are therefore locked into
intractable security dilemmas resulting from the sides’ – or at least their
leaders’ – irreconcilable, indeed predatory, goals. I then discuss the interna-
tional dimensions of each conflict – the spurs and reins on international
intervention, and the resulting dynamics of those interventions. 
Bosnia
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the largest and most destructive of
Europe’s ethnic wars in the 1990s, leaving over two hundred thousand dead
and over two million refugees and displaced persons after a four-year war of
a viciousness unseen in Europe since World War II. Since the outbreak of the
conflict is typically blamed on Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic and his
allies in Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, it is important to point
out that in Bosnia, too, hostile ethnic myths and emotive symbols provided
the tinder which the sparks of Milosevic’s propaganda set alight. Milosevic,
Karadzic and company are indeed the main reasons for the war, but their
efforts could not have succeeded in the absence of a climate receptive to their
appeals.
Among the Serbs, the critical myths stemmed from the traditions about
the Kosovo battle against the Turks, and from the experience (and myths) of
World War II. Kosovo is the founding myth of the Serbian nation, the lost
1389 battle against the Turks that led to five centuries of Ottoman Turkish
domination but, in the mythology, led also to a religious sanctification of the
Serbian nation as Christian heroes of Europe and martyrs to the terrible
Turk.21 The Serbian habit of referring to all Muslims as ‘Turks’ allows Serbs
to feel about the Bosnian Muslims as they do about real Turks, in spite of the
fact that Serbs and Bosnian Muslims had far more in common with each
other than either did with Turks. At the same time, the mythologised
memory of the horrendous fight against the Nazis and the Croatian Ustashe
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fascists inclined Bosnian Serbs to see Bosnian Croats (not entirely inaccu-
rately) as the direct inheritors of the Ustashe.22 Serbian propaganda added to
this noxious mix an additional element, labelling the Bosnian Muslims as
‘Islamic fundamentalists’, raising fears for the survival of the Serbian
community in Bosnia. 
Croatian mythology paints the Croats as a single tribe, distinguished by
their Catholicism and location as the ‘outer wall’ of Christian Europe’s
defence against the early modern Ottomans. It also emphasises over a
millennium of Croatian ‘statehood’, and as a result is ambivalent about the
Ustashe interlude: as Franjo Tudjman put it, the Ustashe regime was simul-
taneously ‘a Fascist crime’ and an authentic expression of Croatian nation-
alist aspirations.23 The Croats of western Herzegovina, long associated with
Croat extremism, were among the most avid followers of Tudjman’s efforts to
revive Croatian nationalism in the early 1990s and strong supporters of the
dream of extending the revived Croatian statehood to their territory
(dismembering Bosnia in the process).
The identity of Bosnian Muslims is more problematic. While there was, in
fact, a medieval Bosnian kingdom – Bosnian King Tvrtko was a key ally of
Prince Lazar and the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo Field – no specifically
Bosnian identity emerged from medieval times. Only in Tito’s time did the
Muslims of Bosnia make clear that they wanted recognition of their distinct
identity. Since Serbs and Croats objected to construction of a ‘Bosnian’ iden-
tity that would include Bosnian Serbs and Croats, the ‘Muslim’ category was
created in the Yugoslav census, and thence in Yugoslav political life. To the
extent that the Bosnian Muslim identity had a political meaning, it was the
vision of Alija Izetbegovic, the first president of independent Bosnia, who
argued for a peaceful melding of secular western civilisation with Islamic
spiritual values.24 Mostly, however, the Muslim identity was a refuge for
those trapped between the unacceptable Serb and Croat visions for the
republic’s future.
The main cause of Bosnia’s war was less these identities, however, than
the policy of the Serbian leadership. Slobodan Milosevic, the president of
Serbia, created the apparatus of Bosnia’s Serbian Democratic Party (SDS),
led by Radovan Karadzic, and the Bosnian Serb army, led by Ratko Mladic.
Using the Serbian myths and manufactured fears as justification, these
leaders, with assistance from Serbia, formulated a policy of remaking most of
Bosnia into an ethnically ‘clean’ Serbian state, leaving over a small Croat-
Muslim rump. To implement this policy, the Bosnian Serbs launched their
campaign of mass murder and ethnic cleansing, highlighted by the concen-
tration camps at Omarska and elsewhere and the brutal siege of Sarajevo.
Hardline Croats in Franjo Tudjman’s HDZ simultaneously tried to carve out
an ethnically Croat entity in western Herzegovina. The fighting continued
until the Croatian counter-offensive of 1995, in alliance with the Bosnian
Muslims and backed by NATO air strikes, presented the Serbs with the threat
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of military defeat, leading Milosevic to coerce his erstwhile Serbian allies into
signing the Dayton peace accords that ended the fighting.
Those agreements established a rickety network of institutions that tried
simultaneously to establish an effective central government for Bosnia and
disperse virtually all effective power to two, and in practice three, ethnically
based units: the Republika Srpska, the Muslim-Croat Federation, and the de
facto Croat entity within the federation. On the one hand, the plan for peace
centred on establishing a de facto partition: creating the ethnic entities,
allowing the continued existence of separate armies and ethnically domi-
nated local police forces, and establishing an arms-control regime. These
provisions were all concessions to the predatory goals of the Serbs and
Croats. On the other hand, the plan for reintegration aimed at undermining
that partition in the long run: establishing a central Bosnian govern-
ment, allowing for repatriation of refugees, and empowering NATO’s
Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce the agreement and arrest the war
criminals who were continuing to block reconciliation efforts.25 These
requirements were, of course, at the demand of the Bosnian government  –
whose goals the Serbs and Croats see as predatory.
In practice, the Dayton provisions that promote disintegration have
proved stronger than those that promote reintegration, primarily because of
the disinclination of IFOR (and its successor, NATO’s Stabilisation Force
(SFOR)) to coerce the Bosnian Serbs and Croats  –  whose leaders were still
intent on carving up Bosnia  –  into implementing the provisions for reinte-
gration. Thus IFOR refused to arrest war criminals, leaving Radovan
Karadzic in power until 1996, and then accepting as his successor the
initially equally hardline Biljana Plavsic. These criminal leaders, in turn,
fought every effort at reintegrating Bosnia, repeatedly blocking efforts to
repatriate Muslim refugees to Republika Srpska, and refusing even to accept
a common licence- plate design for cars. The high representative established
under the Dayton accords finally imposed the licence-plate design, but war
criminals remain in control of local police and governments in Republika
Srpska, have blocked most refugee repatriation, have prevented the estab-
lishment of a single Bosnian economic space, and have undermined
economic reconstruction by maintaining a corrupt system of payoffs linked
to organised crime networks.26 The Bosnian state remains a polite fiction, in
spite of the fall of its most important external enemy, President Slobodan
Milosevic of Yugoslavia.
Bosnia remains so in part because of hostile nationalist myths and atti-
tudes, which were magnified by the horrors of the war. Serbs, Croats and
Muslims all tend to deny or downplay the atrocities and murders committed
by their own side, while exaggerating those committed by the others. But
these attitudes are reinforced by incumbent local and entity leaders (and the
media they control), all too often war leaders and war criminals with every
incentive to obscure their own culpability. The November 2000 elections
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placed moderates in power in the central Bosnian government, but put the
hardline SDS back in power in Republika Srpska. Not only was the SDS domi-
nated by indicted or indictable war criminals – from wartime leader Radovan
Karadzic behind the scenes to a legion of thugs in positions of local power27
–  but it also ran a thoroughly corrupt economic system in which bribery,
smuggling and other sorts of organised crime flourished while reconstruc-
tion and other normal economic activity was choked off. These hardliners
returned to power by exploiting the symbolic politics trap, blaming other
ethnic groups and the international community for the economic misery
their gangsterism causes. In this context, peace-building cannot by itself
promote reconciliation: while some peace building efforts have made
progress in neighbouring Croatia and even in Bosnia itself,28 the general
assessment of most foreign organisations in Bosnia is that the Serbs are
simply not prepared to cooperate, due to hostile attitudes reinforced by hard-
line government officials. The symbolic politics trap in Bosnia thus remains
elite-led.
Macedonia
Macedonia has, so far, managed to avoid the outbreak of all-out war
between the Slavic Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority, which
comprises at least a quarter of the population. The flare-up of fighting in the
spring and summer of 2001 did, however, threaten to escalate into such a
war, and full implementation of the fragile peace deal reached between the
conflicting factions at Lake Ohrid in August of that year remains uncertain.
Speaking mutually unintelligible languages, adhering to different religious
faiths, and leading radically different styles of life (at least in rural areas),
Macedonians and Albanians are distinctly hostile to each other, so their
ability to head off full-scale war is all the more notable.
Macedonian nationalism is a new phenomenon. In the early twentieth
century, there was no separate Slavic Macedonian identity; Macedonian
villagers defined their identity as either ‘Bulgarian’, ‘Serbian’ or even ‘Greek’
depending on the affiliation of the village priest.29 The separate Macedonian
nationalist mythology and national identity are essentially a post-World
War II phenomenon, a product of Tito’s postwar nationality policy.
According to the Macedonian mythology, modern Macedonians are the
descendants of the subjects of Alexander the Great. Macedonian cultural
identity stems from the ninth-century Saints Cyril and Methodius, who
converted the Slavs to Christianity and invented the first alphabet for a
Slavic language. Macedonians trace the roots of their nationalist move-
ment to the turn-of-the-century Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organisation (IMRO) – actually a pro-Bulgarian group – and celebrate the
anniversary of the Ilinden uprising against the Ottoman Turks in 1903 as a
national holiday. Unlike the Serbs, however, the Macedonians do not typi-
cally associate Albanians with the Ottoman Turks of history. There are
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Macedonian fears of group extinction, but these fears have focused histori-
cally on the irredentist threat from Macedonia’s neighbours – the ‘four
wolves’ of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania – as much as on the internal
threat from Macedonia’s Albanians.30
Albanians, for their part, claim (with more plausibility than the
Macedonians) descent from another ancient group in the region, the
Illyrians, and on this basis claim western Macedonia as historically theirs.
According to their mythology, they have never accepted foreign rule: their
national hero, Skanderbeg, led the Albanians’ fight against the Ottomans in
the fifteenth century; their nineteenth-century national ‘awakening’ was
directed as much against the Turks as against their Slavic neighbours. These
ideas incline them to reject Macedonian authority as well. Furthermore, the
savagery of the Balkan Wars beginning in 1912 occurred largely in
Macedonia, so a twentieth-century precedent of extreme mutual violence is
also present.
When Macedonia achieved independence in 1991, therefore, hostile
myths, group fears and political opportunity were all present, and expres-
sions of mass hostility were common. How, then, did it avoid large-scale
violence for a decade; and how did it manage to reach a compromise agree-
ment on its ethnic conflict when fighting did break out in 2001? First,
Macedonians’ fear of group extinction was assuaged because they had
predominant political power, while Albanian fears focused on prosaic
mistreatment rather than existential concerns. Second, and most impor-
tantly, politicians on both sides – presumably deterred by the example of
their northern neighbours – wanted to avoid violence, and were willing to
make efforts to prevent it. Macedonian leaders always included Albanian
ministers in their governments, and Albanian politicians refrained from
pushing their brinkmanship tactics to the point of violence. Given this
modicum of goodwill, the two sides managed to crawl slowly towards reso-
lution of substantive issues, such as Macedonian government tolerance of
the Albanian-language university in Tetovo. The United Nations provided a
small peacekeeping force that helped reassure both sides of international
concern.
When violence did finally erupt in 2001, it was the result of spillover from
Kosovo, an uprising created by a few Albanian Macedonian extremists who
had experience fighting in Kosovo. These cadres created their ‘National
Liberation Army’ (NLA) based on the infrastructure and resources of the
Kosovo Liberation Army, and with some uncertain degree of connection to
the entrenched smuggling rings operating across borders in the region. The
Macedonian government’s reaction to the outbreak of violence was schizo-
phrenic. On the one hand, hardliners led by Prime Minister Ljubcho
Georgievski spoke of a military solution to the problem, and even the moder-
ate President Boris Trajkovski branded the NLA as ‘terrorists’ (which they
were not, in the sense that their usual targets of attack were Macedonian
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military and police rather than civilians). On the other hand, Trajkovski also
launched talks with Albanian political parties to address many of the
Albanians’ longstanding concerns: increasing jobs in government adminis-
tration, expanding local self-government, and extending the use of the
Albanian language in government and education. The NLA, for its part,
staked out a strikingly moderate political platform largely corresponding to
the demands made by the Albanian political parties, but complemented by
the demand for changes in discriminatory language in the Macedonian
constitution.
Prodded by US and EU mediators, representatives of Macedonia’s main
political parties (with the legal Albanian parties acting on behalf of the NLA)
signed a peace agreement in August 2001, despite rising violence promoted
by extremists on both sides. The agreement was a fair-minded compromise:
for example, Macedonian was to remain the official language for the govern-
ment’s foreign relations, but any other language spoken by 20 per cent of the
population of a locality was to be a ‘service language’ for that locality; higher
education in Albanian was also to be provided. On the political level, the two
sides agreed on a power-sharing deal, effectively requiring majority
Albanian support in Parliament for legislation affecting the interests of
Albanians. NATO peacekeepers were introduced to collect the NLA’s arma-
ments, and implementation of the deal was to be roughly synchronised with
the arms-collection process, though in practice the constitutional amend-
ments’ ratification was delayed for two months by hardline Macedonian
leaders. In implementing the deal, the most controversial issue turned out to
be a provision for an amnesty for NLA fighters who had not committed war
crimes: Macedonian hardliners did not want to let these ‘terrorists’ off the
hook.
Neither Macedonia’s approach to war nor its subsequent move towards
peaceful conflict management was surprising. The preconditions for war
were present, but Macedonia is blessed in that even its extremists are rela-
tively moderate. War erupts when both sides pursue predatory goals, stick-
ing to mutually irreconcilable positions; the NLA instead chose a moderate
political programme, and agreed to disband when its demands were largely
met. On the Macedonian side, some leaders did apparently want war in
pursuit of ethnic domination, but President Trajkovski, the leader of the
ruling nationalist VMRO-DPME party, was not among them. Thus while a
security dilemma exists – Macedonians fear Albanian separatism and
lawlessness, while Albanians fear repression by violent Macedonian police
and paramilitaries – it remains manageable because the sides are not pursu-
ing predatory goals. At the same time, none of the regional or great powers
had an interest in fostering violence.31 In these circumstances, the sorts of
leverage available to the international community – diplomatic pressure,
offers of a donor conference to implement a peace deal, pressure on foreign
arms suppliers  –  were enough to tip the balance towards peace. 
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None of this means the conflict is over; implementation of the Lake Ohrid
agreement will remain problematic as Macedonian hardliners try to manip-
ulate emotional symbolism to block Albanian gains. In the medium term,
continuing strong ethnic Macedonian hostility towards Albanians, a strong
chauvinist presence in the Macedonian-language media, and the persistence
of the nationalist VMRO government mean that Macedonia will remain for
some time on the brink of war. If war comes, however, it will be elite-led:
Albanians supported the (now defunct) NLA’s goals but not its violent
methods, while the VMRO government came to power by downplaying its
nationalist programme and forming a coalition with an Albanian faction.
On both sides, mass opinion is volatile but does not want ethnic confronta-
tion.
Mountainous Karabagh
The first ethnic conflict to explode into war in this region was the conflict
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Mountainous Karabagh. At the
time the conflict started in late 1987, there were some 475,000 Armenians
in Azerbaijan, a quarter of them in the Mountainous Karabagh Autonomous
Region, as well as over 100,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia. Ethnic tensions
were longstanding, in large part reflecting deeply hostile ethnic mythologies. 
Armenian mythology painted the Armenian people as ancient inhabi-
tants of the region stretching from Karabagh to eastern Turkey, inheritors of
a political tradition dating back over 2,000 years, and the first nation to
convert to Christianity (in AD 301). The mythology also characterised
Armenia as a martyr nation, repeatedly victimised over the centuries by
Persian and Turkish adversaries. The defining experience for the nation is, in
this narrative, the 1915 Genocide, in which virtually the entire Armenian
population of eastern Anatolia, over a million people, was forcibly expelled in
circumstances designed to ensure the deaths of most of them. The memory of
this experience defined all Turks, including Azerbaijani Turks, as the
national enemy, and rendered Armenians acutely sensitive to the perceived
threat of a new expulsion from other lands of Armenian settlement, espe-
cially Mountainous Karabagh.32
Azerbaijanis, for their part, had a much more recent national tradition –
their very name achieved wide currency only in the 1930s – but their
mythology placed the roots of the nation in ancient times, even before the
migrations that brought their Turkic language to Azerbaijan. The myths
located this national tradition not, therefore, in Azerbaijan’s Turkic
language or Shi’ite Muslim culture, but in the tradition of politically
autonomous entities in the region dating back to ancient times. The awak-
ening of a self-conscious Azerbaijani nation occurred in the aftermath of the
1905 – 6 ‘Armeno-Tatar War’ (Azerbaijanis at that time being called Tatars)
and of the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1918–20.
Armenians thus came to be identified as the enemy of the Azerbaijani nation,
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and Karabagh’s secessionist ambitions came to be seen as a mortal threat to
the ‘statehood’ that was at the core of Azerbaijani identity.
Thus from the beginning of the conflict, both sides feared group extinc-
tion: the Armenian bugbear was ‘genocide’, and for Azerbaijanis it was
dismemberment of their state. These hostile myths and group fears promoted
predatory goals on both sides, with the Armenians calling from the outset for
Armenian domination of Karabagh and its transfer to Armenia, while
Azerbaijanis soon began calling for revocation of Karabagh’s autonomy and
its subordination to direct Azerbaijani administration. As a result, a security
dilemma quickly emerged in spite of efforts by Communist Party leaders on
both sides to dampen down violence: by the end of 1988, some 180,000
Armenians had been ‘ethnically cleansed’ from Azerbaijan, and 160,000
Azerbaijanis fled from Armenian-inhabited areas. In huge upswellings of
mass nationalist sentiments, first Armenia and then Azerbaijan replaced its
Communist leadership with nationalists focused on independence from
Moscow and on the fight for Karabagh. Karabagh itself mobilised to fight the
Turkic enemy, and once the Soviet Union collapsed – allowing the Karabagh
Armenians to inherit part of the old Soviet army – the Armenians went over
to the offensive, capturing and expelling the inhabitants of Azerbaijani areas
in Karabagh, most notably the ancient town of Shusha.
By the time the shooting stopped in May 1994, the Karabagh Armenians,
with overt support from Armenia and slightly less overt support from
Moscow, had captured nearly 20 per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan,
including virtually all of Mountainous Karabagh itself, and expelled the
Azerbaijani inhabitants. Azerbaijan was left to cope with the loss of territory
and a million refugees on the territory it did control, while it hoped for an oil
and gas bonanza that would solve its economic problems and generate the
military power to gain revenge on the Armenians. Armenia, for its part, had
gained de facto military victory, but it faced a dismal economic picture, with
trade shut off on two of its borders (with Azerbaijan and with Turkey), and a
population haemorrhaging into the diaspora.
In spite of both sides’ desperate need for a peace agreement, however,
efforts to reach a deal were repeatedly blocked by the dynamics of the
symbolic politics trap. Until 1998, Armenia was led by Levon Ter-Petrosian,
hero of the independence struggle and leader of the Armenian National
Movement. Ter-Petrosian might have been considered the one man capable
of reaching a peace deal, but it became increasingly difficult as corruption,
economic stagnation and a badly tainted re-election process sapped his legit-
imacy. 
The most hopeful moment for peace came in September 1997, when Ter-
Petrosian and Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliev accepted an OSCE
proposal for a phased approach to peace, involving an Armenian withdrawal
from Azerbaijani lands outside Karabagh, in exchange for an opening of
economic ties in the region. The Karabagh authorities, however, adamantly
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rejected the idea of withdrawal from any territory before the status of
Karabagh was settled, while the powerful Armenian émigré community also
weighed in against the plan. In the ensuing backlash, Ter-Petrosian was
forced to resign and was replaced by premier and former Karabagh president
Robert Kocharian in 1998. This outcome vividly illustrates the symbolic
politics trap: even the nationalist hero was unable to ‘deliver’ his
constituents for a desperately needed peace agreement in the face of
emotionally charged cries of betrayal.
After Kocharian’s elevation, the pivotal place in Armenian politics was
taken by the Yerkrapah movement of war veterans, and its political vehicle,
the Republican Party led by the ex-defence minister and then prime minister,
Vazgen Sarkisian. The road to peace would seem to have been blocked, but
even hardliner Sarkisian, once confronted with the reality of Armenia’s situ-
ation, seems to have swung over to a willingness to contemplate peace. A
series of bilateral meetings between Kocharian and Azerbaijani leader
Heydar Aliev in 1999 seemed to have been showing promise, but the process
was undermined by the assassination of Sarkisian and several other
Armenian politicians in a bizarre terrorist attack on a parliamentary session
in October. Lacking support on his right flank, Kocharian backed away from
a willingness to agree to any realistic compromise.
Aliev was similarly constrained. In spite of his authoritarian control of his
country, partly charismatic and partly institutionalised, he, too, had to be
sensitive to the virtually unanimous view of the political opposition that any
compromise peace was tantamount to betrayal. He responded by conducting
all of the Karabagh negotiations himself, fully trusting none of his advisors.
But in the atmosphere of extreme nationalism in which Azerbaijani politics
takes place, it was not at all certain that even Aliev could ensure the imple-
mentation of a peace agreement, should one be reached. Aliev’s uncertain
health, furthermore, meant that the implementation of any such agreement
would be left up to his successor. It also meant that Aliev’s attention was
increasingly focused on trying to secure the succession for his son Ilham – a
succession that might be jeopardised if Ilham were burdened with an unpop-
ular peace agreement with Armenia.
Within Karabagh, a problem exists similar to that in Republika Srpska:
the leaders of the rebel enclave have more of an interest in perpetuating the
conflict than in solving it. Evidence is murky, but the region seems to be run
by a corrupt coterie of politicians and warlords who enrich themselves by
facilitating smuggling across the borders with Iran and Armenia. They are
disinclined to agree to a settlement, because any deal – even one that leaves
them in power and with continuing autonomy – would require that they
give up control over Azerbaijani territory outside Karabagh, including the
area on the border with Iran. Disinclined to give up any land, they are prob-
ably even less inclined to give up their chief source of income.
At the international level, the most important foreign influence on this
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conflict has been Russian military intervention. While Russian support was
tilted towards Azerbaijan in 1990–93, that support ended once it became
clear in the spring of 1993 that Azerbaijan would insist on the withdrawal of
all remaining Russian troops, while Armenia would not. A Kremlin-
supported military coup in Azerbaijan, and decisive Armenian military
victory, followed. Continued Armenian military superiority was ensured by
a continued flow of Russian weapons into Armenia’s arsenal, while Russia
used its leverage to maintain its military presence in Armenia. Meanwhile,
owing to pressure from the Armenian-American community, the United
States opened a generous flow of economic aid to Armenia and even to the
unrecognised Mountainous Karabagh, while the controversial Section 907
of the Freedom Support Act blocked most American aid to Azerbaijan. 
A critical background factor in the management of the Karabagh conflict
was the growing push to exploit and market oil and gas from the Caspian
basin, especially from Azerbaijan. The most contentious issue was the
proposal for an oil pipeline from Baku through Georgia to the Turkish port of
Ceyhan, in addition to a parallel pipeline from Baku to the Russian port of
Novorossiisk, and a smaller one to the Georgian port of Supsa. US policy
promoted the notion of ‘multiple pipelines’ – meaning, crucially, Baku-
Ceyhan in addition to the others – on the principle that such competition
would prevent one actor from gaining either an economic monopoly or a
political stranglehold on the transportation of Azerbaijani oil. Azerbaijan
hoped that a future oil bonanza shipped through multiple pipelines would
shift the political and military balance in its favour, and it tilted towards the
US in pursuit of influence that would balance Russia’s. Russia, especially
given its goal of an exclusive sphere of influence, therefore found itself in the
position of wanting to block Baku-Ceyhan precisely in pursuit of a political-
economic trump card in the region. To the considerable extent that unre-
solved ethnic conflicts in Karabagh and in Georgia were considered obstacles
to the viability of Baku-Ceyhan, and to the extent that a resolution of the
Karabagh conflict would open the door to increased US influence in
Azerbaijan, Russia found that a resolution of the Karabagh conflict would
not be in its best interests. It therefore refrained from using its considerable
leverage to encourage Armenian flexibility in talks with Aliev. 
The key diplomatic intervention was the establishment of the OSCE Minsk
Group in 1992, and of its system of three (Russian, American and French)
co-chairs in late 1994. The temporary breakthrough of September 1997
came in response to a proposal of the co-chairs, but after that period the
group was largely sidelined by the process of bilateral Kocharian – Aliev
meetings. The two tracks were brought together in a Minsk Group-spon-
sored negotiating session between the two presidents in Key West in April
2001, but the talks yielded nothing but atmospherics – and the observation
by the US co-chair that domestic political constraints on both presidents
remain a key obstacle. These official processes have at times been supple-
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mented by an array of unofficial proposals and internationally sponsored
peace-building programmes such as a parliamentary exchange programme.
The key failure of the international community has been its inability to
bring the diplomatic, political and peace-building tracks together. The nego-
tiating process turned into a way for both governments to pretend interest in
a compromise peace while indulging in extremist rhetoric at home (in
response to the even more extreme rhetoric of some opposition figures),
while Armenia’s foreign support was strong enough for it to feel itself able to
resist compromise. The peace-building efforts were therefore marginalised.
This is the result of a mass-led symbolic politics trap: any moves towards
peace threaten the position of incumbent leaders, while leaders’ efforts to
stay in power block the road to peace. That problem is exacerbated by the
most highly motivated outside force, the Armenian diaspora, which
promotes the hardline position without suffering the ill effects of continued
conflict. Until public opinion on both sides shifts to recognise those ill effects,
and the corresponding benefits of a settlement of the conflict, the current
deadlock will continue. 
Conclusions and future prospects
There are two main themes in the argument of this chapter. The first is that
ethnic civil conflicts such as the ones in Bosnia, Macedonia and
Mountainous Karabagh are at the same time regional security issues whose
trajectory is critically affected as much by external actors as by internal
ones. The second theme is that the behaviour of all parties involved – ethnic
groups within states, governments of other states, and others  –  depends on
their construction of their interests. The construction of ethnic group inter-
ests, in turn, is heavily influenced by the ethnic mythology of the groups in
question, and by the degree of mutual hostility and fear. Many of the groups
are caught in a symbolic politics trap from which it is difficult to escape.
This applies also to other conflicts in the region. In Kosovo, for example,
the Albanian majority insists so strongly on the goal of complete independ-
ence from Serbia that no major Albanian politician dares challenge it – or its
implication of continued discrimination against the Serbian minority. The
Serbian and Yugoslav governments, for their part, cannot concede the
symbolism of Belgrade’s sovereignty over the region even though the reality
of political authority is irretrievably gone. A similar situation obtains in
Chechnya, where legitimate political and guerrilla leaders are locked into
the pursuit of independence, while the Russian president Vladimir Putin has
built his presidency around a tough ‘anti-terrorism’ policy that allows him
little room even to cede local autonomy to the puppet Chechen administra-
tion.
Two conclusions about conflict resolution follow from these thoughts,
one commonplace, the other more controversial. The commonplace insight
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is that regional conflict resolution often depends in large part on whether
external powers find it in their interest to push for it. Years of sanctions
convinced Milosevic’s Serbia, for example, to want an end to the war in
Bosnia, but as long as Milosevic remained in power, the prospects of recon-
ciliation in Bosnia were blocked by Bosnian Serb hardliners backed by
Belgrade. In the Caucasus, Russia’s hegemonic goals and the scramble for
control of oil and gas routes interacted to give Russia little incentive to push
for conflict resolution. Thus conflict resolution was blocked, in the one case
at the implementation stage, and in the other case in pre-negotiations. In the
Macedonia case, by contrast, all regional and great power actors had incen-
tives to prevent escalation of the conflict, so none encouraged Macedonian
hardliners.
The second insight is that ordinary diplomatic, political and even military
interventions are not alone enough to achieve effective conflict resolution.
Since groups’ definition of their interests depends heavily on ethnic myths
and group fears, reconciliation and conflict resolution require addressing the
mythic roots of group interests, and assuaging the symbolic sources of group
fears. This is the way out of the symbolic politics trap, and the tool for doing
it is not diplomacy but peace building. To be sure, diplomacy and military
coercion have their uses  –  peace-building efforts need to be backed by diplo-
matic muscle, and in the case of Bosnia, reconciliation requires coercion by
peacekeepers to arrest the war criminals blocking implementation of the
Dayton accords. Indeed, in the Bosnian case, destroying the crime nexus
organised by war criminals, especially in Serb but also in Croat areas, is the
only workable exit strategy for SFOR, and a necessary precondition for
peace.
But ultimately, the problems are often attitudinal first, and political or
criminal only second. For governments, the key access point to public
opinion is the media. That means that foreign governments need to work
much harder to push the local media towards more responsible and moder-
ate reporting in all of these conflict areas. Efforts to do so might include the
creation and funding of alternative media outlets, and pressure on govern-
ments to tolerate and facilitate their reporting. Other opportunities may be
less intuitive. If Armenian myths and fears are the key driver of the
Karabagh conflict, for example, then the key requirement for conflict resolu-
tion may be that Turkey help heal the Armenians’ deepest wound by
acknowledging and expressing regret for the 1915 Genocide. As with the
Bosnia conflict, the key is to get the separatists’ outside patron to push for
conflict resolution (Serbia in the Bosnia case, Armenia for Karabagh);
dealing with the business interests of the separatists must come later.
Supplying the need for peace building requires ever-closer cooperation
between diplomats and international institutions such as the OSCE, on the
one hand, and conflict-resolution non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
on the other. The cultural and ideological clash between these communities
Ethnic conflict and Eurasian security
65
2504Chap3  7/4/03  3:53 pm  Page 65
is by no means the least of the obstacles to effective conflict resolution.
Russian and US leaders, in particular, see themselves as hard-nosed realists
with little patience for what they see as the soft-headed and impractical
peace activists in the NGO community. NGO activists, on the other hand, are
fiercely independent and inclined to resist the sort of top-down coordination
by officials of any kind that could help them turn their disparate efforts into
broadly effective peace-building programmes. While each side needs to
adjust and accommodate to the other, the onus is on US and European offi-
cials to take the lead in encouraging, funding, coordinating and smoothing
the way for the NGOs to do their work in places like Bosnia, Macedonia and
Karabagh. Such a transformation does not presently seem to be in the offing.
And that means that peace in all three regions will remain tenuous at best.
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not inclined to make waves. Russia may have leaned towards supporting
Macedonia’s nationalists more than did the Western powers, but newly installed
president Vladimir Putin had more pressing problems and did not want to
promote trouble. While Ukraine did provide some heavy weapons to Macedonia,
its motivations were purely mercenary and the aid did not continue for long.
32 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, Ch. 3.
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4Eurasia and the transnational
terrorist threats to Atlantic security 
Phil Williams 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon were not only the most audacious and successful terrorist attacks
the world has yet seen, but also marked the maturation of what had been
described as the ‘new terrorism’. It was a maturation in several senses. In the
first place it revealed that trends identified by astute specialists such as
Walter Laqueur, Bruce Hoffman and Ian Lesser were, in fact, well
advanced.1 These analysts had suggested that terrorists were increasingly
pursuing grander and less specific political objectives than in the past, were
moving towards greater ruthlessness and lethality, and were less likely to
claim credit for their actions.2 These characteristics were evident in the
attacks of September 11. Traditionally terrorism was primarily about
theatre – about lots of people watching rather than lots of people killed.3 The
terrorism of September 11 was about millions of people watching several
thousand people being killed. Similarly, terrorism traditionally had been
about the attainment of a well-defined political objective. The attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, in contrast, appeared to be an attack
on American cultural and political hegemony, and an effort to galvanise a
new pan-Islamic anti-western identity rather than a serious effort to make
the United States withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia or reduce its support
for Israel. Moreover, Bin Laden and al-Qaeda denied responsibility in the
hope that anonymity would enable them to avoid retribution. All that was
lacking from the worst-case scenarios discussed by the terrorism analysts
was the presence of weapons of mass destruction. Even without these,
however, the attacks exacted a far higher death toll than any previous
terrorist action. 
If the attacks marked the maturation of the new terrorism they also
compelled a rapid – if incomplete – maturation in the United States concep-
tion of security. Since the end of the Cold War, and the disappearance of the
Soviet threat, the United States had enjoyed what appeared to be immunity
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to the business cycle and an absence of serious threats to its national secu-
rity. Consequently, serious political debate over national security had been
stultified. National attention had been fixated on scandals ranging from
presidential indiscretions and pardons to the O. J. Simpson trial and the
disappearance of a Washington intern. There had been voices in the national
security community, including on the National Security Council itself,
warning about transnational threats such as terrorism and organised
crime.4 Yet, the military focus had remained on threats from nation-states,
whether an emerging China, a resurgent Russia, or rogue states suspected of
acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 
In launching an audacious, well-coordinated and conceptually sophisti-
cated attack on the United States homeland, the al-Qaeda terrorist cells
responsible for the hijackings transformed a narrow debate among special-
ists about threats to United States security into a national preoccupation.
They also succeeded in galvanising the United States into mobilising
national efforts and resources in ways reminiscent of the Cold War. The
Bush administration, which in its first eight months in office had been
unilateralist in its approach to international issues, embraced a multilateral
approach to security that also harkened back to the Cold War. With NATO
invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history, the European allies
provided enormous diplomatic and law enforcement support to the
United States – especially in the immediate aftermath of September 11.
Subsequently, the United States military response in Afghanistan created
some unease in western Europe, which was exacerbated by the ‘axis of evil’
reference in the president’s 2002 State of the Union address. The European
allies also became very concerned about possible United States plans to
attack Iraq in a bid to oust Saddam Hussein. If the potential for Atlantic divi-
sions remained very considerable, however, the common interests of the
United States and its European allies in combating the challenge from radical
Islamic terrorism are difficult to overestimate.
This is perhaps best illustrated by the series of arrests of terrorists and
disruption of cells that took place in Germany in December 2000 and else-
where in Europe throughout 2001, both before and after September 11.
Close scrutiny of these events suggests that what well-informed observers
described as a series of terrorist spectaculars was very narrowly averted.5
The European cells exhibited the same lethality of intent, if not of execution,
as the September 11 hijackers. The story is intriguing, with many details still
obscure. In December 2000, German authorities in Frankfurt broke up a
terrorist cell planning an attack in Strasbourg. Initial reports suggested that
the target was a square in Strasbourg, while subsequent disclosures indi-
cated that the target was Strasbourg cathedral. One report contended that a
British cell had targeted the European Parliament and that poison gas, prob-
ably sarin, might have been the weapon of choice.6
The arrests also revealed an extensive network of terrorist cells in
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Germany, Italy, Britain, Spain, Belgium and France. The cell structure oper-
ated under two large umbrella movements, the Egyptian movement,
Anathema and Exile, and an Algerian counterpart, the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat.7 In effect, these loose multinational structures
coalesced through three key individuals linked to al-Qaeda: Abu Doha
(whom Italian police believe to be Rachid Kefflous), an Algerian who moved
to London in 1999, was involved in the plot to bomb Los Angeles airport on
the eve of the millennium, and was arrested in Britain in February 2001;
Mohamed Bensakhria, leader of the Frankfurt cell; and Tarek Maaroufi, a
Tunisian with Belgian citizenship, who is wanted in Italy. The Milan cell was
led by a Tunisian, Essid Sami Ben Khemais, who had completed two years of
training in al-Qaeda camps before moving to Milan in March 1998. Khemais
helped to organise the sending of recruits to Afghanistan and was clearly
linked to cells elsewhere in Europe. According to Italian authorities, the
recruits met in Geneva, and used false Italian documents to fly to Pakistan,
from where they were taken into Afghanistan. The Italians also inferred
from the evidence that Khemais financed these activities by ‘means of drug-
trafficking, counterfeiting money and documents, recycling dirty money’.8
The Milan cell also circumvented immigration and employment laws by
creating a bogus cooperative to bring non-EU nationals into Italy, which
enabled them to qualify for work permits.9 In addition, this cell provided
logistic support for its counterpart in Frankfurt as the latter planned the
Strasbourg attack: stolen and false credit cards from Italy were used by
members of the Frankfurt group to buy explosive materials. 
When the Frankfurt cell under Bensakhria was disrupted, German
authorities found a cache of automatic pistols, rifles with telescopic sights,
handguns with silencers, directions for bomb building, and nails and pres-
sure cookers.10 Communication intercepts with the Milan cell also suggested
that some kind of poison gas was being prepared.11 The action by German
authorities provided information that led to Operation Odin in Britain and
the arrest of ten suspected terrorists in February 2001.12 Although most of
them were freed, Abu Doha – one of the three key members of the al-Qaeda
network in Europe – and Mustapha Labsi, who was alleged to be a co-
conspirator in the Los Angeles bomb plot, remained under arrest.13 Members
of the Milan cell were subsequently arrested in April 2001.14 Bensakhria,
who had avoided arrest in Frankfurt in December 2000, was arrested in June
2001 in Spain.15 Further arrests occurred in Spain after September 11. In
September, a cell that had provided logistic support was broken up, while in
November another round of arrests was made.16
Although European law enforcement and intelligence agencies had
considerable success in disrupting some of the al-Qaeda-related cells in
several countries, the extensiveness of the structure and the links among the
groups were surprising. Through a mixture of good luck, effective law
enforcement and extensive intelligence cooperation among EU members, a
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number of potentially devastating terrorist acts were foiled. The arrests,
however, revealed very clearly that Europe is as much of a target for radical
Islamic terrorism as is the United States. Yet, this is only one part of a larger
picture in which transnational threats to European and Atlantic security
continue to loom very large. Accordingly, the next section of this chapter
provides a conceptual analysis and assessment of these threats. The final
section then considers the nature of the responses that are required as both
the United States and European governments adapt to what is a very differ-
ent kind of security challenge from that for which they prepared during the
Cold War. 
The new security paradigm 
In the long term, traditional geopolitical competition could re-emerge in
Europe. The more immediate threats, however, are transnational rather
than national; the geographical sources of these threats are found along
Europe’s periphery and beyond. Indeed, there is a new threat paradigm that
needs to be understood more widely if it is to be combated with maximum
effectiveness. There are nine major characteristics of this paradigm that need
to be taken into account.17
First, security threats are no longer stark, dramatic, and confined largely
to direct external military aggression or threats of military attack; instead
they are often insidious and indirect, with both external and internal dimen-
sions. They include overt threats such as terrorism, in which the intent is to
inflict significant harm, and more subtle threats such as organised crime,
which uses corruption and co-option rather than confrontation. Indeed,
organised crime is the HIV of the modern state, breaking down the defences
of the body politic, eroding the rule of law, and undermining the integrity of
institutions of social control. Although public institutions and the rule of law
in the United States and most EU member-states are sufficiently robust to
withstand such an assault, the ways in which corruption and organised
crime can entrench themselves should not be underestimated. Organised
crime from the former Soviet Union has made considerable inroads into
western countries, often allying, at least temporarily, with local organisa-
tions to expand criminal markets and activities. Moreover, criminal organi-
sations operating in Europe and the United States are more diverse (Russian,
Ukrainian, Georgian, Albanian, Nigerian, Chinese, Colombian, Italian,
Kurdish and Turkish) than ever before, have a wide portfolio of criminal
activities from which they derive considerable profit, and deploy a sophisti-
cated repertoire of risk-management techniques that help to protect them
from law enforcement. 
The second characteristic of the transnational threat paradigm is its
enduring nature: transnational threats are neither simply the flavour of the
moment nor ‘boutique security issues’ that pale in significance compared
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with traditional military threats. On the contrary, they pose continuing and
serious challenges to national and international security and stability.
Transnational threats have developed as a result of long-term secular trends
that are likely to intensify rather than abate in the early decades of the
twenty-first century. Even if al-Qaeda is defeated any time soon – which
seems unlikely – terrorism will continue to be a major threat during the
twenty-first century. Religious fundamentalism, political fanaticism and
economic inequities and asymmetries will continue to feed a desire for
revenge that is expressed in violent attacks against the citizens of countries
that are viewed as the ‘enemy’ or the ‘infidel’. If terrorist networks seek to get
even with their enemies, then transnational criminal networks are moti-
vated by the desire to get rich. And the targets are many of the advanced
postindustrial countries that are also the major targets of terrorism. Not only
do these countries wield political, economic and military power in ways that
terrorist groups find unacceptable, they also provide lucrative markets for
criminals. In short, the target countries are the same; the difference is that
criminals seek to exploit them and terrorists to hurt them.
Third, there are few if any islands of security or safe havens in this new
world. The United States prior to September 11 still considered itself as such,
but this notion was dispelled as the towers of the World Trade Center
collapsed. Part of the reason for this transformation is that in an age of
unprecedented cross-border flows – whether of people, money, commodities
or digital signals – the capacity of even strong governments to monitor who
and what enters and leaves the country is limited. Smuggling can succeed
either by circumventing monitoring systems and control points or by going
through them with false documentation. Borders have always had a perme-
ability about them that Westphalian conceptions of the state found conven-
ient to ignore. With globalisation, however, permeability has increased
enormously: borders are simply not what they were. In the era of military
and territorial competition among great powers, lines on maps meant a great
deal; for terrorists, however, borders are minor barriers that are easily
circumvented and little more than boundaries for target sets. And for crimi-
nals, borders demarcate market opportunities, as many illegal goods such as
drugs increase in value as soon as they cross certain borders. Yet, at the
same time as criminals and terrorist networks transcend and violate borders,
they also use them for defensive purposes, finding weak or sympathetic
states that provide some kind of safe haven. 
The weakness of border controls is particularly pronounced when the
state itself is weak. In Africa and Central Asia, for example, long borders are
often not patrolled and there are many points of entry that simply cannot be
monitored by states with limited resources. As a result, illegal immigration
has become commonplace. Furthermore, criminals and smugglers traffic in
a variety of products including art and antiquities, stolen cattle, fauna and
flora, guns, drugs, diamonds and gold. Customs and immigration services
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are generally poorly developed, poorly trained, badly equipped and inade-
quately paid. As such, they are easily circumvented by relatively sophisti-
cated methods of concealment or bought off by fairly modest exercises in
bribery and corruption. They facilitate what Bayart, referring to large parts
of Africa, has termed ‘the economy of plunder, fraud and smuggling’.18
Fourth, the helpful distinction that was made shortly after the end of the
Cold War between zones of peace and zones of turmoil has to be refined to
incorporate the notion of spillover.19 In a globalised world, there is
inevitable spillover from areas of turbulence and instability to zones of peace
and tranquility. There are several vectors along which the connections are
made. One of these is psychological: states in the zone of peace are held
responsible for injustice or instability in the zone of turmoil. A second is
immigration, which does not end old affiliations or moderate old enmities,
but merely transfers them to new venues. Those in the diaspora retain links
with the homeland and often send back financial remittances. The vast
majority of these financial transfers take the form of legitimate economic
assistance to families and are often eked out of relatively modest incomes. In
some cases, however, financial proceeds generated through crimes such as
drug trafficking and credit card fraud provide support for insurgency or
ethnic conflict.20 Another vector operates through the dynamics of illicit
markets. Although there are some flows such as stolen cars (and, in some
cases, arms) from zones of tranquility to zones of turmoil, most illegal
commodities flow from areas of turmoil into zones of peace and prosperity
where there is significant demand for ‘products’ such as drugs, foreign
women for prostitution, rare antiquities and the like. Closely linked to these
flows is the diffusion of networked actors from the more troubled areas. The
way in which drug traffickers and organised crime groups from the Balkans
have spread into western Europe and taken control of heroin markets in
several countries, for example, illustrates the kinds of dynamics that are
generated by the demand for narcotics in zones of peace and stability. 
Fifth, the transnational actors challenging security operate largely
through networked organisational structures. As such, they are difficult to
destroy with traditional military means. They prefer to hide and strike with
surprise and devastating effect rather than engage in direct head-to-head
combat. The United States in Afghanistan succeeded in part in creating a
head-to-head military contest. Yet it also encountered the problem of an
amorphous networked enemy, as al-Qaeda forces dispersed and fled into a
variety of other countries. The United States, by toppling the Taliban,
removed Afghanistan as a safe haven for al-Qaeda; yet there is a very real
possibility that the members of the network have found other safe havens –
at least temporarily – in countries such as Somalia, Iran and Indonesia. One
inadvertent – and disquieting – consequence of the United States success in
Afghanistan is that al-Qaeda has been forced into becoming even a more
diffused network actor. In the short term, this might inhibit its capacity to
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carry out further terrorist attacks; in the longer term, however, this might
simply make it even harder to locate and combat. 
There is also a danger of overestimating the impact of successful attacks
on the core of the network: networks are not easily destroyed by decapitation
strikes. Indeed, for decapitation to have a significant impact in degrading
terrorist and criminal networks, it cannot be a single temporary measure.
Decapitation has to be both successive and pre-emptive if it is to do more
than temporarily destabilise the organisation. Yet another difficulty is that
as networks become deeply embedded in societies and institutions, they are
increasingly difficult to eradicate. Criminal networks, for example, are very
successful in infiltrating legitimate industries and firms, and once embedded
are difficult both to detect and to dislodge. Similarly, terrorist cells can
operate in target countries, finding support and cover within ethnic and reli-
gious communities, and avoiding actions that arouse suspicions. Identifying
them requires law enforcement strategies that are proactive rather than
responsive, and that place an unprecedented premium on good intelligence.
Unfortunately law enforcement agencies are not geared up to pursue such
strategies. Instead, they are concerned with making cases that generate
successful prosecutions and convictions and that serve to justify their
budgets. The other difficulty is that both criminal and terrorist network
connections are often transnational, whereas law enforcement remains
stubbornly national. If this poses one kind of constraint, continued limits on
the capacity of intelligence agencies to operate domestically create another.
Even if cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies is
good, the result is still collection and analytical processes characterised by
seams, gaps and disconnections. This absence of integrated processes is all
the more debilitating because criminal activities, criminal transactions and
the planning and implementation of terrorist strikes are seamless activities. 
Even if law enforcement succeeds in disrupting networks, it will find them
to be remarkably adaptable and resilient organisations with a capacity to
regenerate themselves. Networks can learn and morph themselves: they can
transform their shape, operations, modalities and size. They can contract
and expand according to opportunities and constraints in their environ-
ment, and even when critical nodes are destroyed and critical connections
severed, they are able to continue operating because of a high degree of
redundancy. Although the United States and allied governments, since
September 11, have begun the process of adapting to the particular require-
ments of combating networked adversaries, the learning curve is likely to be
both long and steep. 
The sixth dimension of the new security paradigm is that some states are
part of the problem rather than part of the solution: the world has entered
the era of the qualified state. If part of the new security paradigm revolves
around a competition between traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical
states on the one side and agile, networked actors on the other, the problem
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is compounded by the fact that many states lack effective, efficient, bureau-
cratic structures characterised by integrity rather than susceptibility to
corruption. Although the United States, after September 11, was very
successful in mobilising not only its traditional allies but also other states in
the effort to combat terrorism, two problems are inescapable.
The first is that some states ostensibly comply with the demands to join
the war on terrorism, but tacitly defect from this effort. Saudi Arabia, for
example, at one level has appeared to provide strong support for the United
States in its efforts to attack the financial basis of al-Qaeda. Yet it is not clear
that it has introduced vigorous measures to inhibit terrorist funding under
the guise of charitable giving.
The second problem is that some states simply lack the capacity to combat
transnational networks of criminals or terrorists. Many states along
Europe’s eastern and southern periphery suffer from lack of authority and
legitimacy, low state capacity, and the existence of no-go zones that provide
safe havens for a variety of illegal activities and those who engage in them.
Endemic problems include capacity gaps and functional holes, which arise
when the state fails to carry out responsibilities that are generally regarded
as the norm for states. Many of these states are weak and have a very limited
capacity to govern; they exhibit functional holes that are readily exploited by
transnational criminals and terrorist networks. The most obvious manifes-
tation of functional holes is the absence of effective social control and law-
enforcement mechanisms, which allows organised crime and terrorist
networks to operate in a low-risk environment. In effect, the networks
exploit the space provided by the functional hole. Another such hole is the
inability of many states to provide for the basic economic and social needs of
their citizens. This failure can lead to migration from the legal economy to
the illegal. It also provides opportunities for transnational actors to fill the
hole. In many countries, for example, Islamic charities are increasingly
providing the social safety nets that state authorities are unable to afford. In
effect, a public function is fulfilled through private provision. Although such
activities are obviously legitimate, they also provide opportunities for Islamic
fundamentalists to spread militant forms of the religion that feed into terror-
ism. Terrorist networks that have embedded themselves in charitable organ-
isations also use the opportunity to recruit new members. Moreover, as
evidence from the trials relating to the United States embassy bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania revealed, al-Qaeda has been particularly adept at using
charities as cover for the movement of money and people. Another func-
tional hole that has been particularly evident in Russia and other states of
the former Soviet Union has concerned the regulation of business. Where the
state has been unable to provide contract enforcement, arbitration of
disputes or debt collection, organised crime has become a surrogate, in effect
filling the functional hole and expanding its influence into the economy to a
degree that is unprecedented.
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In some cases, of course, the capacity gaps and functional holes are so
large that the state simply collapses. This outcome occurs particularly where
there are ethnic rivalries, secessionist aspirations, religious animosities or
tribal divisions. Indeed, one of the most significant features of the late twen-
tieth and early twenty-first centuries is the resurgence of warlordism.
Although there are important regional variations, warlordism of one kind or
another has helped to fuel conflicts in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the
Balkans. It is a complex phenomenon that both combines and blurs cate-
gories that in other parts of the world are regarded as separate and distinct.
Warlords, who typically engage in criminal activities and in insurgent, mili-
tary or terrorist activities, achieve what can be termed a symbiosis between
politics and accumulation.21 One manifestation of this is found in Africa,
where the state is seen as the prize of politics, with the spoils to be distributed
along tribal lines by the representative of the dominant tribe. This results in
two phenomena: dictatorship where there is in effect a dominant warlord;
and conflict among warlords where there is a struggle for dominance. Such
conflicts revolve around control over resources, both in the legal economy
and in the underground economy. Moreover, the resources that can be
acquired through territorial control continue to fuel these conflicts, provid-
ing the wherewithal to continue fighting. Similarly, in Tajikistan’s civil war
from 1992 to 1997, conflict among rival warlords was intensified by the
struggle for control over drug routes and markets, as heroin from
Afghanistan was transshipped through Tajikistan. In Afghanistan itself,
local warlords – prior to the consolidation of power by the Taliban and subse-
quent to the regime’s overthrow – fought for control not only of drug culti-
vation areas, but also of trade routes, levying taxes on merchants passing
through the territory under their control. One implication of all this is that
political-military and sometimes terrorist activities on the one side and crim-
inal activities on the other are combined as part of the warlord’s day-to-day
activities. 
Nor are there easy solutions to these problems. In almost all cases of failed
states, the lack of legitimacy and authority is reflected in the way in which
many groups and individuals place their own narrow interests above the
collective interest of the state and society.22 It is hardly surprising, therefore,
that state building is an extremely difficult enterprise. Nowhere has this been
more evident than in Bosnia. The Dayton accords envisaged the emergence
of a centralised state which would increase its resource base and pave the
way for the gradual integration of different ethnic communities. What has
happened instead is that the separatist national parties have worked in close
cooperation with organised crime. These parties, in turn, have obtained
control over criminal markets, corruption and rent-seeking opportunities,
and have used their position to enrich themselves at the expense of the over-
arching state apparatus. The state, in effect, has been ‘ripped off’ and organ-
ised crime has become a spoiler not only in a peacekeeping contingency, but
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also in the state-building endeavour.23 It seems likely that similar kinds of
developments will bedevil Afghanistan as the United States tries to ensure
that further neglect does not provide a continued safe haven, breeding
ground and training camp for terrorists and drug traffickers. 
The seventh feature of the new paradigm is the growing diffusion of tech-
nological capabilities. This is most obvious in the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and the possible linkage between states that posses them and
terrorist organisations that would be willing to use them against the United
States and western Europe. Significant tensions between the Bush adminis-
tration and western European governments over a possible attack on Iraq
reflect divergent assessments of the salience and urgency of this issue. The
Bush administration has regarded the terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction as a real threat that is inextricably linked to Saddam Hussein’s
programmes for developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Whether or not Iraq is the supplier, the terrorist use of WMD is
certainly not a contingency that can be excluded. As Bruce Hoffman pointed
out several years ago, Aum Shinrikyo’s use of sarin gas on the Japanese
underground crossed a significant threshold.24 Moreover, for terrorist
networks whose goal is to create mayhem and inflict large-scale casualties,
WMD are ideal. In spite of the lack of evidence found in Afghanistan, it would
not be surprising if al-Qaeda had acquired enough radioactive material to
make a ‘dirty bomb’. In the latter half of the 1990s, nuclear and radioactive
material stolen from Russian installations and stockpiles was increasingly
smuggled through Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans, all areas in
which al-Qaeda had a significant presence. The critical point about the use of
such weapons by terrorist networks is that they are more likely than not to
be delivered in unconventional ways and not by missiles. 
James Rosenau’s identification of ‘sovereignty-free actors’ underscores
the growing importance of technology and expertise diffusion from tradi-
tional great powers to other states with respect to computers and informa-
tion technology.25 Moreover, this is an area where entry costs for acquiring
offensive capabilities are very modest.26 This is linked, of course, to the
notion of asymmetric warfare, in which enemies are able to exploit aspects of
modern societies and economies that have traditionally been seen as
strengths but increasingly create concomitant vulnerabilities. Indeed, the
corollary of the diffusion of information technology is that the enormous
reliance of postindustrial countries on computerised information and
communication systems for the effective functioning of their economies and
societies is a major vulnerability. United States infrastructure, for example,
presents a tempting target set to terrorist organisations. If terrorist networks,
using a mixture of physical and cyber attacks, succeeded in destroying
Fedwire and CHIPS, the two systems that provide wire transfers and funds
settlements domestically and internationally, the damage to the United
States financial system as well as to global financial markets would be enor-
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mous. Although backup installations, based on a well-established risk
management ethos, provide a high degree of redundancy within the system,
there is little or no redundancy of the system. Consequently, a well-coordi-
nated systemic attack could prove profoundly debilitating. The September
11 attack on the Word Trade Center was not designed primarily as an attack
on infrastructure, but certainly caused short-term problems for the financial
services sector. An attack that specifically targeted the electronic payments
systems could overwhelm the existing safeguards. Getting even has never
been so feasible or easy. 
The eighth characteristic of the twenty-first-century security paradigm
relates to the paradoxical and perverse consequences of globalisation.
Although globalisation has been widely hailed as facilitating the spread of
liberal democratic values and free market economics, it has both a downside
and a dark side that liberal neo-institutionalists were slow to acknowledge.
Legitimate businesses have benefited enormously from opportunities to
exploit global markets, but the major beneficiaries of globalisation have been
transnational criminal networks. These networks use the global trade
system to embed illegal products in legal commodity flows, the global finan-
cial system to move and hide their money, the global telecommunications
system to transmit directives and messages, and the global transportation
system to move people and products. Terrorists have exploited globalisation
in similar ways, using the global financial system to move and hide their
money, and the Internet to transmit messages through either steganogra-
phy (messages hidden in digital images) or more simply the use of encrypted
emails. In addition, both criminals and terrorists have used global diasporas
and transnational ethnic networks as cover and recruitment for their activi-
ties. As a result, combating criminal and terrorist activity has become very
difficult without impeding the rapid flows of money, goods and services on
which modern commerce and finance depend; and without violating the
civil liberties which are the hallmark of western democracies and facilitate
the efficiency of the market. Although the equation between security on the
one side and freedom of movement on the other has swung in the direction of
security after September 11, there is still a reluctance to interfere too much
with a system of commerce based on just-in-time inventories and virtually
unimpeded movements across borders. The adverse consequences of global-
isation for national and international security must not be allowed to detract
from the benefits of globalisation in economics and commerce. The subordi-
nation of security considerations, however, can have very serious conse-
quences. 
In addition to having a dark side, globalisation also creates discontents.27
Regarded by its adherents as an unmitigated benefit, globalisation has
disruptive effects on traditional societies, contributes to the marginalisation
of groups within societies and in some cases of whole societies, and brings
with it a form of cultural imperialism that is regarded with enormous hostil-
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ity in certain regions and countries. There is also a gap between the speed
with which ideas of the market economy have taken hold and the speed with
which liberal democratic values and respect for human rights have become
accepted as the norm. For many developing countries engulfed by globalisa-
tion, the result is growing prosperity for pro-western, non-democratic
governments, and alienation of the large masses of the population who suffer
from economic deprivation at the same time as their cultural norms are
being eroded. In these circumstances, Benjamin Barber’s notion of the clash
between Jihad and McWorld proved to be prophetic.28 Al-Qaeda’s attacks on
the United States and the foiled attacks on western European targets were
simply the opening salvos in a struggle that is partly a clash of civilisations
and partly a struggle over the pervasiveness of globalisation.29 These attacks
also reflected an anti-hegemonic impulse that, significantly, is manifested
through transnational actors rather than emerging great powers. For those
opposed to it, globalisation is not a neutral process so much as a project
directed and dominated by the United States and its allies.
The ninth and final characteristic of the new security paradigm is the
prevalence of disorder. Indeed, the management of great power rivalry has
been superseded as a central theme of global politics by the issue of disorder
versus governance. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are
not the same as those of the twentieth: mass industrialised nations fighting
one another to the finish have become passé. The obvious costs of such
conflicts are compounded by the possibility that they will escalate to nuclear
war either as a result of deliberate decision or through inadvertence and loss
of control. Moreover, the source of most of these conflicts – struggle for
geopolitical dominance in Europe – has been transcended by the evolution of
the EU, a union that has tied together France and Germany, traditional
enemies, in inextricable forms of political and economic interdependence.
Western Europe – along with North America – has not only become the kind
of ‘security community’ envisaged by Karl Deutsch but is extending this to
selective states in central Europe. At the same time, the forces of disorder
outside this security community, particularly emanating from Eurasia, have
become increasingly formidable. Charles Tilly, in an oft-quoted comment,
once noted that the state was simply the most efficient and effective form of
organised crime.30 In effect, the state legitimised organised crime by trans-
forming extortion into taxation, brute force into authority, and rule by fear
into rule by consent of the governed. Yet, in the last decade or so organised
crime has been fighting back with a new vigour and some success – in many
cases penetrating state institutions and dominating important economic
sectors. Similarly, the fact that the main challenge to United States hege-
mony comes from a transnational terrorist network rather than other states
suggests that the world has entered the twilight of the Westphalian system.
It is likely to be a long twilight, however, as powerful states continue to func-
tion effectively, to deploy vast economic and military resources, and to
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combat the forces of disorder that embody the new security challenges. Yet
for states to have any chance of maintaining their pre-eminence in the inter-
national system and defeating new security threats from organised crime
and terrorist networks, they have to fight smart as well as hard.
Consequently, the final section of this chapter looks at the kinds of strategies
the United States and western Europe need to adopt to meet not simply the
immediate challenge posed by al-Qaeda, but also the long-term challenge
presented by the forces of disorder. 
Conclusion: responding to the new security paradigm 
The difficulty for the United States and western European states in respond-
ing to the new security paradigm is that they have well-established diplo-
matic and military systems and institutions based almost exclusively on the
traditional state-centric security paradigm. Governments are prepared and
equipped to deal with threats from other governments. They are familiar
with a struggle of like versus like in which the actor with most resources
generally comes out ahead. They are far less comfortable with asymmetric
warfare, where there are no rules and no front lines, strengths and vulnera-
bilities are sometimes indistinguishable from one another, and fighting
smart can sometimes compensate for limited resources. Against this back-
ground, this section does not seek to elaborate detailed strategies for coun-
tering terrorism or organised crime. Instead, it establishes some precepts
that could be helpful not only in guiding these strategies, but also in devel-
oping a long-term approach to managing the new disorder. 
The first injunction is to think and act strategically. While this appears so
obvious as to be superfluous, there are, in fact, several ways in which
governments typically fail to meet this requirement. Thinking strategically
requires a long view going beyond a concern with immediate failures and
successes; some analysis of root causes of security problems; an assessment
of the consequences of success as well as failure in existing responses; and
systematic efforts to turn assessments into actions.
The second imperative is to know the enemy. This requires far better intel-
ligence than ever before. Much of the necessary intelligence can be collected
only through multilateral efforts – and United States and European intelli-
gence agencies need to collaborate and share intelligence with each other
even more fully than in the past. They also need to cooperate with foreign
agencies that can infiltrate al-Qaeda and similar terrorist or criminal
networks with greater ease and lower risk of detection than can intelligence
personnel from NATO countries. Similarly, it is necessary to develop and
maintain intelligence assets in zones of turbulence, so that vectors creating
spillover to zones of peace can be anticipated. Knowing the new enemies also
requires extremely effective techniques for fusion of highly classified and
open source material, traditional intelligence and law-enforcement intelli-
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gence, foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence, and strategic warning
and tactical indicators. To have any chance of meeting the new security
challenges with any degree of real effectiveness, intelligence superiority is
essential. Indeed, it is far more important than weapons superiority. The
United States obviously enjoys military superiority over any challenger,
whether state or transnational network, but in many contingencies such
superiority is meaningless.
The third imperative is to think out of the box and avoid the temptation of
locating new challenges in old conceptual frameworks. It is essential to
adopt new ways of thinking, beyond the conventional wisdom, and to
deviate considerably from traditional ways of doing things. Old conceptuali-
sations, categorisations and distinctions are no longer adequate and, in
some cases, no longer relevant. The familiar distinction between domestic
and foreign, for example, is of little utility when considering transnational
threats that typically cross multiple borders. The way in which the threat
from weapons of mass destruction is assessed is similar: it is conceivable, for
example, that the delivery system of choice for a nuclear strike against
United States citizens will be an intermodal container that is brought into a
busy United States port as part of a legitimate shipment of goods. In the new
security environment, container defence might be more important than
ballistic missile defence – especially in relation to homeland security. While
the Bush administration is fully committed to defence against ballistic
missile attack, therefore, some of the effort and resources devoted to this
could usefully be diverted to detection and prevention of other, less orthodox
delivery systems. Another area where far more needs to be done is in identi-
fying the requirements of network warfare and how it can be fought most
effectively. Analyses by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have provided an
excellent basis for this.31 Indeed, in the aftermath of September 11, the US
secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, adopted the rhetoric of network
warfare. Yet, in Afghanistan it is not clear the United States military under-
took serious network damage assessment, or began to anticipate the ways in
which the al-Qaeda network could adapt to the new security environment it
now faces. For the most part, the United States relied on conventional mili-
tary tactics supplemented by special forces. For United States military plan-
ners, therefore, the challenge is to think in very different ways about
warfare. The United States is no longer involved in conflicts in which indus-
trial or technological superiority is the simple key to victory. On the
contrary, it has to confront enemies for whom traditional notions of victory
and defeat mean very little so long as they can continue to inflict pain on the
United States and its citizens.
Finally, the United States needs to reassess the institutions and proce-
dures through which national security policy is made and implemented.
Along with its NATO allies, the United States faces what is, in effect, a crisis
of institutions: many of those institutions that still govern societies were
Security threats
82
2504Chap4  7/4/03  12:39 pm  Page 82
organised primarily for the industrial age, not the digital age. They are
essentially hierarchical, slow, bureaucratic organisations in which the
chain of authority runs top-down, in which creativity is stifled, and in which
standard operating procedures rule out innovative responses and solutions.
Remedying the deficiencies will not happen overnight. As a matter of
urgency, however, it is essential to break down the institutional stove-piping
that characterises not only intelligence collection and analysis but also
strategic and policy planning and task implementation. Institutional inno-
vation needs to be encouraged at all levels, so that traditional bureaucratic
distinctions and demarcations can be overcome. A premium must be placed
on the creation of smart institutions to combat smart enemies. Anything less
is unlikely to succeed. 
In other words, as the United States and its NATO allies face a new
strategic environment, particularly along Europe’s eastern periphery, they
need to develop new methods and procedures for responding to it. The
enemies are flexible, nimble and innovative; governments are laboriously
slow, wedded to established methods, and restricted by standard opera-
tional procedures. Unless the NATO member-states are able to transcend
these limitations and respond to disorder in systematic and innovative
ways, the forces of disorder will emerge triumphant and the Westphalian
system will be doomed. 
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5Transboundary water management
and security in Central Asia1
Stuart Horsman
Central Asia is subject to a number of major environmental concerns,
including the desiccation of the Aral Sea, the depletion and degradation of
river and irrigation waters, and the consequences of Soviet and Chinese
nuclear weapons testing at Semipalatinsk and Lop Nor, respectively.
Riverine water, particularly when linked with irrigated land, is perhaps the
only one of these environmental issues that demonstrates a ‘probable
linkage between environmental degradation and the outbreak of violent
civil or interstate conflict’.2 This proposition reflects current research
suggesting that globally fresh water is the renewable resource most likely to
be a source of conflict in the near future.3
Historically water provided a cultural, economic and geographical focus
for Central Asia. The khanates’ political culture, including deferential collec-
tivism, was associated with water scarcity and the organisational require-
ments of the construction and maintenance of irrigation systems.4 Irrigation
was ‘one of the principle functions of state power’.5 Conflict in the region was
often linked to or affected water resources.6 Tsarist and Soviet expansion of
irrigation networks in the region heightened water’s strategic importance,
illustrated by the Bolsheviks’ attempt to pacify the Ferghana Valley in the
1920s and by the national delimitation process of 1924–36.7 During the
late Soviet period, the Aral Sea and related irrigation crises provoked friction
between Moscow and environmental and nationalist critics in Central Asia,
and Uzbekistan in particular.8 Competition for land and water was also cited
as a contributory, if not the primary, cause of interethnic violence in the
Batken-Isfara, Osh and Samarkand regions.9 Since the Soviet Union’s
collapse, a number of academics and politicians have cited a relationship
between Central Asia’s water crisis and regional stability.10 The recent
extended drought in the region has renewed concerns about this dynamic.
As well as the Aral Sea basin issue, another transboundary river dispute is
emerging between China and Kazakhstan. 
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While riverine water is the environmental issue most liable to lead to war
in the region, such an outcome remains improbable for a number of reasons,
some related to water and others not. Water’s security implications princi-
pally fall within the wider conceptualisation of security – as an indirect or
contributory cause to instability. Poor water management affects diplomatic
relations, economic development, public health and access to land. Thus,
while interstate war directly associated with water disputes is not likely to
take place in the near future, it is expedient to address Central Asia’s water
problem. There is a broad consensus that interstate cooperation is required if
the problem is to be managed properly. Consequently, a number of interna-
tional institutions, which range from the regional to the global, have been
involved in addressing the issue. These represent a breadth of interests and
bailiwicks, ranging from traditional and non-traditional security to
economic development and integration to environmental sustainability.
Transboundary water resources in Central Asia 
The 1.8 million km2 Aral Sea basin encompasses all of Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the two Kazakhstani provinces of
Qyzylorda and Southern Kazakhstan, 40 per cent of Afghanistan and a small
area of Iran. The basin supports 75 per cent of Central Asia’s total population
and contains 90 per cent of the region’s surface water. Two rivers, the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya, both of which drain into the Aral Sea, dominate the
region. The former rises in the Pamir mountains and flows through
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan before entering the sea. The Syr
Darya’s source is the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan, and its subsequent route to
the Aral Sea travels through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Since the 1950s, the rapid expansion in irrigated agriculture has reduced
the rivers’ combined flow into the Aral Sea by 90 per cent and has resulted in
an adverse environmental impact on the region. Between 1960 and 1998,
the sea’s volume and area declined by approximately 80 per cent and 50 per
cent respectively. It has now divided into a small northern and larger south-
ern section.11 Riverine water in Central Asia is economically significant,
politically sensitive and overutilised. The present water crisis can be attrib-
uted to a large extent to two Soviet-era polices: the establishment and
demarcation of the five Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs); and the rapid
expansion of irrigation agriculture since the 1950s. Dams constructed
upstream, in the Kyrgyz and Tajik SSRs in particular, stored water for irriga-
tion and also hydroelectric production (HEP), which accounted for 35% of
Central Asia’s energy by the early 1990s.12 These policies and processes
created a regional economic complex, but also led to intra-regional problems
and tensions.
The misallocation and overallocation of water, its economic significance
and competing demands are expected to increase in the near future. Over 50
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per cent of water supplies for Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the
two southern Kazakhstani provinces are extra-republican in source.13
While this in itself does not indicate an intractable source of tension, these
supplies are overutilised and matters are further complicated by charges of
inequitable water allocations. Under the existing water agreements the three
downstream states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) receive 73
per cent of total withdrawals from the Aral Sea Basin.14 This contrasts with
upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These two countries, the source of 90
per cent of all available waters, are allocated only 5 per cent and 11 per cent,
respectively.15
These allocation problems are significant because of the importance of
riverine water to agriculture, an important sector of these nations’ economy.
Irrigated land produces 90 per cent of the region’s crops. Cotton, the single
most important irrigation crop, underpins Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s
economies. It provides 30 per cent of Uzbekistan’s gross domestic product
(GDP), 35 per cent of its employment and 27.4 per cent of exports. Similarly,
over 50 per cent of both Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s electricity production
is generated using HEP.16
Demographic pressures further increase the contested nature of the
region’s water. Between 1959 and 1989, the population of the basin states
increased by 140 per cent.17 It is expected that it will increase by a third
again by 2020.18 Fifty per cent of the region’s population lives in 20 per cent
of its area – the Ferghana Valley, Lower Zeravshan and Tashkent–Khujand
Corridor.19 These are the prime irrigated areas, emphasising the relationship
between population pressures and competition for limited access to water
and fertile land, as was evident in the Kyrgyz–Tajik violence, over land and
water, during the 1980s.20
These problems existed in the Soviet period, but were manageable while
the Soviet Union remained intact. The region’s water resources were
controlled by a unified system, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water
Resources, based in Moscow.21 While disagreements existed, there was a
single and final arbiter – Moscow.22 Downstream Kazakh, Turkmen and
Uzbek SSRs were allocated the majority of the waters for irrigation, while the
upstream Kyrgyz and Tajik SSRs were compensated by energy supplies from
their neighbours. With the break up of the USSR, ‘[a]ll of a sudden, a very
complex water management problem became a very complex transboundary
water management problem’.23 In other water-scarce areas the water
problem and its management have gradually evolved in tandem with the
development of relations between the riparians. This has not been the case in
Central Asia, where the states have been rapidly forced to assume responsi-
bility and develop management strategies.
Another distinct transboundary water management issue of regional
significance is emerging between China and Kazakhstan. The two states
share 24 rivers, the key ones being the Ili and Irtysh, both of which rise in
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China.24 Eighty per cent of Kazakhstan’s Ili Valley water originates in China,
while the Irtysh supplies the industrial regions of central and eastern
Kazakhstan.25 China plans to extract water from the Ili and Irtysh rivers for
Urumchi and oilfield developments in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region.26 The proposal has both economic and political objectives – to stim-
ulate the economy of Xinjiang, to raise living standards, and to erode support
for Uighur irredentism. As well as the constraints on Kazakhstan’s economic
growth and living standards, China’s proposals have broader environmental
implications. These include the increased salinisation and shallowing of
these rivers as well as the Balkhash and Zaisan lakes, and adverse microcli-
mate changes, problems already evident around the Aral Sea.
The regional response: institutional innovation 
The most fundamental and important function that an international institu-
tion can undertake is actually managing and allocating the region’s water
resources. The Central Asian leaderships quickly acknowledged the need for
indigenous responsibility with the signing of the 1992 Almaty Agreement.
The agreement stated that ‘only [through] unification and joint coordina-
tion of action’ could the region’s water crisis be managed effectively.27 Under
the agreement, the states agreed to retain their Soviet-period water alloca-
tions and refrain from projects infringing on other states, and promised an
open exchange of information.28 From this auspicious beginning the
republics initiated a plethora of agreements and institutional structures.
These included the Interstate Commission on Water Coordination (ICWC),
the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basin Management Authorities (BVOs) subor-
dinated to the ICWC, the Interstate Council on Problems of the Aral Sea
Basin (ICAS), and the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS).
Institutional reforms in 1997 merged the ICWC and the ICAS, with the
former subsumed by the later. It was hoped that the merger would simplify
administrative procedures and resolve duplication of effort and bureaucratic
inertia.29 This step was a positive indication of the states’ awareness of the
seriousness of the crisis and the need to coordinate their response more effec-
tively. IFAS’s responsibilities after 1997 included deciding water allocations
among the republics and the Aral Sea, overseeing the ‘regulation, use and
the protection of water courses’, acting as a conduit for the states to give
notification of intentions to act, and the avoidance of ‘disputes before they
arise’.30 The IFAS increased its role further when it was provided with the
managerial responsibility of Phase Two of the Aral Sea Basin Program
(ASBP). The World Bank had played a more prominent managerial role in
Phase One of the ASBP, a project discussed in more detail later in this
chapter.31
The Central Asian presidents continue to reiterate their commitment to
cooperative water management via the IFAS, other regional organisations
Transboundary water management
89
2504Chap5  7/4/03  12:40 pm  Page 89
and regional summits. Between March 1998 and January 2000, six frame-
work agreements and nine annual operational agreements, including water-
energy sharing agreements, were signed between different Syr Dayra
states.32 Similarly, a joint presidential proposal for further intergovernmen-
tal agreements on water use was proposed at the Central Asian Economic
Union’s (CAEU) June 2000 meeting.33 Likewise the December 2001
Declaration of the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CAC), the
CAEU’s successor, stated that the ‘heads of state are convinced that coordi-
nated and agreed actions in the sphere of rational and mutually advanta-
geous use of water facilities and hydro-energy resources based on the
principles and norms of international law will serve as a basis for effective
use of the existing agricultural and energy potential of the states’.34 The CAC
has one key attribute, which encourages such an optimistic assessment – its
membership. It includes the four Syr Darya riparians and avoids the more
difficult Amu Darya basin issue and the region’s most difficult interlocutor,
Turkmenistan.
Regional bodies, however, have been found wanting. None, and in partic-
ular not the IFAS, has established an effective institutional framework for
regulating regional water disputes. As one commentator recently stated,
there are ‘too many intergovernmental agreements [which] remain just
words on a piece of paper’.35 The principle cause of this ineffectiveness has
been the organisation’s key stakeholders. Political differences, lack of politi-
cal and financial commitment, and failure to implement agreements have
weakened these bodies. Initially, it was proposed that the IFAS would rely on
contributions from the member states of 1 per cent of their individual gross
national products (GNPs), with additional international donations.36 The
IFAS then reduced the level of contributions to 0.3 per cent for Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and 0.1 per cent for Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. Despite this revision, the majority of its member-states have been
unable or unwilling to pay their agreed contributions.37 More generally, the
Central Asian government’s political and financial commitment to the IFAS
and other regional initiatives has been poor, Kazakhstan being the excep-
tion. Although the IFAS has been underfunded, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan have spent in excess of $650 million on projects within their
own territory related to the Aral Sea.38 The IFAS has been unable to develop
an institutional identity or authority distinct from its members. 
In an effort to provide some sense of permanency and consistency, the
IFAS’s Scientific Commission of the ICWC, which prepares the data for the
annual irrigation plans, is now permanently based in Tashkent. This basing
decision, however, caused difficulties when the ICWC refused to provide
Turkmenistan, when it was the IFAS chair, with relevant hydrological data.
As a result of such difficulties the IFAS’s effectiveness has been limited.
Similarly, the CAC’s ambitious objectives are not matched by reality. Its goal
of a single economic space by 2002, for example, did not materialise and its
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members have failed to implement the institution’s decisions. In the long
term the CAC may be the basis for an effective and indigenous organisation,
but the present prognosis is not encouraging.
The republics and international donor community have increasingly
acknowledged the nexus between energy supplies and water supplies formed
by the Soviet management of regional waters. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have initiated a number of relevant agreements,
with encouragement from the EU-TACIS and the United States Agency for
International Development.39 The most promising of these initiatives is the
Council of the Central Asian Energy System, established in August 2001.
However, it remains a fragile structure and the issue is still as intractable as
ever. The states have frequently failed to honour agreements – suspending
supplies of water or energy, or not paying debts on time. Kyrgyzstan, for
example, was still awaiting the delivery of 30,000 tonnes of coal from the
2000 agreement in April 2001. Similarly, Uzbekistan has sporadically cut
gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan because of Bishkek’s energy debts and possibly
as a means of political leverage.40 A Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan energy–water
agreement collapsed soon after it was signed in December 2000. Kyrgyzstan
was forced to release waters for HEP, which were allocated for Uzbekistan’s
summer irrigation requirements, because the latter had cut gas supplies. A
new agreement was signed in March 2001. Consequently, Uzbekistan may
have received only a third of the water it should have been allocated.
Tashkent estimated that this cost it $400 million in lost agricultural
revenue.41 Similar difficulties were reported in early 2002.42
The potential disputes over the Ili and Irtysh have attracted less interna-
tional involvement. The most relevant organisation in this context is the
SCO. Kazakhstan has attempted to draw the SCO into the problematic, with
mixed results. At the 2001 SCO Shanghai Summit, President Nazarbaev
stated that there is a need for cooperation in ‘environmental-related interac-
tion, first of all, in the border zones . . . There are such issues as transbound-
ary rivers [that] both sides are trying to resolve. In some cases, it would be
preferable to conduct multilateral negotiations in the context of the
Shanghai Cooperation Oganisation.’43 China subsequently allowed
Kazakhstan to survey the upper reaches of the Irtysh.44 In fact, Amanbek
Ramazanov, the chair of Kazakhstan’s Water Resources Committee,
suggested the preceding summit had provided a suitable opportunity for
progress on the negotiations.45
In reality, the SCO has so far provided a limited forum to deal with trans-
boundary water negotiations. The negotiations on the rivers remain bilat-
eral in nature.46 The Declaration of the SCO does state that the organisation
aims to encourage ‘further effective cooperation in politics, economy,
science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, envi-
ronmental protection and other fields’.47 However, the fundamental inter-
ests of the SCO and in particular its most powerful members, China, Russia
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and Uzbekistan, are firmly linked to traditional security interests. This
confluence of interests within the SCO reflects a common preoccupation
with irredentism, terrorism and extremism. These three states also view and
respond to new security challenges in a traditional manner. As a result, only
modest expectations can be placed on the SCO’s role in and effective manage-
ment of regional water management issues. 
The extra-regional response 
Given the fact that Central Asian states have had only ten years to assume
managerial responsibility and develop the institutional structures, it is
understandable that indigenous institutions have not been entirely success-
ful. In this milieu a number of extra-regional organisations have become
involved in regional water issues. The principal role that these institutions
can play is in technical assistance and institution building/capacity develop-
ment. 
The awareness in the donor community of the need for creating and
strengthening an institutional framework for regional cooperation, based on
a clear set of structures and institutional framework, has led to some
successes. Both the ICAS and the IFAS were established under international
donor pressure to improve regional cooperation on water management
policies.48 The World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
and United Nations Environmental Program have been involved with the
Central Asian states in the ASBP. The three-phase, 20-year ASBP aims to
stabilise and rehabilitate the environmental situation and develop the
region’s institutional capacity in order to implement the remedial work.49 In
Phase One, the World Bank temporarily moved out of its traditional financial
and technical roles to become an active participant in related negotiations.50
By Phase Two, however, the World Bank had returned to its more traditional
role, focusing upon financial assistance and support of regional manage-
ment and capacity building. Both the UNDP and EU-TACIS’s Water
Resources Management and Agricultural Production (WARMAP) have
assisted in capacity building. 51 WARMAP has also sought to enhance water
management strategies and information sharing.52
Another area in which extra-regional institutions have offered assistance
is the application and implementation of international water law. This effort
has had limited success to date. While water management agreements
continue to be signed, none of the IFAS ones have been accorded the status
of international law, as is the norm for other treaty-based river basin
commissions. Neither of the BVOs is recognised by national legislatures and
therefore they lack authority.53 Similarly Eric Sievers reports that China has
contravened both international law and bilateral agreements: in particular
it has failed to notify and consult Kazakhstan on its intentions or provide
environmental impact assessments.54 Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian
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state to have acceded to the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.55 However indi-
rectly, international water law has penetrated the debate. The World Bank,
for example, has supported only projects that do not contravene interna-
tional water law principles.56 WARMAP has likwise been involved in this
sphere: ‘Unlike the other aid projects with a technical focus, WARMAP had
a specific legal and institutional agenda to create a framework for water
sharing based on legal principles in accordance with the Helsinki Rules and
International Law Commission recommendations’.57
Extra-regional organisations have played an important role in providing
financial assistance to the region. The World Bank’s Vice President for
Europe and Central Asia, Johannes Linn, argues that the World Bank has
two instruments, financial assistance and the appropriating of water
resources, that can solve the Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan ‘water problem’.58 As
Philip Micklin notes, although it is difficult to record the actual levels of
foreign financial assistance, the World Bank had loans and credits of $605
million to the Central Asian states in 2000.59 However, the relationship
between the regional governments and extra-regional donors has been prob-
lematic. The regional governments’ expectations that the international
donor community would provide large-scale and unconditional financial
assistance because the Aral Sea crisis is a ‘global concern’ is unrealistic.
Conditionality and transparency have posed difficulties between the two
parties, as have different expectations about the pace of related economic,
environmental and management reforms. During 2001, these differences
emerged when Uzbekistan sought financial assistance from the World Bank
and United Nations (UN) as well as other donors to address the consequences
of the ongoing drought.60 The donor community was initially reluctant to
offer further money – Tashkent had failed to implement any remedial poli-
cies, had in fact further exacerbated the drought by its water management
and agricultural policies, and failed to account properly for previous loans.
While the potential for water-related conflict in Central Asia exists, water
is unlikely to provoke interstate conflict by itself. Water-related issues
remain none the less highly disputed and are discussed in a tense if not
antagonistic manner. Water has also at times been incorporated, at least
rhetorically, into the traditional security sphere. The rebel Tajik commander
Mahmud Khudaberdiyev threatened to destroy a dam during his November
1998 insurrection.61 There were also reports that groups in Tajikistan once
discussed the idea of using the Syr Darya as ‘an offensive weapon in any
territorial dispute with Uzbekistan’, and that Uzbekistan would threaten to
use military force to seize the Toktogul Dam if Kyrgyzstan attempted to alter
the existing distribution policy.62 It is unclear whether any of these threats
had any substance. They do indicate a regional political atmosphere from
which confidence and cooperation are absent. In such a milieu, interna-
tional institutions can provide essential assistance in conflict prevention and
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confidence building. There are a number of security-orientated organisa-
tions which should be able to provide this function in this region, most
notably the UN, the OSCE and the SCO.
The OSCE’s inclusive Eurasian membership, comprehensive security
concept (which includes an environmental dimension) and cooperative
approach to resolving security problems make it one of the most relevant
organisations in this context.63 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
‘Central Asian republics have called upon the OSCE to assist in addressing
the environmental issues of security in the region, particularly the question
of water resources’.64 As a result, the OSCE has focused on the promotion of
consensus building and the support for negotiated and institutional
approaches to water management, which the OSCE regards as ‘important
instruments for preventing potential conflict’.65 Wilhelm Hoynck, special
representative of the chairman-in-office for Central Asia, recently high-
lighted this conflict-prevention role of the OSCE: ‘Central Asia is a region
with a high potential for problems and also conflicts. But at this point . . . is
not a crisis region. And here we have a challenge for the international
community to deal with a situation which is really a task of crisis prevention’
(italics added).66 The Central Asian states and the OSCE have had a difficult
relationship, in particular in relation to the differing priorities over which of
the OSCE’s three dimensions of security should take priority in the region.
The OSCE’s Water Initiative, an attempt to encourage dialogue and coopera-
tion, failed because of competing attitudes towards external intervention
and the value of bilateral or multilateral diplomacy. Similar problems have
affected the other water management scenario under discussion, the
Sino–Kazakh waterways. The SCO’s original raison d’être was confidence
building and it successfully produced a multilateral agreement on military
reductions along the joint Sino–former Soviet Union borders.67 However, as
noted previously, the SCO has not been able to provide more than an infor-
mal forum and indirect confidence-building measures on water issues.
Institutional involvement can also help define the norms of debate and
behaviour, and indicate what is environmentally, financially or technically
feasible. In 2001 there were reports that President Karimov had proposed
the revival of the Sibaral water diversion scheme. This plan was met with
broad international disapproval. The World Bank refused to fund even
preliminary analysis of the scheme.68 Despite significant financial resources
and global credibility, the leverage that international institutions have on
encouraging cooperative and sustainable management structures should
not be overestimated.
Understanding the limitations of institutions 
Regional and international organisations have had mixed success in manag-
ing Central Asia’s water. Cooperation on water issues is attainable as long as
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other, more deep-seated political differences can be managed. To a great
extent the failings in regional water management are indicative of the
broader political context. While interstate conflict or major diplomatic
disputes have been avoided, it is not certain whether institutional bodies,
within and outside of the region, have played a significant role in deterring
them. Nor have there been significant improvements in water management
or environmental protection – key objectives of the many institutions
involved. As Daniel Bedford and Philip Micklin independently argue,
regional institutional arrangements, such as the IFAS, could play a signifi-
cant role in water management, but weak political commitment and cooper-
ation, and financial and legal constraints, have hamstrung them.69 Newly
found and jealously guarded state sovereignty, lack of trust, of confidence
and of compromise, unequal economic and political relationships, poor
economic development, and the legacy of Soviet attitudes, infrastructure
and norms have all hindered the development of regional cooperation.
Political and personal rivalries between the Central Asian leaderships also
weaken the potential for regional cooperation. For example, Niyazov’s
antipathy to Karimov’s appointment as head of the IFAS marred the organi-
sation’s February 1997 summit meeting.70 Problems and misunderstanding
with and within the international donor community have also complicated
the situation.
It is understandable that the region’s governments have been keen to
protect and promote their state sovereignty. However, this protection of
sovereignty is also indicative of regional political thinking, in which policy-
makers have at times applied nationalist, protectionist and ‘zero-sum’
calculi to the problem. For Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, this feeds into
their opposition to revisions of water allocations and the preference for bilat-
eral diplomacy over multilateral engagement. Turkmenistan is the most
obvious proponent of this approach. Despite the evident need for interstate
cooperation, President Niyazov has stated that multilateral organisations
‘shall not infringe upon [Turkmenistan’s] sovereignty’.71 When invited by
the OSCE to participate in collective water discussions, both Asgabat and
Tashkent declared that they favoured bilateral approaches.72 Uzbekistan’s
refusal to participate in the multilateral discussions was accompanied by the
statement that Uzbekistan had a thousand years of resolving its own water
problems.73 Similarly Henning places China’s behaviour in the Irtysh
scenario within Asia’s broader and bleak environmental security dynamic.
Beijing’s assertive water policy is indicative of a trend in Asia, where states
are keen to ensure their national water supplies, often to the detriment of the
stability of other states and the region.74 This attitude was also evident in
Asgabat’s redefining of the Kara Kum Canal as a river and entirely on its own
territory. In Asgabat’s view, this meant that the related allocation and
management issues would not require interstate consultation.75
Unequal power relationships pervade the ongoing water disputes. There
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are in essence conflict of interests between ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’
states. The former have the most to lose if allocations are renegotiated, while
multilateral negotiations provide the best option for the latter to reverse
what they perceive as inequitable quotas.76 This dynamic is evident in
the Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan–Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan–Uzbekistan and China–Kazakhstan cases.
Most of the Central Asian leaders lack a genuine commitment to finding a
viable solution to the regional water crisis. The lack of commitment is
evident in the republics’ limited support of the relevant organisations. It is
also noticeable in a pervasive attitude within the region that because the
problem is of Soviet origin and of considerable magnitude, the present
governments should not be expected to shoulder the burden on their own.77
Unless regional ownership and initiative are enhanced it is difficult to see
how the problem will be resolved or why external actors should be seriously
involved. Economic policies and priorities have hampered cooperative water
management. The continuation of Soviet-style and unsustainable environ-
mental and economic practices has been a major impediment for
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Admittedly, there has been a modest decline
in acreage under cotton since 1991, and a corresponding expansion in less
‘water-thirsty’ grain production. This change in the composition of crops
under cultivation has been undertaken principally to promote national food
self-sufficiency, rather than to reduce water consumption and forestall an
ecological disaster. 
During 2001, the fourth year of a regional drought, both Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan sought to find new water sources, drilling new boreholes, for
example, rather than reduce state-planned targets for cotton and grain
production. Similarly both Turkmenistan’s planned Lake of the Golden Age
and the reported revival in the Sibaral scheme suggest outdated and unsus-
tainable developmental and environmental thinking.78 After a decade of
independence, an Uzbekistani water expert could state: ‘the re-routing of Ob-
Irtish [sic] appears to be the only tangible solution to the ecological and other
problems caused by the drying of the Aral Sea. . . . [T]he international
community could conceivably provide funding to support a project . . . re-
routing the Ob-Irtish to [the] Aral Sea’.79 This statement suggests that inter-
national institutions and norms on water management may not have
penetrated the regional understanding on the water crisis as deeply as many
advocates have hoped or suggested.
The divisions between the republics’ individual economic priorities,
between HEP and irrigation requirements, and between HEP-reliant states
and hydrocarbon producers have also weakened institutional agreements
and management. The fragile nature of the recent energy–water transfer
agreements demonstrates that while the republics are aware of the poten-
tially symbiotic relationship between water and energy, they have not found
a robust or mutually beneficial mechanism to regulate this dynamic. As a
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result water remains a scarce, strategic resource which the states find diffi-
cult to compromise on. Without a shift in economic thinking and priorities,
a viable compromise over the distribution of water among the riparian states
will remain elusive. 
Management prospects and implications for Eurasian security
Water remains a contested and strategic asset for the four countries of the
Aral Sea Basin and may become so between China and Kazakhstan in the
near future. How far water-related conflict is likely in the future is difficult to
gauge. International evidence, particularly from the Middle East, suggests
that interstate water-related conflict is the exception rather than the rule.80
It is fortunate that water rarely results in interstate violence. Demand for
water is, however, intense and predicted to increase in the near future.
Moreover, rising demand is accompanied by a number of negative political
factors: poor collective management, proposals for further water extraction,
tension in interstate relations, bellicose diplomatic rhetoric, and sporadic but
low-level violence at the communal level. 
The countries of the Aral Sea Basin do not appear to have acknowledged
either individually or collectively the seriousness of the situation, the expedi-
ency of cooperative political action, or the need for an integrated manage-
ment system to resolve this issue. As Micklin notes:
Looking at the future, the only rational avenue for the Aral Sea Basin states to
follow is cooperation and compromise in managing and sharing their trans-
national water resources. This is not only necessary to avoid interstate conflict,
perhaps even military confrontation, but to develop an integrated basin-wide
strategy to optimize water use efficiency and maximize efforts to restore and
protect key water related eco-systems.81
The republics have taken tentative steps towards collective water manage-
ment, although ‘progress is slow and uneven, and the most critical problems
remain formidable and largely unresolved’.82 Further pressures – the deteri-
oration of the existing irrigation infrastructure, the continued economic
reliance on irrigation agriculture, demographic growth, and Afghanistan’s
and China’s demands for water, as well as non-water-related disputes –
suggest a heightened sense of water insecurity and an inability to cooper-
ate.83 As a result the region’s water security milieu is and will continue to be
tense, although not openly hostile. 
The role of external actors in this strained and confused security environ-
ment is on the whole positive but limited. Extra-regional organisations can
play a useful but essentially supportive role. Encouragement and incentives for
more efficient water provision, cooperative water management and conflict
prevention have not necessarily found a receptive audience in Central Asia.
Although the Central Asian republics have been resistant to some initiatives,
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the international community is also to blame for this failure. International
organisations and individual states have failed to maintain clear and consis-
tent objectives, with economic and strategic objectives often running counter
to policies encouraging collective regional behaviour. Confusion and competi-
tion between the initiatives of different organisations have also hindered the
goal of cooperative water management.84
The focus of future international attention with respect to Central Asia’s
water resources should include increased and simplified cooperation within
the donor community and with regional bodies in order to produce a more
coherent, efficient and less adversarial management structure. It should also
include the provision of ‘a know-how transfer concerning the legal basis of
international river basins [and] the organization of water management’, and
induce a shift from the alleviation of the symptom (the drying up of the Aral
Sea) to reform of the fundamental cause, the cultivation of cotton. Two other
categories of policy response are also essential: increased support for civil
society activities in general and those related to agricultural and environ-
mental sectors in particular; and, depending upon the Central Asian states’
response to the World Bank’s 1996 ASBP Review, financial support.85
Interstate relations in Central Asia are far less tense than those in the
Middle East, and the existing institutional framework and shared political
norms at the elite level in Central Asia suggest that, while there have been
disputes and tensions over water, violent conflict is unlikely. The sub-state
situation has greater potential for environmentally related conflict. Here
violent incidents associated with access to water have been evident,
although limited in scale. The most significant of these conflicts was the
1992 ‘kolkhoz war’ in Kurgan Teppa.86 Low-level tensions over water
poaching and rerouting of irrigation canals have been reported elsewhere.87
However, these are unlikely to escalate into interstate conflict.
Although interstate conflict may be avoided, water does have wider secu-
rity implications.88 The interaction between economic and environmental
issues is particularly acute and problematic in the rural sector. Given the fact
that the majority of the region’s population is employed in the agricultural
sector, this has serious implications for social stability, and possibly for secu-
rity. It was reported that ecological deterioration led to the internal migra-
tion of 70,000 Kazakhstanis in 1996.89 Similarly, it is estimated that 20 per
cent of agricultural jobs in Uzbekistan are superfluous.90 Degradation of
agricultural land, demographic pressures, unemployment and underem-
ployment may translate into major population movement, group competi-
tion for economic, political and social resources, social instability, the rise of
political Islamist movements and the erosion of regime legitimacy.91
Given the limited scale of recent examples of water-related population and
economic dislocation and instability, the security implications for the wider
region and Europe in particular are limited and indirect. Also, the geograph-
ical distance between the main water flashpoints and European energy
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investments in the region and western Europe itself means that unless any
potential water war escalated considerably, it would not adversely affect
Western interests. However, these may be affected indirectly. Some of the
interests at risk are national self-interests and material. These include risks
to current and potential investments in the region, a worsening security
environment in Central Asia, which could draw in significant near neigh-
bours including Russia and China, and the possibility of massive refugee
flows. Other interests are more universalist and benign in character, includ-
ing the promotion and defence of human rights and conflict prevention,
good governance, international and social stability, security and (sustain-
able) development, equitable resource allocation and environmental protec-
tion, for example. It is more likely, however, that interest in the region will be
a function of narrow national interests.92
Prior to September 11 2001, western interests in the region were rela-
tively modest. The exceptions to this rule were perhaps the concern about
the Aral Sea and the investment into the energy sector. International assis-
tance to and interest in the immediate Aral Sea region was relatively forth-
coming. However, much of this was misplaced, diverting attention, energy
and funding away from the fundamental causes – water mismanagement
and irrigation-based cotton agriculture – to what is essentially a symptom of
the basic factors.93 Since September 2001, there has been a substantive
increase in western interest in the region and the resources available for
implementing recent and long-term objectives there. Western European
involvement in the region is more than a strategic reaction to the American-
led campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to the
American presence in Central Asia more generally. It reflects, for example,
an effort to promote good governance and economic reform in the region. As
a result of both self-interested and universalist objectives, it is expedient that
the West retains and increases its engagement in Central Asia. Despite the
difficulties faced by international institutions’ activities in Central Asia, they
remain probably the most effective vehicle for promoting effective regional
management and European engagement on this issue. Ultimately, however,
both the international donor community and the Central Asian leadership
should recognise the limitations of extra-regional parties in this dynamic.
The key role for ‘the international donor community [is] to remind the Aral
Basin governments that whereas the international community is committed
to assisting the region in resolving the Aral Crises, fundamental responsibil-
ity for this rests with the Aral Sea Basin countries’.94
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6The geopolitics of
Central Asian energy 
Jaewoo Choo 
This chapter assesses the rising geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of
Central Asian oil and natural gas for China and the United States – the most
transparent source of Sino-American conflict in this region. The initial
rationale for Chinese engagement in Central Asia, despite the emergence of
China as a net oil-importing nation in 1993, was not driven by the search for
an alternative and secure source of oil and natural gas.1 Rather, Chinese
policy reflected a set of domestic and foreign policy concerns, particularly the
desire to address unresolved border disputes with its many neighbours, to
dampen ethnic unrest in the Xinjiang autonomous province, to foster
regional economic cooperation, to open new markets for Chinese arms, and
to reduce the incidence of drug trafficking and illegal migration.2 American
interest in the region was closely linked to the Clinton strategy of engage-
ment and enlargement, particularly the desire to facilitate the transition to
democracy and the market economy in the states spawned by the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. But as the gap between the demand and domestic supply
of oil widened in both countries, the oil-producing states of Central Asia took
on a new significance. Both the Chinese and American governments have
sought privileged access to this region for their national oil firms.3
Sino-American competition in this region began in earnest in 1994.4
China seemed to be better positioned initially, owing to successive annual
summit meetings with the regional oil-producing states – Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These meetings resulted in the
creation of the ‘Shanghai Five’ in 1996, a grouping that was subsequently
enlarged with the addition of Uzbekistan in 1999 and formalised in 2001
with the creation of the SCO.5 The Shanghai process generated cooperation
agreements in various issue areas, ranging from border disputes to economic
cooperation to anti-terrorism measures. In this way, China established a
firm diplomatic presence in the region.
The September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC,
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however, have had a lasting effect on the trajectory of Sino-American
competition in Central Asia. The subsequent American retaliation on the
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan generated the not unwelcomed exter-
nality of expanding the American sphere of influence in the region.
American military operations required the acquisition of military basing
rights, and the United States was able to deploy and base its troops along
Afghanistan’s perimeter in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in
exchange for considerable sums of humanitarian aid and economic assis-
tance. The basing of American forces in these Central Asian states initially
raised concerns in Russia, China, Iran and even Turkey. Despite the
American claim that the US military presence in the region was temporary
and contingent on the war on terrorism, the world in general, and Russia
and China in particular, were very much concerned that this temporary
deployment of American troops would become permanent and formalised in
a set of bilateral treaties. At this juncture, it appears certain that the duration
and nature of the US military presence in Central Asia will extend into the
medium term, an assessment in keeping with the immediate challenge of
counter-insurgency warfare in Afghanistan and the longer-term challenge
of waging the war on terrorism. 
The longer the duration of the American military presence in Central
Asia, the more anxious will China be. Just as the United States was discom-
fited by the rising influence of China and Russia in the region prior to
September 2001, China and Russia are now discomfited by the rising
American role and influence there, despite their (self-interested) support of
the US campaign against terrorism.6 China, in particular, faces an acute
geostrategic dilemma. Whether it be NATO’s PfP programme, the OSCE, or
the signing of bilateral military agreements with states in the region, China
views these American initiatives, even if they have been directed at the disin-
terested goal of regional stability, as a putative threat to Chinese regional
interests (just as many in Washington have viewed the SCO as a threat to
American interests). These divergent geostrategic assessments raise a few
interesting questions: are American and Chinese interests in fact opposed in
the region? Is the nascent security regime embodied in the SCO inherently
incompatible with the Atlantic security system? Will the development and
exploitation of Central Asian energy be hindered or precluded by the clash of
Chinese and American geostrategic interests in the Pacific?  Answers to
these questions will inevitably be conditioned by the negative perceptions
that Chinese and American foreign policy elites have of one another and the
power vacuum in Central Asia that has invited the major powers to stake an
exclusive leadership claim there. While Chinese diplomatic options are
increasingly constrained by the rapprochement between Russia and NATO
and the dependence of Pakistan and India on American patronage to broker
the Kashmir dispute, the ‘Great Game’ for influence and control of this
region could none the less be replayed by the United States and China.
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Increasingly, such an outcome could be fuelled as much by a competition for
future rights to Central Asian oil reserves as by concerns over geostrategic
advantage.
The rising geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of Central Asia 
Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, Central Asia was already an
important region in the world for two reasons, one positive and the other
negative. Central Asia is potentially an alternative to the Persian Gulf as a
major source of oil and natural gas.7 American, European and Chinese
interest in Central Asia embodies similar diversification strategies designed
to lessen dependence on unstable Middle Eastern governments and an
unpredictable Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Central Asia
offers two prominent advantages for oil consumers. First, its reserves are
much larger than previously assumed and continue to be revised upwards as
recovery technologies improve and prices rise. Second, the oil-production
capacity of the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, which account, respectively,
for 63% and 25% of the world’s proven oil reserves, has stagnated over the
past 20 years.8
American, Chinese and Russian interest in Central Asia is driven by the
fragility of Central Asian regimes and the potential threat they pose to
regional stability. The difficult transition process has stalled in many cases
and outstanding conflicts, territorial and other, continue to plague inter-
state relations and complicate the process of exploiting, extracting and deliv-
ering oil and natural gas from the region.9 The ability of the great powers,
particularly China and the United States, to mitigate the causes of regional
instability, to mediate interstate conflict, and to avoid the outbreak of war
will largely determine whether Central Asia can become a stable and reliable
source of supply. The states of the region have already proven themselves
incapable of managing their own affairs and have relied heavily on outside
help for solutions to the economic and political challenges attending state-
hood. The region remains potentially volatile owing to water-allocation
conflicts, Islamic militancy and ethnic tensions. The prospects for regional
peace and stability will depend, at least in the short term, on the sustained
interest and intercession of the great powers, especially China, Russia and
the United States. 
These three powers have made sustained and competitive diplomatic
overtures to the Central Asian states. The United States, for instance, has
made an effort to integrate these states into the Atlantic security system via
the PfP programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.  China and
Russia, in turn, adopted a more traditional strategy of limited multilateral-
ism with the creation of the ‘Shanghai Five’, which was later institution-
alised as the SCO. Both China and the United States have sought
preponderant influence, if not hegemony, in the region. Moreover, the
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Sino-American competition means that China and the United States, almost
by definition, view each other’s ambitions in the region as virtually inimical
to each state’s own interests. 
Illustrative of this trend is the American marriage of convenience with
Uzbekistan, which reflects Washington’s effort to manage the tension
between ideals and self-interest in a critical area of the world. Washington
designated Tashkent a strategic partner in 1995, despite the latter govern-
ment’s non-democratic and totalitarian nature.10 Washington’s embrace of
Tashkent later served the short-term American interest in the war against
terrorism and reinforced the American presence in the region. That policy,
however, may make long-term solutions to regional problems more difficult
to come by, particularly from the need to find a multilateral solution for the
routing of oil lines to eastern Asia as well as to Europe.11 The potential
danger of the American intimacy with Uzbekistan is that ‘the inertia and the
logic of events may tempt the Bush administration to let a temporary expedi-
ent grow into an enduring policy shift’.12 In other words, propping up
Uzbekistan as a regional hegemon not only would fail to address, but would
actually exacerbate, a key source of Central Asian instability: the domestic
political repression that fosters the radicalisation of Islamist movements and
galvanises popular support behind them. Moreover, viewing the Islamist
threat primarily as a military problem will not mitigate the various transna-
tional concerns plaguing the region, particularly water-allocation disputes
and unwanted flows of drugs, refugees and weapons.13 This danger is partic-
ularly acute since the Caucasus and Central Asian states could become zones
of interstate competition similar to that in the Middle East or the Korean
peninsula. The intensification of war in Chechnya and the evolution of
post-Taliban Afghanistan already point to the region’s potential for
‘Balkanisation’.  Were this process to accelerate and spread throughout the
region, it could precipitate military intervention by any one of the regional
or global major powers, including Turkey and Iran, both of which threat-
ened to intervene in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1992–93.14
A second negative development in the region is the gradual shift in the
goals and objectives of the SCO. Russia, and particularly China, are potential
challengers to the American design for and role in the region. The SCO, for
instance, shifted its focus from the resolution of border conflicts and
enhanced economic cooperation to addressing the common problem of
Islamic militancy when the members established an ‘anti-terrorism centre’
in Biskek (Kyrgyzstan) in 1999. Although the SCO claims that the sole
purpose of the Biskek centre reflects a growing recognition of the threat
posed by terrorism to the region, the United States has not fully accepted that
explanation. Rather, the Bush administration suspected that it was a
harbinger of a joint Sino-Russian strategy of eventually stationing Chinese
and Russian troops in Central Asia, moving towards creating a military and
political bloc.  But this fear has been allayed by the evolution of the
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Russian–American relationship, particularly the amicable personal rela-
tionship of the presidents, George Bush and Vladimir Putin, and Russia’s
virtual de facto membership of NATO. Russia’s concern with the SCO has
changed correspondingly. No longer interested in creating a balancing
alliance against the United States, Russia now sees the SCO as an institu-
tional basis enabling it to act as Asia’s interlocutor with the United States.
Sino-American relations have not experienced a similar evolution.
Washington and Beijing remain suspicious of each other’s intentions and
strategic interests, particularly in Central Asia. In the Chinese strategic
calculus, the SCO remains an institution designed to balance American
power in the region. The United States, on the other hand, suspects that
China’s ultimate objective is Chinese hegemony and an American loss of
presence in Eastern and Central Asia.15
American and Chinese energy policy and strategy
Both the United States and China were forced over the course of the 1990s to
reassess their growing vulnerability to disruptions in the supply of oil from
the Middle East. Each has had to reconsider the economic and political
consequences of an unanticipated energy shortfall, as well as the need to
fashion policies that would encourage the development of new sources of oil
outside the Middle East. There is a growing consensus that there may even-
tually be an unsustainable gap between the supply and demand for oil.16 The
chief reasons for the anticipated gap between global supply and demand are
attributed to the secular decline in the production of oil, limited reserves in
the OPEC states, a rising demand for oil outside the wealthy countries of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and an inade-
quate refining capacity. The rapid rise in oil consumption by the developing
states of Asia, particularly China and India, underscores the concern over a
future, major oil shortage and has accelerated the search for new sources of
oil. As a Brookings Institution study warned, the ‘growth in international oil
demand will exert increasing pressure on global oil availability’, and the
growth rate of Asian economies and populations – particularly in China and
India – will be ‘major contributors’ to this increased demand.17 In a similar
vein, the US Energy Information Administration projects that the demand
for oil in developing Asian countries will increase by 129 percent over the
next 20 years.18 Another study forecasts that China will need to import
some 60 percent of its oil and at least 30 percent of its natural gas by 2020.19
The anticipated gap between the domestic supply and demand for oil has
forced the Chinese government to look abroad to meet China’s future energy
needs.20 Similar concerns in the United States led the Department of Energy
to recommend in May 2001, for example, that the Bush administration take
aggressive measures to meet America’s future energy needs.21 The
suggested policy initiatives, particularly  drilling for oil in the Arctic National
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Wildlife Preserve, pose a formidable domestic political challenge to the
administration.22 A confluence of domestic politics and foreign policy imper-
atives has turned Chinese and American attention to Central Asia as a solu-
tion to their respective future energy requirements. The oil-rich states of
Central Asia have been accorded a privileged place in the American and
Chinese foreign policy calculations. As a consequence, these states may
become the fodder in any Sino-American competition for geopolitical and
geoeconomic predominance in the region. 
The United States will face fierce competition from China and other Asian
states in the race to exploit and develop Central Asian energy resources.
While it is true that Asian states have been important consumers of oil, they
have been content to buy that oil on the open international market rather
than to undertake the capital investment necessary to discover and exploit
new oil fields or lay claim to existing reserves.  That time has passed. The
Asian states now possess the financial and technological wherewithal to
compete on a near equal footing with the European and North American oil
companies. Western dominance in this area of the international economy is
coming to an end, a development which will no doubt enhance the energy
security of the Asian states, but at the same time diminish the energy secu-
rity of Europe and North America. The Asian advantage is particularly
marked in the oil-rich states of the Caspian Sea area: geopolitics will allow
China and other Asian states to pose a direct challenge to the West, espe-
cially the United States, when it comes to exploiting new sources of oil and
natural gas and controlling the all-important energy supply networks.  The
potential for conflict, rather than cooperation, has been conditioned by
Chinese and American foreign policy initiatives in the region after the
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1992.
US policies in the region
The Bush administration’s policy in Central Asia remains very much within
the framework of the Clinton administration’s policy of engagement and
enlargement. When the Central Asian states became independent of Soviet
rule in 1992, the United States focused on promoting political and economic
stability among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. The goals and objectives of American policy towards the region
remained congruent with those of the grand strategy pursued by the Clinton
administration: to institutionalise democracy and the free market economic
system; to improve human rights and underwrite the rule of law; and to stop
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear
weapons.23 At the outset, the Clinton administration sought to foster
regional cooperation, relying on multilateral initiatives such as NATO’s PfP
and the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC).24 The overall goal of
the administration’s policy was to create a favourable environment in which
to achieve America’s strategic goal of extending its influence in the region.
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Arguably, an important secondary strategic goal of American policy was the
facilitation of energy exploration in the region by American corporations.
For the Bush administration, the search for new sources of energy was close
to the top of the foreign policy agenda in the region, but that goal has been
displaced by the war on terrorism, a war which poses a threat to national
and regional security as well as any future effort to exploit a significant,
alternative source of energy.25 This fusion of America’s geopolitical and
geoeconomic objectives in the region has produced a constellation of policies
that may persuade regional governments to favour American over European
or Chinese corporations in the energy field. 
The Uzbek–American relationship illustrates this fusion of the geopolitical
and geoeconomic. At the outset, the United States was interested in fostering
the emergence of Uzbekistan as a regional hegemon serving American inter-
ests. In the early 1990s, only Uzbekistan was viewed by the United States as
a reliable partner, although some in the Clinton administration cautioned
against choosing a ‘preferred’ customer in the region. Some analysts
believed that the administration’s policy was too ad hoc and insufficiently
sensitive to Chinese and Russian interests in the region; others felt that the
administration was too confused to promote and secure the nation’s inter-
ests, not to mention the interests of corporate America.26 Arguably, the
United States did lack a concrete plan for achieving stability in the region.
The administration was initially unable to engage the regional leadership by
identifying or creating a common or coincidental set of interests that would
facilitate cooperation. Instead, it provided generous amounts of financial
support in exchange for their support of American policy preferences.27
The Bush administration’s war on terrorism has not provided the necessary
policy coherence that would sustain cooperation over the long term,
but instead has substituted a diffuse agenda with an agenda of one item –
terrorism. 
American diplomatic activity in Central Asia prior to September 2001
focused on creating an environment that would privilege American corpora-
tions in the exploitation of regional economic and financial opportunities.
The main thrust of that policy was the building of firm political connections
with the Central Asian regimes and governments.28 Moreover, the United
States relied on other regional actors to accomplish this end. As Edward
Morse and James Richard observed, ‘until September 11, the United States
pursued two often conflicting goals: encouraging Russia to better protect US
corporate investment in the Russian energy sector, and assisting the Caspian
countries in developing and exporting their own hydrocarbons, thereby
avoiding pipelines routes through Russia’.29 Thus, the United States sought
to engender political stability in the region – either by its own efforts or the
efforts of others – to facilitate the exploration of Central Asian oil and natural
gas fields. After September 11, however, energy interests were conjoined to
the war against terrorism. This change in the definition of American security
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interests led the Bush administration to forge stronger bilateral political and
military relationships with the regional states. The consequence of the
administration’s foreign policy shift was a significant change in the regional
balance of power. 
The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon has had the collateral effect of furthering its
long-term objectives in Central Asia; viz., creating a political environment
conducive to the exploration of the region by American energy firms and to
a regional military and political order conducive to the furthering of
American strategic interests vis-à-vis China. In the process, however, the
United States could not escape the dilemma of protecting its strategic and
political interests – responding to the terrorist threat and gaining privileged
access to Caspian Sea oil – at the familiar cost of its rhetorical dedication to
American values, democracy, freedom and liberty, the inescapable and
persistent tension between ideals and self-interest identified by Robert
Osgood over fifty years ago.30 As in the past, the Bush administration opted
to protect its interests at the expense of its professed ideals. As noted by
Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, the war against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban required the United States to enlist Uzbekistan’s authoritarian ruler,
Islam Karimov, who has long been regarded as one of the region’s most
undemocratic and repressive leaders.31 None the less, the United States
succeeded in securing access to Uzbek air bases to station its troops, airplanes
and helicopters and to make use of Uzbek territory to launch offensive strikes
on Afghanistan. In exchange, Uzbekistan received $125 million in grants
between September 2001 and January 2002.32
On the surface, the evolution of US policy in Central Asia could be seen as
facilitating the exploration and development of new sources of oil and
natural gas by American corporations. However, regional instability and
volatility demands more than a diplomatic environment facilitating the
signing of contracts. It requires, instead, a long-term American commitment
to regional stability in order to reduce the financial risks attending the explo-
ration and development of new energy sources. Thus, American policy has
had to shift from the relatively painless task of facilitating contracts between
American firms and regional governments to the more difficult and costly
task of ensuring regional political stability.
Chinese policy in the region
Beijing’s original goals and interests in Central Asia are still very much
directed towards mitigating ethnic conflicts along its borders, the favourable
resolution of outstanding border conflicts, and other non-military threats
like drugs and ethnic unrest.33 In recent times, however, the Chinese orien-
tation has evolved along lines similar to those of the United States: China is
increasingly concerned with the task of ensuring a secure supply of energy,
and views Central Asian oil and natural gas reserves as central to that strate-
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gic necessity.34 China is now actively involved in Central Asian energy
exploration, which reflects China’s long-standing fear of dependency on
uncertain sources of foreign supply.35
As China’s economy continues to grow, its demand for all sources of
energy, notably oil and natural gas, will increase. Oil demand is projected to
grow at an average annual rate of 3.8 percent during the period of
1996–2020, increasing consumption from 3.5 to 8.8 million barrels per
day. In tandem with the rising demand for oil, China’s domestic reserves and
production have steadily declined. Conservative estimates of Chinese oil
reserves indicate a reserves/production ratio of just 20 years. On the brighter
side, the share of oil in China’s primary energy consumption will remain at
20 percent, in part because of the Chinese government’s effort to expand
natural gas production and consumption.36
Natural gas demand is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 11.7
percent over the same period, increasing consumption from 0.7 to 9.5 tril-
lion cubic feet. China’s demand for natural gas is growing at a more rapid
pace than that for other sources of energy, with the result that natural gas is
expected to grow from 2 percent of China’s energy consumption in 1996 to
11 percent in 2020. Rising natural gas consumption will be largely respon-
sible for the projected decline in the use of coal from 73 percent to 65 percent
of total energy consumption between 1996 and 2020, although demand for
coal is still expected to grow at an average annual rate of 3.6 percent during
this period.37
Besides the recent decline in China’s domestic oil exploration and produc-
tion, there are two other reasons why China has sought to develop both
domestic and foreign natural gas reserves: to end chronic energy imbalances
and shortages; and to stem rising petroleum imports.38 China has been faced
with sporadic, yet chronic, energy imbalances and shortages. The uncertain
rate of future economic growth makes it very difficult to predict Chinese
energy needs with any precision.39 To reduce uncertainty, China made two
strategic decisions in the 1990s regarding its future energy needs. First, as it
became clear that the volume of crude oil imports was set to rise dramati-
cally, China started to import ever-larger quantities of oil from the Middle
East and to diversify its sources of supply.40 Second, the government
committed its state-owned enterprises in the oil business to undertaking
substantial international investments related to the extraction of oil and gas
resources, as well as to the improvement of transport networks.41 In general,
the overall purpose and intention behind these decisions were to ensure that
China would have the energy supplies necessary to sustain its future
economic growth. 
China will play a more active role in Central Asian energy politics in the
coming decade, which may well bring it into conflict with America’s strate-
gic goals in the region. China is already engaged in one energy exploration
project in Iran and is refurbishing two refineries for oil swaps from the
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Caspian region; China has committed substantial financial resources for oil
exploration in Kazakhstan; Chinese service companies are active in
Turkmenistan; and China hopes to increase oil and gas shipments from
Turkmenistan via Iran. As important, China plans to commit capital to build
long-distance pipelines running to and from the region. Moreover, the seri-
ousness of the Chinese concern about its future energy security is under-
scored by China’s long-term negotiations with the Iraqi government to
secure rights to an oil field, despite the American animus towards Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq and the American-led and enforced embargo on that
country.42
Perception and misperception in the Sino-American relationship
The United States and China would seem to share coincidental, if not
common interests and goals in the region, particularly the need to create a
favourable political and strategic environment facilitating the exploitation of
Central Asian oil and natural gas reserves.  However, the strategies and
tactics employed to achieve this goal suggest that the two states are having a
different dream in the same bed. While the United States has earnestly
striven to improve its political profile as the means to secure its economic
interests in the region, China is fearful that an American presence in the
region will frustrate its own pursuit of not dissimilar objectives. Historically,
China has been discomfited by the presence of a great power along its border
and has sometimes responded militarily, the Chinese intervention in the
Korean conflict providing the prime example.  The heightened American
profile in Central Asia and the indefinite basing of American troops in
China’s backyard suggests that the United States runs the risk of inflaming
Chinese suspicions of American intentions and ambitions in the region. 
There has been a progressive realignment of the American military pres-
ence in Asia during the past decade. The United States has very slowly,
perhaps haphazardly, crept into the Chinese neighbourhood – from
Singapore to Indonesia, from the United Arab Emirates to Oman, and now
from Uzbekistan and Pakistan to Kazakhstan. This development reinforces
the Chinese preoccupation with an American strategy of neo-containment
in Asia.43 How is China going to perceive and react to this untoward change
in its external environment? Will the US military presence in the region have
a negative or positive effect on China’s effort to secure a new channel of
supply from Central Asia? A similar question can also be raised with respect
to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea lanes: how will American policy
towards Southeast Asia affect Chinese strategic thinking and its future
acquisition of foreign oil and natural gas? What are the consequences of a
Sino-American dispute over issues of territorial sovereignty (i.e., the Taiwan
question) or the direction of the pipelines from Central Asia? 
China and the United States are wary of one another’s interests and inten-
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tions in Central Asia, a legacy of their postwar relationship and different
conceptions of international order. Real conflicts of interest, which are
magnified by mutual misunderstandings and misperceptions, will inevitably
complicate the task of developing, extracting and delivering oil and natural
gas from the region. Two examples illustrate this mutual wariness. First, the
United States perceived the ‘Shanghai Five’ and the subsequent SCO as a
military alliance aimed against the United States and as a mechanism for
isolating it in the region, if not excluding it from the region.44 The Bush
administration in particular regarded the SCO as a platform for joint Russo-
Chinese denunciations of American policies and as the legal basis for
enabling either Russia and/or China to project military force into the area.
The administration also assumed, incorrectly, that the SCO would be manip-
ulated to enhance Chinese leverage with Russia on the Taiwan question. The
American preoccupation with a set of unfounded strategic assumptions
about the purpose of the SCO and the idée fixe that China is a ‘peer competi-
tor’ have distracted attention from the Chinese effort to defend its interests in
Central Asia against separatism, terrorism and Islamic extremism – areas
where the United States and China should be able to find common ground.45
The fundamental logic informing the Bush administration’s understanding
of the SCO has reflected the deeply held assumption that China seeks
regional hegemony and the diminution of the American presence in the
western Pacific. The administration’s pessimism about the destabilising role
of the SCO – at least from the American perspective – has been reinforced by
the inevitable competition for Central Asian oil and natural gas. Although
the SCO cannot be viewed as an institution that is capable of excluding the
United States from the region, it can be viewed as a regional effort to check
American influence. None the less, the SCO is likely to have a limited impact
on the American freedom of action for two reasons: first, the emerging
framework of understanding in Europe between the United States and the
Russian Federation is likely to spill over into Central Asia; and second, China
cannot yet act alone against the United States without Russian support.46
Were one to persist in arguing that the SCO presents a serious challenge
to the US role in Central Asia, it would be equally clear that the ongoing
American military and political penetration of Central Asia presents a direct
challenge to China. First, the American military action taken in Afghanistan
has certainly shifted the regional balance of power in the American favour.
The United States has concluded military cooperation agreements with
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Second, these agreements have
laid a solid foundation for the United States to realise its long-sought objec-
tive of expanding its political influence in regional affairs. With a military
presence legitimised by a set of bilateral agreements, the United States is now
in a much better position to secure and promote its energy interests in the
region. Third, the US military presence is indefinite and provides a source of
considerable anxiety for China, which ‘would prefer not to have the US next
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door (again), as it did during the wars in Vietnam and Korea’.47 The station-
ing of 1,000 American troops in Uzbekistan, a limited deployment by any
standard, has had important regional implications.  Although those troops
were tasked to provide security for an airport central to the success of the
war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (as well as to the ancil-
lary tasks of humanitarian aid and search-and-rescue missions), Uzbekistan
now provides the staging ground for military action against any regional
power threatening American objectives or allies. The United States is now
positioned to support the governments of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan as well as smaller Kyrgyzstan and even the Russian client-state
Tajikistan in exchange for the favourable treatment of American interests,
particularly the construction of energy pipelines and major infrastructure
projects in the region. This prerogative may enable the United States to
determine the direction, path and end point of the energy transport networks
in the region. Were the United States to wield this kind of influence, it would
seriously compromise the Chinese goal of securing its own channel of supply
from the region.48
Conclusion: different starting point, different end point? 
The set of interests pushing China and the United States into Central Asia
were initially quite different. China’s engagement reflected a desire to resolve
outstanding border disputes as well as ensure regional stability, which was
jeopardised by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Beijing desired stability
and peace along the country’s long border with the Central Asian states; it
also had an equally compelling interest in stopping the transfer of arms from
the radical Islamic states and terrorists in support of the Uigor minority inde-
pendence movement in the Xinjiang autonomous region.49 By contrast,
American policy objectives for the states of this region were not dissimilar
from those held for the Russian Federation during the early years of the
Yeltsin administration. The Clinton administration provided economic and
financial assistance in an attempt not only to resuscitate weak regimes in the
region, but to lay a strong foundation for the spread of democracy and the
free market economic system. 
Starting from the mid-1990s, American and Chinese policy priorities
shifted towards devising foreign policies that would best develop and exploit
Central Asian energy reserves towards the goal of enhancing national
energy security. Neither state desires an increased dependence upon Middle
Eastern oil; neither wants future economic growth held hostage to supply
shortages – real or manufactured – or price rises. Despite a common interest
in regional stability and the exploitation of Central Asian oil reserves, China
and the United States have so far acted independently of one another.
Arguably, Sino-American cooperation would be one avenue for reducing the
high costs and risks attending the development of Central Asian oil and
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natural gas fields. None the less, Sino-American cooperation remains limited
by the two states’ deep distrust of one another, which is aggravated by their
ongoing strategic competition for Pacific and Asian dominance. 
The United States has sought to maintain its dominant position in the
Pacific. For Beijing, the cumulative impact of the Bush administration’s poli-
cies in Asia has been an increased wariness of American intentions in the
region.  President Bush’s state visits to India and Pakistan for the first time since
the late 1970s were freighted with important military and strategic implica-
tions, at least for China. In the wake of September 11, the United States has
succeeded in building military posts on the basis of official military cooperation
agreements that have strengthened its strategic and military position in the
South China Sea, the Malacca Strait and Central Asia.50 American policy
towards Russia in Europe has weakened the SCO as a bulwark against undue
American influence in Asia; the stationing of a sizeable US military force in the
region has also meant that there is now an opportunity for the weaker
members of the SCO ‘to escape from Russo-Chinese efforts to dominate them’.51
China is specifically worried that the Central Asian states, in siding with the
United States in the war against terrorism, have traded their penury relation-
ship with Russia and China for a much more munificent dependence on the
United States. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in promising Washington access to
military bases, over-flight rights and intelligence sharing, have purchased
insurance against a Sino-Russian condominium. The Central Asian states are
engaging in a balancing diplomacy in an effort to maximise their freedom of
movement, not only from Russia and China – their proximate neighbours – but
from the United States were it to become an overbearing protector.
Unsurprisingly, Beijing views these trends and developments as inimical to its
own long-term strategic interests in Asia. 
Sino-American goodwill will probably remain shallow at best and Sino-
American cooperation episodic and contingent on shared calculations of
interest. In 2001 and the first half of 2002, for instance, China and the
United States have seemed to be on good terms, with China winning the
hosting rights to the 2008 summer Olympics and entering the WTO as a full
member in the winter of 2001. These positive developments were disrupted
by the US spy plane incident on the island of Hainan in April 2001.
Moreover, despite Beijing’s support of the American action against terrorism
in Afghanistan, tensions re-emerged when the Bush administration invited
Taiwan’s minister of defence to visit Washington, DC, in March 2002.  This
chequered recent past, which is indicative of the deep mutual mistrust exist-
ing between these two important states, in combination with their not easily
reconciled strategic ambitions, suggest that the exploitation and develop-
ment of Central Asian energy is an unlikely basis for Sino-American cooper-
ation. As important, the Central Asian states may face the unpalatable
choice of choosing between Washington and Beijing.
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7Geopolitical constraints and
institutional innovation: the dynamics of
multilateralism in Eurasia1
Sean Kay
This chapter assesses the relationship between traditional state-based secu-
rity concerns and the development of multilateral institutions in Eurasia
from 1992 to 2002. Multilateral institutions matter in Eurasia, but multilat-
eral cooperation is highly contingent upon power relationships. Large states
have used multilateral institutions to exert power and small states have used
them to constrain larger ones. States have also used these institutions to
signal their intentions and to reinforce their domestic identity. None the less,
international institutions in Eurasia have neither mitigated the security
dilemma nor facilitated cooperative approaches to the new security chal-
lenges of transnational terrorism, ethnic strife, environmental degradation,
food and energy scarcity, drug trafficking, unchecked population growth,
rampant migration and organised crime.2 Eurasia hosts several variations in
institutional forms, including the CIS, GUUAM, and the SCO. Yet these three
principal regional institutions have largely failed to cultivate cooperative
multilateralism. Can they do so singularly or in combination in the future?
Multilateral form and the security dilemma
The basic conditions underlying western models of multilateral institutional
cooperation do not exist in Eurasia.3 In the transatlantic context, the major
institutions reflected a benign American hegemony and acquiescent western
European states. NATO, for example, survives because its combination of
American power and institutional attributes enhanced cooperation between
its members over time. NATO has promoted transparency and information
sharing, facilitated issue linkages, fostered the norm of multilateralism, and
helped lower the transaction costs of collective action among its member-
states. This transatlantic institutional configuration of power and coopera-
tion has not taken hold in Eurasia, where Russia retains a degree of
postcolonial hegemonic influence through the CIS. Nevertheless, smaller
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former Soviet republics have sought to exert their independence through
multilateral balancing of Russian influence and by signalling their national
identity preferences through the GUUAM group. Meanwhile, the growth of
American military engagement in Eurasia has the potential to transform
another multilateral institution – the SCO – into a mechanism for a renewed
Sino-Russian alliance.
Despite potential fissures arising from great power competition in the
region, the states of Eurasia share some important interests in multilateral
cooperation. Russia and China, as well as key medium-sized states such as
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are status-quo oriented and seek to ensure that
no single power can dominate. Moreover, the states of Eurasia and interested
external powers such as the United States all view radical political Islam and
international terrorism as common threats and share interest in the quest
for international order. Eurasia is not a region where interstate war is
likely.4 And yet, traditional security concerns dominate the dynamics of
multilateralism. The inability of the Eurasian states to develop western-style
institutions or to embrace cooperative multilateralism effectively is not the
result of intrinsically opposed political cultures or a new political divide
reflecting a ‘clash of civilisations’.5 The key variable affecting the dynamic
and form of multilateralism in Eurasia is divergent state interests.
The security dilemma
Security dilemmas stem from the assumption that the international system
is based on self-help and comprised of states with an egoist definition of inter-
est. In the absence of a global leviathan, international relations are
inevitably anarchic. States will eventually position themselves in an offen-
sive or defensive posture depending on their perceived security needs. States
operating under such threat perceptions confront a situation where a
country’s efforts to increase its own security (even if for defensive purposes)
can be perceived by other states as an offensive threat.6 Consequently, states
will make adjustments in their defensive or offensive position – through self-
help or via alliances – to ensure survival. Such a security dilemma can
produce arms races or preventive war if a balance of power is not attained or
breaks down. States therefore must worry about both the absolute and rela-
tive gains of their competitors.7 That is, states must worry about their overall
international position relative to the power of other states.8
States have a variety of multilateral options to pursue in response to a
threat.9 States might balance the existing threat by increasing their capabil-
ities or forming alliances with like-minded countries sharing the same threat
perception.10 Alternatively, states might align with a dominant power by
bandwagoning towards it to reap distributive gains.11 Balancing or band-
wagoning through multilateral alliances represent one variation in institu-
tional form of multilateralism. Each approach can result in peace if a
Institutions of security governance
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functional balance of power is achieved. Among a coalition of states, the
dominant power can exert the greatest degree of influence and, in the
process of exercising institutional hegemony, may also contribute to peace-
ful relations among alliance members. From hegemony, effective multilat-
eral cooperation can emerge and be applied to issue areas separate from that
for which the institution was originally intended.12
Confronted with a relative decline in power, large states often seek to
maintain influence by making concessions to prevent defection and balanc-
ing by previous allies. Smaller powers may seek to sustain multilateral insti-
tutions, but also to adapt them to gain more influence. Moreover, great
powers are positioned to lead coalitions with smaller states – which make
residual institutions useful in lowering transaction costs. Institutional forms
reflecting hegemonic influence can alleviate the security dilemma, because
smaller states receive security reassurance against each other as the domi-
nant power provides a public good of general security.13 Nevertheless, as
hegemonic influence declines, states will not necessarily bandwagon
towards the declining power and rather might pursue balancing strategies.
At this stage new forms of multilateralism can emerge with new institutions
replacing old ones, or old ones being transformed. Alternatively, conflict and
instability can emerge as institutions become unable to moderate the secu-
rity dilemma given changed geopolitical realities.
International institutions and security
International institutions are persistent and connected sets of rules that
prescribe behaviour roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations
through informal regimes and formal organisations.14 As a possible means
of modifying the security dilemma, international institutions have become a
dominant part of international politics. Though institutions remain depend-
ent upon the will and interests of member states, they are increasingly seen
as enhancing security and facilitating crisis management. Institutions are
used by states to maximise their individual or mutual security interests
because they are presumed to make cooperation easier to attain than in their
absence. By encouraging reciprocity, international institutions help states
manage the uncertainties of international anarchy better. Multilateral coop-
eration, conducted over time, might become an international norm if states
were socialised into new patterns of cooperative behavior. Consequently,
security could be enhanced because states would perceive gains from learn-
ing about each other. By enhancing transparency among states, the security
dilemma might be reduced, as states can better signal their intentions and
reduce the risk that misperception or miscalculation will lead to tension or
conflict.15
Institutions are thought to impact on interstate relations positively
because the shadow of the future and the uncertainty of anarchy in the
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international system allow for an environment in which international insti-
tutions embody and affect state expectations.16 Institutions play a variety of
roles including aiding the exercise of influence, constraining bargaining
strategies, balancing or replacing other institutions, signalling govern-
ments’ intentions, specifying obligations, and shaping or defining the inter-
ests and preferences of states.17 Institutions are seen as relevant to security
because they increase the level of information available to states by enhanc-
ing transparency, raising the costs of defection and defining what constitutes
defection, increasing the likelihood of issue linkage, and advancing inter-
state socialisation towards the concept of an international community.18
Unlike multilateral forms of hegemonic stability and alliance formation,
some institutional approaches to security offer positive inducements to
multilateral cooperation. For example, concert diplomacy is an institutional
form emphasising state interest in maintaining great power equilibrium. A
concert is a self-regulating means of systems management. If the principal
regional powers have a common interest in maintaining a systemic status
quo, they may avoid steps to revise it. Conversely, if concert powers see a
state making efforts to overturn the status quo, then those states will form a
common alliance to challenge the defector and ensure that it does not
succeed. Concerts are generally organised around informal structures with
powerful states cooperating to resolve crises. If each major regional power
shares in the benefits of an existing international order, a concert system will
function. However, if any one actor successfully dominates and balancing
fails, then the system will be transformed. Historically, war is the most
common byproduct of a failed consensus on international order by the great
powers.19 The historical track record of concert diplomacy is strong when
the conditions are favourable. The Concert of Europe lasted, at various levels
of strength, well into the nineteenth century.20 This institutional form was
replicated in the arrangements providing for the permanent members of the
UN Security Council and is evident in the Contact Group/Group of Eight
diplomacy used to settle the 1990s Balkan conflicts.
A contemporary institutional form, cooperative security, has emerged in
the post-Cold War era, building on a more inclusive approach to systems
management than concert diplomacy, while also being more realistic than
the legalistic, hierarchical arrangements of the failed League of Nations.
Cooperative security provides for less automatic but prospectively more
successful approaches to organising states to act on mutual security
concerns. Cooperative security implies that no state acting alone can solve
all regional security problems and thus respectful multilateral solutions are
necessary. Cooperative security is intended to be inclusive and to promote
consultation over confrontation, reassurance over balancing, and informa-
tion sharing, transparency and burden sharing among security partners.21
Cooperative security promotes both dialogue and socialisation into shared
norms as a crisis-prevention mechanism via confidence- and security-
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building measures. Cooperative security is also a model for forming ad hoc
military coalitions for crisis management by lowering the transaction costs
of multilateral cooperation. Thus intervention in a crisis is thought to be
easier to attain under coalitions of the willing facilitated through the institu-
tional mechanisms of cooperative security.22
In Eurasia, the security dilemma drives the nature of state choices for
international cooperation. Eurasia is also, however, a region where the
status quo has not been changed by deep military alignments or security
cooperation. The variations in institutional form illustrate that states are
primarily signalling their security concerns via institutional membership
choices. While such security cooperation is not deeply ingrained, it could
become so in the future. Thus the dynamics of multilateralism in Eurasia do
provide a framework for understanding the general geopolitical trends in the
region. Consequently, as the following discussion shows, the institutional
forms that reflect hegemonic stability, regional balancing and global balanc-
ing are key to understanding the geopolitical trend-lines of Eurasia. As this
chapter illustrates, many of the core components are in place for a general
regional concert system in Eurasia. Whether that concert system can
successfully be translated into a new cooperative security arrangement is a
critical policy and theoretical question confronting Eurasian security.
Geopolitics and the institutions of Eurasia
Much strategic analysis of Eurasian geopolitics focuses on access to oil and
related transportation routes. Many strategists thus predict increased
competition over natural resources in a new ‘great game’, as historically
practised between Great Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century.23
This historical analogy gained currency with the 2001 war in Afghanistan
and the resulting extension of American access to military bases in
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, the ‘great
game’ assessment of Eurasian power competition is oversimplified. In the
words of one regional expert: ‘The misplaced belief among US, Russian and
other analysts in the central importance of geopolitical rivalry represents a
cumulative failure of imagination’.24 In reality the priority concern of the
Eurasian states is status-quo maintenance. This quest has led to a combina-
tion of divergent threat perception and shared interests on specific issues
such as counter-terrorism.
The Eurasian geopolitical spectrum reflects three major trends: Russian
efforts to sustain hegemonic influence, met by the actions taken by some
former states to balance Russian influence and assert their sovereignty;
American efforts to project power and promote regional stability, generating
nascent cooperation between Russia and China to balance American
engagement; and a shared interest among all regional actors in diffusing the
encroachment of radical political Islam and associated terrorism. The
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confluence of these geopolitical trends reflects the persistence of the security
dilemma, which forms an intractable barrier to the duration and effective-
ness of multilateralism. These geopolitical trends make Eurasia not espe-
cially receptive to multilateral institutions addressing the ‘new security
agenda’, which raises the prospects that instability will grow and in turn
impact on the existing strategic concerns of states. These trends are illus-
trated by the three most prominent multilateral security institutions of early
twenty-first-century Eurasia: the CIS, GUUAM, and the SCO.
The CIS and hegemonic stability
The CIS is a manifestation of some structural aspects of the Soviet Union.
Established through the Minsk Treaty of 1991, the CIS emerged as a loose
confederation of 12 countries seeking to harmonise various economic and,
to a much lesser extent, security policies after the collapse of the Soviet state.
In 1993, Russia completed a military doctrine that defined the frontiers of
the former Soviet Union as the strategic frontiers of Russia. In 1995, a presi-
dential statement identified Moscow’s goals in the CIS as making the region
an exclusive area of Russian influence, minimising the expansion of external
presence and influence in CIS territory, facilitating regional crisis manage-
ment, and protecting Russians living outside Russia within the CIS.25 For
non-Russian members, support for the CIS has varied from the enthusiastic
responses of Belarus to the antagonistic compliance of Ukraine. In the
absence of significant western assistance, states like Ukraine, with their
continued economic dependence on Russia, have little choice but to band-
wagon reluctantly towards Moscow.
Russia’s residual hegemony in the CIS is primarily economic and is exer-
cised through pre-existing, Soviet-era personnel networks and bilateral
linkage strategies. Power is increasingly exerted through fuel and energy,
which Moscow can turn on and shut off to those states still depending on the
Soviet-era pipeline system. For example, to pressure Georgia into allowing a
continued presence of Russian military bases on its territory, Moscow has
shut off the flow of natural gas. When Georgia refused to allow Russia to
enter the Pankisi Gorge area on the border with Chechnya, Moscow retali-
ated by introducing visas for Georgian citizens and by halting gas supplies
until past debts were repaid. Russia has also used the flow of energy supplies
as a means of pressuring Ukraine and Moldova to make payments on debts
owed to Moscow.26
Russia has sought to develop within the CIS a customs union, economic
integration, converging standards of international economic legislation, a
payments union, integration of production in science and technology (and
the defence industry), common legal conditions and a common capital
market.27 Moscow has also sought to destabilise CIS countries not cooperat-
ing with Russia through intelligence activities, blackmail, coercion,
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subversion of problematic political leadership, and support to violent groups
amenable to Russian influence.28 Russia’s overall military influence is
receding. Russia maintains 8,000 forces in Tajikistan (in high combat readi-
ness status), 2,900 troops in Armenia, 4,000 in Georgia and 1,500 in
Moldova.29 With a base in Tajikistan, Moscow has organised joint exercises
with Central Asian armies and seeks to supply arms and equipment to
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which Russia sees as important
allies.30 However, Russia has declining capacity to project military power
within the CIS. Russia hopes to develop a 50,000-member rapid deployment
corps at the Russia–Kazakhstan border, but whether it can fund and sustain
full readiness is doubtful. Airlift capabilities are severely limited and what
remains of Russia’s air capacity is largely medium-range bombers and oper-
ational-tactical missiles – most of which are of little value in a fight against
terrorism, the major security threat.31 In a worst case, Russia might, given
its conventional military weakness, have to rely on tactical nuclear weapons
to deter attacks on forward-deployed forces.
Other aspects of Russian influence within the CIS area are in steady
decline. Between 2025 and 2035 the last generation socialised during the
Soviet era will retire and leave leadership positions. Russian is no longer a
priority language in non-Russian Eurasian countries, though it remains a
primary language of business and government.32 Moreover, the Russian
public had little appetite for shedding blood and treasure to keep Russia
intact in Chechnya – let alone to sustain the CIS. Russia has thus used
economic leverage to exercise its residual hegemonic influence. While
Russia’s economic pressure has some effect, CIS states increasingly define
their relationship with Moscow on their own in the absence of the credible
threat of military force. This trend is especially true as trade and other forms
of international contact have diversified among the non-Russian CIS states,
to include alternative transport corridors for oil and natural gas. Russia’s
ability to exert its regional influence is complicated by the hegemonic design
of the CIS, which does not foster trust among its member-states, in combina-
tion with a variety of competing national agendas among the smaller
members. The more Russia leverages its residual hegemony in the region,
the lower the prospects for cooperative multilateral relationships through
the CIS. Indeed, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan opted in 1999 to with-
draw from formal CIS security cooperation, while Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan have refused to participate in CIS political and economic
structures.
While Russian influence is declining, a number of post-Soviet states have
bandwagoned towards Russia, and thus the CIS persists. The trade-off for
Russian influence is the provision of some degree of stability – especially for
states like Tajikistan, which have post-Communist leaders drawing from
their Soviet background to facilitate distributive gains and enhance their
domestic authority (in the absence of democratic legitimacy). Even non-CIS
Geopolitical constraints
131
2504Chap7  7/4/03  12:40 pm  Page 131
state (and NATO member) Turkey has made some important moves towards
Russia to enhance its own relative economic-security needs. In June 2001,
Turkey completed a deal to build the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline with
Russia, which would increase its dependence on Russian natural gas from
66 to 80 per cent (Turkey imports some 98 per cent of its energy needs). This
deal was completed over strong American opposition.33 For Russia, the
result has been sustained regional involvement which satisfies Moscow’s
basic interests in maintaining influence on its periphery. However, Russians
may increasingly question these gains as they see core CIS partners as
resource burdens diminishing Moscow’s international prestige. Of particular
concern has been the degree to which Russia has discounted energy prices to
CIS members in order to promote the objectives of integration.34 Since
becoming president, Vladimir Putin has increasingly prioritised Russia’s
bilateral relations with CIS members over multilateral action.
To make Russia’s regional hegemonic goals more palatable within the
CIS, Moscow presents its efforts to foster hegemonic stability as a cooperative
effort. In 1992, Russia negotiated a ‘Collective Security Treaty’ with most of
the CIS members. As security developments under this framework largely
reflected all institution and no cooperation, little effective action was taken
to develop the CIS at the multilateral level of security cooperation. By 1999
some multilateral programmes did emerge, with the development of a CIS
Joint Air Defence System headquartered in Moscow and headed by the
Russian Air Defence Forces command. Participants in the air defence system
include Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (which has kept its participation limited to what it
describes as ‘coordinated’ rather than ‘joint’ operations). CIS security func-
tions received additional competencies in October 2000 when an agreement
was signed in Biskek to create a joint rapid reaction force, consisting of
troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to respond to
regional crises and to fortify porous border areas against terrorist attacks
and incursions.
In March 2001, the CIS Collective Security Council secretary, Valery
Nikolaenki, visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to discuss mili-
tary integration of rapid reaction forces, to include headquarters planning as
‘the first step in setting up collective rapid deployment forces’ under the
Collective Security Treaty.35 For Russia the purpose of such an organisation
would be to facilitate the transfer of military equipment and technology
within the CIS to limit the influence of other purveyors of military equip-
ment, particularly the United States, and to organise responses to radical
political Islam and associated terrorism. On 25 May 2001, the participating
countries – now including Armenia and Belarus – completed plans for a CIS
rapid deployment force. Each participant contributes at least one battalion to
this force. The force includes a 3,000-strong contingent for Central Asia
including battalions from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and
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includes elements of the remaining Russian 201st division deployed for
peacekeeping purposes in Tajikistan. A separate arrangement includes
Russian and Armenian forces totalling 1,500 for crisis management in the
Caucasus.
The mandate of the CIS rapid deployment force was put in geostrategic
terms, declaring that: ‘We, the leaders of the states participating in the
Collective Security Treaty, state our strong resolution to promote the forma-
tion of a multipolar, fair, and democratic world order based on respect for the
United Nations Charter and the norms of international law’.36 For Russia,
the CIS was also a means of signalling its security interests to the United
States and its worries over the projection of American power. The culminat-
ing effect of CIS security developments has been to allow Moscow to extend a
defence perimeter away from its borders via air defence, border guards, and
the possible development of small-scale rapid deployment forces. This
outcome runs contrary to many assumptions of the mid-1990s that the CIS
would be strengthened, perhaps as a counter-weight to balance NATO
enlargement. Rather, the CIS has become a progressively weaker security
institution.
GUUAM: regional balancing
Efforts by some Eurasian states to minimise the effects of lingering Russian
hegemony have produced mixed results. Most former Soviet states are torn
between their desire to enhance their sovereignty vis-à-vis Russian influence
and the reality that Moscow dominates their economies. The most signifi-
cant attempt at regional balancing against Russia’s residual hegemony is
the GUUAM grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and
Moldova.37 The GUUAM states officially describe this institution as a ‘strate-
gic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of
these former Soviet republics’.38 At the same time, the members of GUUAM
assert that their institution is organised against no particular state. Rather,
GUUAM members stress it is a cooperative means to address a range of issues
via: political cooperation; joint efforts on energy production (including a
Transcaucasian energy supply route); mutual support for sovereignty and
territorial integrity; opposition to ethnic and religious intolerance; combat-
ing illegal drugs; and working closely with NATO, the OSCE and the UN.
Conceptually, the GUUAM members identify economic security, energy
security, environmental security and territorial security as their main
concerns. None the less, it is highly significant that GUUAM is the only secu-
rity institution in the former Soviet space not including Russia.
Western officials generally view GUUAM as an anti-Russian balancing
effort. This perspective was shared in Moscow, which watched cooperation
in GUUAM accelerate during the Kosovo war in side-meetings held during
NATO’s fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington, DC. Russian foreign
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minister Igor Ivanov noted:
How should we understand the fact that the new regional organisation
GUUAM has been created in Washington during a NATO summit? What aims
are pursued by demonstratively creating this organisation at the time of the
latest events in the Balkans? This is a reflection of the policy of the leaders of the
states who make such steps rather than a mere coincidence.39
GUUAM began informal consultations and produced joint declarations
beginning at the Conventional Forces in Europe review conference held in
1996, and formalised their status as a cooperative structure at the 1997
Summit of the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg.40 The principal
organising elements of GUUAM include promotion of: political interaction,
combating separatism, peaceful resolution of conflicts, peacekeeping activi-
ties, and development of a Eurasian-Transcaucasian transport corridor.
Strategically, GUUAM members signalled their intent to hedge against
Russian power through their integration into Euro-Atlantic and European
structures of security and cooperation, including ‘the development of a
special relationship and dialogue with NATO’.41 By combining elements of
cooperative security and balancing simultaneously, these countries have
signalled a general desire to pursue a political and economic path divergent
from Russia’s vision while seeking to constrain Russia’s influence. As the
Georgian ambassador to the United States, Tedo Japaridze, declared in
November 2000, ‘GUUAM’s birth mother is the CFE [Conventional Forces in
Europe] negotiations, and our foster mother is NATO’.42
The level of members’ interest in GUUAM varies. Both Moldova and
Uzbekistan engage inconsistently. Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Moldova moved
closer (to varying degrees) in their alignments towards Russia in 2001–02,
although those alignments face the countervailing pulls of a heightened
economic reliance on Moscow and the general desire to signal a non-Russian
security policy orientation. By June 2002, Uzbekistan effectively suspended
its membership in GUUAM and Ukraine announced its desire to be consid-
ered a formal candidate for NATO membership, even while at the same time
its economic fortunes grew more deeply embedded with those of Russia.
Moreover, the GUUAM architecture remains informal, with high-level
ministerial meetings occurring, but with little effort to create institutional
mechanisms to coordinate multilateral action on declared objectives.
Nevertheless, GUUAM made modest steps towards institutionalisation by
creating a secretariat in 2001 and exploring the establishment of a parlia-
mentary assembly. At a June 2001 summit, the GUUAM members signed the
Charter of GUUAM, which codified it as an international organisation. Yet
GUUAM’s significance is symbolic in that these states pursue, to the extent
feasible, a policy separate from that of Russia, or seek a balance between a
western and a Russian orientation.
Concerns over residual Russian hegemony are a driving force behind
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GUUAM. However, the organisation is a reflection of only nascent multilat-
eral balancing efforts. GUUAM members have avoided deep security cooper-
ation within this framework, as they generally prioritise their individual
relationships with NATO’s PfP.43 The leaders of GUUAM stress that the
success or failure of their institution lies in the degree to which it gains assis-
tance from the United States. The United States has trodden carefully so as
not to over promote GUUAM as the sole western alternative for Southeast
and Central Eurasian states, while simultaneously encouraging the develop-
ment of cooperative security programmes. US assistance included (for the
fiscal year 2001): $5 million in foreign military financing grants, $2 million
in non-proliferation and export control assistance, $500,000 in interna-
tional military equipment and training funding, and $1 million in anti-
terrorism assistance.44 Some members of GUUAM are ambivalent about
giving the institution true balancing power. Ukraine, for example, still exists
under significant Russian economic influence.45 President Leonid Kuchma
insisted that GUUAM members not turn the organisation into a military-
political structure.46 Ukraine and Uzbekistan are increasingly deviating
politically from some of the declared normative goals of the institution, while
at the same time moving closer to Moscow out of economic necessity and a
shared fear of the spread of international terrorism.
GUUAM does force Russia to account for balancing forces affecting its
foreign policy. This trend could moderate Russian hegemonic ambitions if
Moscow worries that its exercise of power might contribute to a deepening of
balancing institutions. Consequently, the prospect of significant counter-
vailing pressures within Eurasia might force Russia to consider more cooper-
ative or issue-linked bargaining strategies that eventually are reflected in
new institutional forms. However, in the short term, Russia would be more
likely to favour working bilaterally with each GUUAM member (as it has
with Ukraine and Moldova) to undermine institutional cohesion. It is possi-
ble that with the growing US–Russian accommodation, reflecting a common
interest in combating terrorism, the historical fears of Russian hegemony in
the region will be allayed – particularly for states such as Uzbekistan, which
hosted US troop deployments in the 2001–2 campaign against the Taliban
in Afghanistan.
The SCO: great power balancing
In June 2001, the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan transformed an informal grouping established in 1996 and
known as the ‘Shanghai Five’ into a formal international institution, the
SCO, which was expanded to include Uzbekistan. The official objectives of
the institution are to promote trust, stability and mutual understanding
between members, including confidence building in the military sphere and
mutual reductions of armed forces in border areas.47
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The SCO is viewed in western circles as a potential balancing mechanism
designed by China and Russia to frustrate American global dominance.
Indeed, the founding SCO document specifies that promoting multipolarity is
a core institutional objective. Both China and Russia use the advancement of
multipolar international relations to balance American power. At the politi-
cal level, this objective is reinforced by the specific requirement that states
accept the primacy of the UN, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference
in the domestic affairs of states. While specifying that the organisation is not
an alliance directed against any other states, there are important elements of
balancing behaviour in the SCO. For example, to bolster Russian and
Chinese efforts to frustrate US plans for national missile defence, SCO
members agreed to preserve the global strategic balance. The members
stated that they all saw the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as crucial to
that objective. According to Chinese vice-foreign minister Zhang Deguang,
the SCO is in agreement that missile defence ‘would have a negative impact
on the safeguarding of world strategic balance and security’.48 None the less,
the application of the SCO to this global balancing dynamic demonstrated
the relative weakness of even a combined Russian–Chinese position as the
United States announced its intent to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty in late 2001.
The balancing prospects of the SCO can be overstated. Russia had serious
misgivings about including Uzbekistan in the institution, largely because
Tashkent has pursued a strident independence. Meanwhile, the smaller SCO
members – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have have been reluc-
tant to place too much emphasis on purely Russian-led institutions. As
Uzbek president Islam Karimov asserts: ‘This organization must never turn
into a military political bloc . . . It should not be against any country, should
not join certain trends, should not organise subversive activities against
third countries’.49 Russia’s interest in the SCO may be as much guided by a
desire to constrain the growth of China’s influence in the region as to hedge
against American power. Russia might also bandwagon towards the United
States if Chinese power continues to grow. Russian–Chinese accommodation
must also be viewed in the light of their history of deep tensions and rivalry
for influence in northeast Asia.
The issue generating the highest convergence of interests among the SCO
members is the spread of radical political Islam and associated international
terrorism. The SCO has agreed to create an anti-terrorist centre in Biskek,
Kyrgyzstan, and a 2,000-soldier unit of Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik
troops was organised. Although there  are American concerns that this insti-
tution was designed to counterbalance the United States, the SCO could
alternatively move more closely towards American interests in combating
international terrorism. This trend-line is true even for China, which has a
significant ethnic separatist movement in its northwest Xinjiang province.
China asserts that Islamic groups in Xinjiang were supplied with money,
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arms and leadership by the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation.50
Given the proximity of these states to Afghanistan and other areas of
terrorist basing, the SCO could even complement American strategic inter-
ests as the SCO pursues its open-ended campaign against terrorism.
Conversely, the SCO could be used by Russia and China to ensure that the
United States does not gain a strategic foothold in Eurasia justified by
counter-terrorism. By further institutionalising the SCO in the area of
counter-terrorism, Russia and China would advance their goals of limiting
American influence in Eurasia and justify efforts to secure their own state
authority in Chechnya and Xinjiang. In early 2002, the SCO issued a joint
statement declaring that regional and sub-regional structures were best
suited to fighting terrorism, and implied that the post-September 11 envi-
ronment had provided a rationale to institutionalise further the SCO’s anti-
terrorism capabilities. Yet, for medium and smaller regional powers, the
increased American presence in Central Eurasia might make the SCO less
attractive – particularly for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Conclusion: geopolitics, multilateralism and twenty-first-century Eurasia
The prospects for building cooperative multilateral institutions for address-
ing the complex new security agenda of Eurasia are not promising. The secu-
rity dilemma remains strong in the region as Russia continues to seek
hegemony via the CIS; former Soviet republics seek to balance against or
bandwagon towards Russian power; America has significantly increased its
Eurasian regional interests during the war against terrorism; and Russia and
China remain poised to balance continuing assertions of American power.
All the regional actors remain united in a shared fear of radical political
Islam and international terrorism. While these geopolitical constraints are a
major inhibitor of the development of western-style cooperative security
institutions, it does not mean that multilateralism is irrelevant. Rather, as an
institutional form, multilateralism remains at best an intervening, and more
likely dependent, variable determining regional security outcomes.
Nevertheless, Eurasia is poised to function as a regional concert system that
might eventually foster cooperative multilateral efforts towards addressing
the new security agenda.51
Prior to the September 11 2001 attacks on the United States, conditions
favouring a regional concert system were largely in place in the Eurasian
area. The United States, Russia and China appeared prepared to sustain an
informal triangular framework for relations among major regional actors.
Of these countries, currently none can exercise complete hegemony over
the Eurasian area. While American influence ascended in 2001–2,
Washington’s interests in the region are transitory and limited to counter-
terrorism and transit routes for oil rather than issue-based multilateralism.
The key pivot point is Russia, which has the opportunity to shift between the
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United States and China. Meanwhile, the medium-sized states of Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan serve as keystone powers between Russia and China. Both
large and medium powers want to sustain domestic regime stability, espe-
cially in the light of the challenge of a rising tide of radical Islam. Ultimately,
Eurasian states hope to sustain international stability so they can address
pressing domestic challenges.
Formal institutions that can constrain state behaviour through the exten-
sion of hegemony or specific rules and norms, such as the CIS, GUUAM and the
SCO, are not likely to provide cooperative means of addressing Eurasia’s new
security agenda. These institutions remain highly conditioned by the regional
balance of power. Indeed, they are best understood as important reflections of
an informal concert framework. Should China or the United States become too
powerful, Russia can use the CIS as a peripheral defensive measure. However,
the weaknesses of the CIS may force Russia to bandwagon and make a truly
historic decision as to whether its interests lie with the West or with Asia.
Should the United States become too powerful in a way that undermines the
Eurasian balance of power, Russia and China can use the SCO to balance
American power. Conversely, while Russia may bandwagon towards the
West, Moscow might undermine American primacy by elevating its relation-
ship with Europe over Washington. Alternatively, should Russian power
increase or a functional Russian–Chinese accommodation emerge, then
GUUAM might serve to project American security interests.
The defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001, however, raises
important questions as to the longevity of the concert model. While political
Islam remains a serious challenge to regional stability, the absence of the
Taliban regime makes it more difficult for radical Islamic groups to organise
and wield international influence. Consequently, this shared threat percep-
tion could recede if stability reigns in Afghanistan. The utility of the concert
model lies in its flexible capacity to ebb and flow depending on the interests of
the major powers. Should, for example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ever succeed in taking over Uzbekistan and further threaten its neighbours,
the existing concert framework would be strengthened among the major
powers in a manner similar to that exercised by the 2001–02 anti-Taliban
coalition. Even without the collapse of a key state, smaller areas such as
Chechnya, the Ferghana Valley and the Xinjiang province provide sufficient
reason for the major powers to share ongoing fears of radical political
Islam.
American military engagement could also upset the Eurasian status quo.
The nascent concert framework places heavy emphasis on states’ preference
for the existing status quo and particularistic quest for domestic regime
stability. Conservative Eurasian regimes fear radical Islam and increasingly
use that threat to avoid addressing human rights concerns or opening to
democratic reforms. The global pressures towards democracy, free markets
and respect for human rights that accompany the expansion of American
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power may run directly counter to the status-quo state interests in Eurasia.
Even more problematic, as conservative and repressive regimes work to
sustain the status quo they are able in the short term to combat international
terrorism. However, in the long term, it is this very state repression of free-
doms that often fuels the radicalisation of Islam. Thus the United States faces
an uncomfortable policy choice between promoting stability and values.
The prospects for a lasting regional concert system for Eurasia will depend
on whether the United States asserts its regional role with restraint and
whether it pursues multilateral or unilateral security engagement. During
the war in Afghanistan, Russia acquiesced to the United States and allowed
American military deployments in former Soviet bases in Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Indications that American troops would not be
likely to leave this area in a timely manner might eventually heighten the
security dilemmas of Russia and China. Russia, in particular, will be put
under increasing pressure to overturn the status quo or seek balancing
arrangements if the United States does not act with restraint. Russia’s
historic sensitivities to traditional encirclement are well known – and now
Russia faces an expanding NATO to the west, American military forces on its
southern borders, and the rising power of China to the east. The core ques-
tion of the future of Eurasian security may be which side Russia will choose:
West or East. This long-standing question for Russia’s identity will in large
part be determined by how the United States adapts its policies in the region,
and by whether Washington builds cooperative security institutions that
include Russia and account for Moscow’s interests.
To sustain its regional presence, the United States might pursue trade-offs
with Russia on economic assistance or on future NATO enlargement. Or
America might withdraw and thus instigate a return to regional bandwago-
ning and balancing behaviour. Such a move would seriously damage expec-
tations raised among the smaller states of Eurasia and contribute to a
persistence of unresolved traditional and new security challenges.
Alternatively, the United States presence could be the precursor of the devel-
opment of a cooperative security dynamic for the region. This outcome
would require Washington to pursue a multilateral and inclusive framework
for its engagement, involving Russia and China as co-equal regional part-
ners, and to create institutional mechanisms to engage the smaller regional
powers in multilateral dialogue. Western models of cooperative security
might subsequently evolve in Eurasia, but only as an evolutionary process
that fosters trust. Such an effort might use conference-style diplomacy to
create a network of multilateral issue-based regimes. For example, by
making the existing Cooperative Threat Reduction programme (for reducing
the risks of nuclear proliferation out of Russia) into a multilateral regional
framework, new patterns of security cooperation might emerge and be
transferred into other issue areas.
The United States has important gains to make by achieving a regional
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foothold in Eurasia. A US military presence in Central Asia could facilitate
containment of either Russia or China should the need arise in the future. An
American presence could also facilitate access to proven and unproven oil
reserves that could supply the world with significant energy resources well
into the twenty-first century. Moreover, a military presence could assist
American power projection should it lose access to bases in the Persian Gulf.
If the extension of American power into Eurasia were accompanied by a
gradual extension of cooperative multilateral forms, rather than a quest for
extending unilateral gains, Russia might overcome its historical security
dilemma and join the West while constructive engagement with China was
fostered. However, if poorly handled by Washington, there is significant risk
that its policies in Eurasia will drive Russia and China towards a balancing
architecture. As with the cooperative multilateral institutions that have
evolved in Europe, the prospects for international institutions in Eurasia will
depend on the nature and exercise of American leadership – and restraint.
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8The OSCE role
in Eurasian security
P. Terrence Hopmann
A wide range of institutions have appeared in the Eurasian region since the
end of the Cold War that have a role to play in Eurasian security. Indeed, it
has often been observed that Europe after 1989 is ‘institutionally thick’, that
is, it is crisscrossed by an extensive web of multilateral institutions designed
to prevent, deter, manage and resolve conflicts that might appear in the
region once occupied by the former Communist states of the Soviet Union
and its Central and East European allies. Among these institutions the OSCE
is unique, mainly because it is the one institution that has a clear-cut
mandate in the field of security that also includes all of the parties involved in
Eurasian security, including 55 participating states extending from
‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’ the long way around.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),1 the fore-
runner of the OSCE, opened in Helsinki in 1973 and produced the Helsinki
Final Act signed at a summit conference in the Finnish capital on 31 July–1
August 1975. During the Cold War years, the CSCE focused primarily on ten
principles for security (the ‘Decalogue’), a series of confidence-building
measures to reduce fears of surprise attack between NATO and the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation, and on human rights and expanded human contacts
across the East–West divide through the centre of Europe.
Since the end of the Cold War, conflict prevention and resolution have
moved to the forefront of the OSCE’s agenda. Yet these roles performed
routinely by the OSCE and its missions and field activities have gone largely
unnoticed in governments and especially in the general public, not only in
the United States but in much of Europe as well. We are all painfully aware of
the failures of conflict prevention in the former Communist regions of central
and eastern Europe and Eurasia. Names like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo
and Chechnya – previously known only to regional specialists – have
become household words and appear in our media almost daily. Yet success-
ful conflict prevention receives virtually no attention since, by definition,
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‘nothing happens’ – and we all know that ‘nothing’ never makes the news or
excites the attention of policy-makers and public officials.
Therefore, when the ‘dogs don’t bark’ – when a potential conflict does not
erupt into violence or when an old conflict remains dormant for many years
– we may easily overlook the fact that this may be due to skilful and fore-
sighted diplomatic initiatives taken outside the glare of public attention. In
fact, patient but often overlooked preventive diplomacy by OSCE missions
and field operations has frequently made a significant contribution to the
avoidance of violence in a number of potentially dangerous situations in the
OSCE region, and that other conflicts have been moderated or prevented
from escalating is further due to the rapid, but often unseen, work of these
OSCE officials.
Within the Eurasian region only the OSCE – in particular the Conflict
Prevention Centre (CPC), with its missions and field activities, as well as the
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) – has a clear mandate,
organisational structure, and significant acquired experience in the field of
conflict management. When combined with the ‘human dimension’ that
infuses all of the OSCE’s work, this conflict-prevention capacity constitutes
the special contribution that only the OSCE brings to the European security
‘architecture’. This is an especially important function that needs to be
nurtured and strengthened with the active support of the OSCE’s largest,
wealthiest and most powerful participating states, especially the United
States.
The special role of the OSCE
In the field of medicine, the principle that ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure’ has long been accepted. The US government and private
sources devote billions of dollars every year to research on preventive medi-
cine, because the best way to deal with the most deadly killers such as cancer
and heart disease is by preventing their occurrence in the first place.
Unfortunately, this simple principle has not yet been widely accepted in the
field of foreign policy. For whatever reason, it seems to be easier to achieve a
political consensus behind the deployment of large and expensive military
peacemaking and peacekeeping operations than to provide the much
smaller resources generally needed to carry on the activity of multilateral
preventive diplomacy. Thus, for example, the entire annual US assessment
for all OSCE activities, including its missions, amounted to only about $20
million in fiscal year 2002. At the same time the United States spent over $4
billion annually to pay for the cost of US forces stationed with SFOR in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and with KFOR (Kosovo Implementation Force) in
Kosovo. Thus the US contribution to conflict prevention in the OSCE region
was approximately equivalent to what it spent in just two days to maintain
its military presence in those two regions where violence occurred. As budg-
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etary pressures become more stringent, and political opposition grows
against the large-scale deployment of US troops overseas, perhaps US politi-
cal leaders will learn that the need for such interventions might be averted if
they invested even a small fraction of those resources into the less visible, but
often more important, work of conflict prevention. But this too requires a
shift in institutional focus: while it is NATO that implements peacekeeping
operations, the North Atlantic alliance has little or no capacity to engage in
conflict prevention. That vital role in conflict prevention, management and
resolution represents the comparative advantage of the OSCE, and it is to the
OSCE that the United States should give its support to perform this role more
effectively.
It is interesting to speculate about how much might have been saved if the
United States had only devoted more resources, attention and effort to
conflict prevention before either of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo exploded into violence. But this is not just a matter of saving budget-
ary resources, however important that is. Nor is it first and foremost a ques-
tion of avoiding politically difficult choices about deploying US troops in yet
one more overseas operation, although that too is an important considera-
tion. It is mostly about preventing the tragic consequences of war for the
innocent people who are its inevitable victims. Before the NATO-led deploy-
ments took place in Bosnia and Kosovo, thousands of residents of these
regions lost their lives; physical infrastructure, homes, farms, schools and
factories were destroyed; the bare rudiments of social connections across
different ethnic groups were severed; and the human spirit of the peoples
surviving in all of these regions was crushed by the violence that swept
across their societies.
Rebuilding from the physical damage is the easy part; re-establishing
mutual trust among peoples who have lived alongside one another for
centuries and who must inevitably continue to do so for the foreseeable
future will be far more difficult. Yet this is essential if the foundations of a
functioning civil society are to be constructed, if individual human rights
and the rights of persons belonging to minorities are to be respected, and if
democratic governance is to be established. For all of these reasons, one clear
lesson that emerges from the recent experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo (and for that matter from the Russian experience in Chechnya) is
that it is a lot harder to ‘put Humpty Dumpty back together again’ than it
would have been to prevent him from falling off the wall in the first place.
Preventing the outbreak of war throughout the entire OSCE region is the
principal challenge that faces the OSCE today. Furthermore, there is no other
multilateral institution or individual country at present that can perform
this role. Even before the end of the Cold War, Europe was crisscrossed with
a wide variety of multilateral security institutions. Since 1990, most of these
have expanded their functions, and the web of institutions has become even
thicker: NATO has been enlarged and transformed, the EU has expanded and
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adopted a ‘common foreign and security policy’, and the OSCE has created
institutions such as the CPC, the Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) and the HCNM. The UN continues to have an impor-
tant role to play in European security, as does the Council of Europe. Yet
within this region only the OSCE has a clear mandate, an organisational
structure, and significant acquired experience in the field of conflict preven-
tion and resolution.
NATO has long been an important institution for deterring aggression
against its members by promising a collective response in defence of its
member-states if they are attacked from outside. Since the early 1990s, it has
developed a significant peacekeeping capability as well. By its very nature,
NATO is a military organisation that can support but not supplant diplo-
matic institutions in preventing the outbreak of violence and promoting the
resolution of existing conflicts. Almost by definition, the introduction of
NATO troops into a country experiencing conflict means that the point of no
return is about to be, or already has been, crossed. At this point, efforts to
achieve political solutions have usually been abandoned in favour of provid-
ing some form of ‘temporary’ military security. The role of the OSCE missions
and of the HCNM, by contrast, is ideally to enter into a situation long before
it reaches the violent stage. By trying to assure full rights for all citizens in
multinational states and by providing facilities for mediation and conflict
resolution at the grassroots level, these institutions seek to head off incidents
before they reach the boiling point.
A further limitation of NATO is that it is still viewed with considerable
scepticism in many of the regions of Eurasia most threatened with conflict, a
legacy of the Cold War and of the fact that some countries, especially Russia,
are not members and are not likely to become so within the foreseeable
future. To be effective in conflict resolution at the local level, it is necessary
that outsiders not be perceived to be injecting global political issues into the
already complex set of local issues. Once again the OSCE has a comparative
advantage over other institutions owing to the universal participation of all
states in the region where it operates.
The EU has also sought to play a major role in some conflicts in the OSCE
region, and the adoption at Maastricht in 1991 of a ‘common foreign and
security policy’ was supposed to signal a more active collective diplomatic
effort on the part of the EU. However, so far EU efforts have been plagued
with considerable inconsistency and policy differences among its member-
states, and the outlines and priorities of the common foreign and security
policy have emerged slowly, if at all. Furthermore, there has been a tendency
for the EU to try to demonstrate its bona fides in the field of conflict preven-
tion and resolution by intervening in situations where other institutions and
NGOs were already at work, often causing confusion and ‘institution shop-
ping’ on the part of disputants, and at times even undermining other efforts
that might have promoted a successful resolution of disputes. The EU also
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suffers from the fact that two states – namely the United States and the
Russian Federation – that play a fundamental role in European security are
not among its members. In short, the EU has an essential role to play in
contributing to the economic recovery and development of its neighbours to
the east; the prospect of eventual membership provides a compelling reason
for those states to undertake the difficult tasks required by democratisation
and economic reform. But its role in conflict prevention, resolution and
peacekeeping has yet to be established or validated on the basis of its record
to date.
Many of the same limitations apply as well to the Council of Europe,
whose membership automatically excludes the United States and Canada
and is likely to restrict the participation of Russia and other post-Soviet
states. Furthermore, the focus of the Council of Europe has been primarily on
issues of human rights and democracy building. Although the Council sets
up strict standards for admission, once admitted a country largely escapes
long-term monitoring and enforcement. This contrasts with the OSCE long-
term monitoring that observes over time and on-site how well participating
states actually live up to the obligations they have taken on. Thus, the
Council of Europe has not been engaged in long-term security building on
the ground in zones of potential or actual conflict.
This leaves the OSCE as the only multilateral institution with a mandate and
capacity to carry out the functions of conflict prevention and resolution in
areas of tension within the broad European region it covers. Furthermore, this
capacity has grown considerably throughout the past decade and, as I will
argue below, its potential for further growth is great. When the CPC was first
created by the Charter of Paris in 1990, it had a very limited mandate and a
minute budget and staff. After the sad experience of the former Yugoslavia in
1991, the CPC’s capacity gradually grew to the point where in 2002 there
were OSCE missions and other field activities in eighteen countries and regions
of Eurasia: six in Southeastern Europe, three in post-Soviet Eastern Europe,
four in the Caucasus, and five in Central Asia. In the cases of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo those missions have also grown quite large,
as the OSCE has been charged with significant political roles in rebuilding these
war-torn regions, operating in two of those venues alongside the NATO-led
forces of SFOR and KFOR. The missions have also been supported by two OSCE
organs based outside of the country, namely the ODIHR, which supports
missions activities in areas such as democratisation, elections, the rule of law
and human rights, and the HCNM, who works with missions in conflict-
prevention and conflict-resolution activities in disputes involving ethno-
national groups or between central governments and persons belonging to
minority groups. The chairperson-in-office and other member governments
serving in the OSCE troika (the chair, past-chair and chair-elect), as well as offi-
cials of the OSCE Secretariat and CPC in Vienna, frequently provide assistance
at the highest levels to the field missions and activities.
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The OSCE institutional capacity for conflict management
in the Eurasian region
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the OSCE began to
increase its capacity to manage conflicts despite the very modest mandate of
the CPC. After the outbreak of violence that occurred in both the former
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia in the first two years of the decade,
the OSCE substantially strengthened its institutional capacity in this area at
the Helsinki Summit of 1992. The mandate for the CPC was reinforced, and
the first mission of long-duration to be stationed in a region of conflict was
created for the regions of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Of equal importance, the office of the HCNM was
created. Together, these two institutions have functioned as the core of the
OSCE’s conflict management work throughout the Eurasian region.
The CPC is located within the secretariat in Vienna and is primarily
responsible for coordinating the work of the OSCE missions and other field
activities. It is largely responsible for staffing and training missions, for coor-
dinating their work in the field, and for liaison between the missions and
other OSCE institutions and participating governments. It is thus the CPC
that provides the primary point of contact between each of the field missions
and activities and OSCE officials in Vienna. Prior to the 2000 reorganisation,
all arrangements to staff and supply the missions with necessary materials
were provided by the CPC. Presently, the CPC still serves as the communica-
tions link through which instructions are normally relayed to mission heads,
and mission heads normally convey all reports, both routine and special,
through the CPC office in Vienna. Although the staff of the CPC in Vienna
was recently enlarged, it is still quite small in proportion to the number of
missions that must be supported, a reflection of the limited budgetary
resources available to it. The staff in 2001 consisted of three professional offi-
cers, including a director and deputy director, supported by 14 contracted
staff members. Therefore, it is often necessary for the staff to prioritise their
responses to the requests of each of the field missions. 
At the time of its founding, the CPC focused mostly on the implementation
of various military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs),
especially those included in the agreement known as Vienna Document
1990. These included the following:
• providing an information and database regarding military forces and
activities in the OSCE region, including force size and deployment, mili-
tary budgets, and a calendar of annual manoeuvres and other military
movements that were required to be reported under the terms of Vienna
Document 1990;
• providing a locus and infrastructure for consultation and coordination
regarding any unusual military activities not reported through the
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Vienna mechanism that might give rise to concern of impending military
activity of a threatening nature;
• coordinating the responses of countries with regard to hazards resulting
from military activities or incidents involving military forces before they
could set off a chain reaction of potentially violent responses;
• organising annual meetings to assess the performance of participating
states with regard to the implementation of all CSBMs agreed to under
CSCE provisions.
The Charter of Paris thus anticipated the possibility that the CPC’s initial func-
tions might be expanded as the need arose. Following the outbreak of fighting
in the former Yugoslavia, the CSCE ministerial meeting in Prague in January
1992 created the framework for expanding the functions of the CPC, opening
the door to the creation of its present structure. Based on the concept of
responding to unusual military activities, the possibility of long-term monitor-
ing to provide ‘early warning’ of impending threats to the security of states and
persons in the region became a central function of the CPC during and immedi-
ately after the 1992 Helsinki follow-up meeting. Therefore, the concept of the
‘mission of long duration’ emerged, and the CPC was given the task of organis-
ing and overseeing the operation of these missions.
In the event that missions provide ‘early warning’ to the CPC of incipient
conflict, it is the CPC’s primary responsibility to see that OSCE institutions
and participating states are alerted to the potential danger, as well as to
prepare to implement any decisions taken by the Permanent Council or
other high-level institutions. This often requires the director to deliver ‘early
warning’ messages to the appropriate OSCE institutions and to prepare to
implement decisions taken by those institutions. The director also frequently
travels to the site of potential conflicts to meet with local officials or with
parties involved in local conflicts to provide assistance and backing for the
work of the mission.
A further reorganisation of the CPC took place in 2000 as a result of the
Istanbul Summit conference and the decision to create the Rapid Expert
Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) system for recruiting and train-
ing mission staff. As a consequence an Operations Centre was created within
the CPC to provide for advanced planning of all aspects of future OSCE
missions, including the deployment of civilian police. The Operations Centre
also created the position of liaison officer to become a point of contact
between the OSCE and other international organisations, both military and
civilian, that might be involved alongside the OSCE in regions experiencing
conflict. The new Operations Centre includes a ‘situation room’ which can
maintain contact at all times (24 hours a day, seven days a week) with all
field operations and can relay information from the field to secretariat offi-
cials and to the chairman-in-office on very short notice. The mandate for the
Operations Centre includes three major tasks:
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• helping to identify crisis areas by maintaining close liaison with other
international organisations and NGOs involved in conflict-management
activities, including but not limited to the role played by OSCE missions
and field activities, but also extended to regions where no OSCE mission is
currently on the ground so that information must be obtained from other
international actors operating in these regions;
• serving as the planning unit for all future OSCE missions and field opera-
tions;
• acting as a point of coordination during the initial mobilisation and
subsequent deployment of any future field operations mandated by the
OSCE Permanent Council. This new function first operated to set up a
reinstated OSCE mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in early
2001.
The CPC, directed in 2002 by Ambassador Marton Krasznai, coordinates
implementation and verification of OSCE agreements on CSBMs (i.e., the
1986 Stockholm agreement, the Vienna Document 1990 and the Vienna
Document 1992), although separate consultative groups promote the imple-
mentation of the Conventional Forces in Europe and Open Skies Treaties.
The CPC also coordinates the work of the Forum for Security Cooperation,
which meets regularly in Vienna to discuss long-term policy issues and to
negotiate on arms control and CSBMs.
The HCNM in The Hague is a senior official, initially the former Dutch
foreign minister Max van der Stoel, who has considerable independent
authority to investigate and assist in responding to potential or actual inci-
dents of violence where national minorities play a significant role. Many
specialists on international organisations view the creation of this position
at the Helsinki Summit in 1992 as one of the most creative decisions taken
by the OSCE in its 25-year history, as the office has provided a function not
found in most other global or regional international institutions.
Supported by a small staff, the HCNM provides early warning of brewing
conflicts and intervenes in such situations where he deems it appropriate in
order to assist the parties to find non-violent solutions to their disputes.
Under the mandate given to the HCNM by the Helsinki Summit, he is only
supposed to deal with issues involving persons belonging to national minori-
ties, he is not permitted to deal with groups practising terrorism, and he is
only supposed to deal with conflicts that have the potential to affect inter-
state relations or regional security. Although the HCNM reports regularly to
the Permanent Council, he does not receive instructions from it (unlike the
CPC and the missions and field activities which it coordinates), and he is free
to respond according to his own judgement whenever he believes it to be
appropriate. Under van der Stoel’s leadership, this became a very active
office in the OSCE that has operated with considerable political independ-
ence. Van der Stoel retired in 2001 and was replaced by Rolf Ekeus of
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Sweden, who is likely to continue van der Stoel’s broad interpretation of the
mandate for his office and be actively engaged in monitoring relations
between governments and persons belonging to minorities throughout the
Eurasian region.
Typically the HCNM responds to any incidents that fall within his
mandate by travelling to the scene of the event and meeting immediately
with the parties involved, including government officials and aggrieved
parties. On the basis of his observations he may offer immediate advice to the
parties, engage in third party mediation, prepare recommendations for the
parties, or organise seminars or round tables at which parties may discuss
their grievances. As a representative of the OSCE – an international organi-
sation composed of national governments – the HCNM must always be
aware of his obligations to the governments to whom he is responsible. Thus
his role is not necessarily to act as an advocate on behalf of minorities; rather
it is to promote dialogue between persons belonging to minority groups and
governments or other institutions and organisations representing the
national majority. His goal is to promote the successful integration and
acceptance of persons belonging to minority groups within the structures of
a multinational state and, in so far as it is possible, to seek to head off pres-
sures for secession by regions heavily populated by persons belonging to
minority groups.2
Frequently the HCNM has travelled to countries and regions where there
is not an established OSCE mission or field activity. In this way, he has been
able to intervene in situations where short-term assistance is needed, but
where a longer-term presence is not necessary. However, whenever the
HCNM has concluded that a more continuous presence by OSCE representa-
tives is desirable in a region, he has recommended to the Permanent Council
that a mission or field activity be set up. Indeed, a substantial number of the
missions now fielded by the OSCE have come into existence in part as a
consequence of recommendations by the Commissioner. Once a mission is
on location, however, that does not necessarily mean that the role of the
HCNM disappears from the region. Although most OSCE missions and field
activities have at least one human rights specialist on their staff, their work
can often be supplemented by the involvement of the Commissioner, espe-
cially when the issue concerns the rights of persons belonging to minorities
as opposed to violations of individual human rights. 
Therefore, the HCNM has often appeared in countries where OSCE
missions are established and functioning. In these cases, the on-site mission
has been in part responsible for arranging the logistics of the visit by the
Commissioner, for briefing him about the situation on the ground, and for
assisting him with the follow-up to his visit. On rare occasions there have
been tensions between mission members, who often feel that their continu-
ous presence gives them a more in-depth knowledge of the situation in a
particular country, and the Commissioner, who enters into many regions of
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conflict where he necessarily must operate on the basis of a concern for
general principles of minority rights rather than according to the details of
the local situation. On the other hand, in most cases the OSCE missions and
the office of the HCNM have collaborated closely in their effort to resolve
underlying tensions involving the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
Ideally, their relationship should be complementary rather than competi-
tive. The local mission members typically do have more intimate knowledge
of the local situation, whereas the prestige and international standing of the
HCNM generally give him the clout necessary to persuade governments and
leaders of minority groups to pay serious attention to his recommendations,
which is not always the case with regard to recommendations made by OSCE
mission staffs. Therefore, the HCNM and the mission human rights special-
ists each have their own special role to play, and through close collaboration
they can best advance the OSCE’s role in resolving tensions surrounding
national minority issues in many of the OSCE participating states.
One of the most innovative roles performed by van der Stoel during eight
and a half years in office was to create what has come to be known as ‘seminar
diplomacy’. Typically, this approach involves inviting leaders of national
minorities and leaders of majority groups as well as government officials to
small seminars, often in isolated locations where they can deliberate outside of
public attention. In general, the HCNM also invites to these seminars a small set
of international ‘experts’ from OSCE countries on issues such as human rights,
minority rights, constitutional law, shared power and autonomy, and federal-
ism/confederalism. Through intense interactions over several days, the
Commissioner seeks to acquaint all parties with international norms and prac-
tices for dealing with minority groups and their integration into multinational
states. These seminars also provide an opportunity for the parties to express
their own grievances in the presence of an audience of international experts,
who may then make recommendations to the parties about how to overcome
their differences. In most cases, the HCNM follows up these seminars with a set
of written recommendations to the parties based on what he learned from the
seminar, as well as a series of follow-up visits to promote direct negotiations
between the parties in an effort to resolve their differences. Through a continu-
ing series of back-and- forth exchanges of information and ideas, therefore, the
High Commissioner may hope both to educate the parties about international
standards and norms and to bring them together around solutions based on
those broadly acknowledged principles. The HCNM has thus been one of the
OSCE’s most effective instruments for promoting conflict resolution through-
out central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU).
Specific OSCE conflict prevention and resolution activities since 19913
OSCE field activities may be categorised into five different functions that they
perform in countries experiencing potential or actual violent conflict. Most
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missions and field activities perform multiple functions, but for purposes of
this chapter I focus on prominent examples that illustrate each of these
different functions. I will thus highlight each of these five functions and
present a brief evaluation of the major accomplishments and shortcomings
of the OSCE in performing each of them:4
• Virtually all OSCE missions promote long-term conflict prevention
through encouraging the development of democratic institutions and
procedures and respect for human rights and the rights of persons
belonging to minorities, and for many missions this serves as the princi-
pal task assigned by their mandates.
• Many OSCE missions seek to prevent the escalation of conflicts to the
level of violence through various forms of diplomatic intervention,
including efforts at conciliation and mediation of disputes.
• Occasionally, but rarely, OSCE missions may actively mediate ongoing
violent conflicts, seeking a ceasefire as a precursor to introducing non-
violent methods for the eventual resolution of the conflict.
• Once violence has ceased, OSCE missions often seek to promote through
negotiations a long-term resolution to the underlying issues of the
conflict.
• Many OSCE missions have focused on rebuilding societies and re-estab-
lishing security in the aftermath of violent conflict.
Long-term conflict prevention through democratisation
It has become a generally established finding of social science research that
democracies generally do not go to war with other democracies; further-
more, intra-state or civil conflicts are less likely to occur in societies that
have well-established procedures for the non-violent resolution of conflicts
of interest among their citizens.5 Therefore, the establishment of democratic
processes, the creation of governments of laws and not of individuals, and
processes to integrate persons belonging to minorities fully into the institu-
tions of the state are together the best long-run guarantors of peace.
Examples include Estonia and Latvia, where the OSCE played a significant
role on behalf of large minorities of ethnic Russian denied citizenship rights
in these Baltic states; indeed, these missions achieved sufficient results so
that they were closed down at the end of 2001. Furthermore, the OSCE has
embarked since 1998 upon an effort to defend democracy in Belarus against
an authoritarian government that has reversed that country’s early post-
Soviet progress in the field of democratisation. As one of a very few interna-
tional institutions operating in Belarus, the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring
Group has played a vital role in providing international protection for NGOs
and a severely restricted political opposition within that country. 
Difficulties in the process of democratisation have also arisen in the five
Central Asian states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union with
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strong leaders in charge, and the democratisation process has been slow to
take hold. Therefore, in 1995 an OSCE Liaison Office in Central Asia was
established in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. This effort was enlarged in
1998 with the establishment of OSCE centres in the capitals of three other
Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. (The
fifth Central Asian state, Tajikistan, has a full-scale OSCE mission operating
on its territory with a more specific mandate in the field of conflict manage-
ment that will be discussed below.) The focus of OSCE efforts in Central Asia
has been on stimulating education about democratisation and human
dimension issues. In each case, numerous seminars have been organised
with local political elites and NGOs in which outside specialists on topics
such as criminality and drug trafficking, legislative changes that would
promote greater foreign investment, regional environmental problems,
sustainable development, and CSBMs among ethnic communities and with
neighbouring states. In addition, the OSCE has worked closely with local
universities and other educational institutions to try to institutionalise these
topics in their curriculum.
In all of these efforts, it is important to realise that democratisation is an
extremely difficult and long-term task even in the best of circumstances.
Centuries of authoritarian rule throughout the region have created a climate
in which few persons if any were alive in 1990 who had ever lived in a demo-
cratic state. As a result, the transition to a fully democratic society, in which
more than the outward appearance of democracy is established and in which
democratic values are truly internalised throughout the population, is
unlikely to take place rapidly. Democracy is inherently fragile in all transi-
tional societies, and more immediate measures of conflict prevention and
resolution will frequently be required in order to avoid an outbreak of
violence that might set back the democratisation process by a decade or
more. The linkage of security to political and humanitarian concerns epito-
mises the special role that the OSCE missions have come to play in societies
undergoing political transformation since the collapse of communism.
Prevention of violent outcomes in potential conflict situations
As noted above, a major function of the OSCE has been to prevent ‘Humpty
Dumpty’ from falling off of his wall. The organisation’s record in this case is
mixed. However, the OSCE has often been blamed unfairly for failing to
prevent conflicts. Too often OSCE inaction was the result of the refusal by
one or more of its participating states to take action recommended by OSCE
mission heads or other officials such as the HCNM; that is, by the failure to
obtain the consensus that is required to take decisive action. Furthermore, in
the early post-Cold War years the OSCE did not have a sufficient structural
capacity to respond to brewing conflicts. 
Thus the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were well under
way by the time the first CSCE mission of long duration was sent into the field
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in late 1992, following the Helsinki follow-on meeting that summer. In the
case of Kosovo, the OSCE was hamstrung by the fact that it had suspended
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from participation in May 1992.
Although there were many good reasons for this action, it also had the
perverse effect of preventing the OSCE from having any access on the ground
in the Kosovo region until tensions had passed the point of no return. By the
time the United States, led by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, persuaded the
parties to accept an OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission on the ground in
October 1998, it was too late to realise a peaceful resolution of the conflict. A
similar decision a year or more earlier, however, might have prevented the
bloody war and subsequent international occupation of Kosovo, although of
course it is always impossible to prove ‘what might have happened if . . .’. But
it is very clear that the OSCE and especially the special representative of the
chairman-in-office, Ambassador Max van der Stoel, provided substantial
‘early warning’ of impending disaster in Kosovo. It was the failure of key
participating states – including the United States – to take ‘early action’ in
the form of active diplomacy prior to late 1998 that permitted the outcome
in Kosovo to be so violent and the subsequent task of reconstruction so
enormous.
Looking at the other side of the coin, the OSCE has contributed to the
successful resolution of potentially violent conflicts in several regions of
Eurasia. Perhaps most notable is the role played by the OSCE in mediating
between nationalistic ethnic Russian politicians in Crimea and the central
government of Ukraine, which was critical in reaching a solution to that
volatile conflict that could have easily exploded into violence. Russian
nationalists wanted to separate Crimea from Ukraine and perhaps return it
to its pre-1954 status as a part of the Russian Federation, and the Ukrainian
government was prepared to do anything necessary to prevent this from
happening. Special credit here goes to the OSCE’s HCNM, van der Stoel,
whose continuing intercession, often using the problem-solving workshops
referred to above as ‘seminar diplomacy’, played a major role in promoting a
non-violent outcome in this potentially grave situation. Van der Stoel’s work
was also backed up by continuous efforts of the OSCE mission members in
both Kyiv and Simferopol to broker a solution guaranteeing substantial
Crimean autonomy while preserving the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Furthermore, this effort was especially important due to the strategic signifi-
cance of the region. Needless to say, a war in the mid-1990s between Russia
and Ukraine would have created a severe international crisis that would
have affected the vital interests of the entire West, including the United
States. Even if this were the only accomplishment of the OSCE in the decade
of the 1990s, I would argue that this alone was worth all of the effort and
resources that have been put into the entire organisation by the United
States and its European allies.
But this is, of course, not the only significant accomplishment of the OSCE
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during the 1990s. At least until 2001, the OSCE mission to Skopje (the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) played an instrumental role in
preventing that former Yugoslav republic from falling into the kind of
violence that has swept across Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Of
course, the results of those efforts were placed in doubt as violence expanded
in regions of Macedonia inhabited by large ethnic Albanian populations
throughout 2001. Several factors largely beyond the control of the OSCE
conspired to push the situation in Macedonia towards the brink of violence,
including the collapse of the government of Albania in 1997 and the looting
from its storehouses of large supplies of light weapons and munitions, which
made their way into Kosovo and subsequently into Macedonia; the removal
of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) from the
northern border regions due to Chinese opposition in the UN; and the
growing ambitions of some ethnic Albanian politicians to follow up their
‘success’ in Kosovo with a similar effort to split heavily Albanian-populated
regions of Macedonia off from the rest of the country, perhaps eventually
creating a ‘greater Albania’.
Fear that violence was imminent, however, in turn led to a rise in nation-
alism among the Macedonia majority and greater restrictions on minorities,
especially Albanians. At the same time, some parts of the Albanian minority,
in the aftermath of the defeat of Serbian forces in neighbouring Kosovo,
began to advocate separation from Macedonia and joining with Kosovo and
Albania. Their separatist ambitions were fuelled by a ready availability of
weapons that crossed the border from neighbouring Kosovo. As a result
violence flared up in the spring of 2001 between Albanians near the border
areas and the Macedonian armed forces. After a ceasefire was negotiated in
the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001, several units of NATO
troops entered Macedonia to disarm the parties, following which the armed
forces were withdrawn. At the same time, the OSCE enlarged its mission in
Macedonia to a total of about 210 unarmed monitors, protected by some
1,000 soldiers from France, Germany and Italy. While the OSCE’s mandate
remained basically unchanged, the necessity for intensive conflict preven-
tion at the local level had been clearly indicated by the outbreak of violence
and the increased radicalisation of the two communities that lay behind the
violence. In the autumn, deteriorating conditions in Macedonia seriously
challenged what was previously regarded as one of the more successful
preventive diplomacy missions. None the less, the OSCE Spillover Monitoring
Mission in Macedonia, with some timely help from NATO and the continued
engagement of the OSCE HCNM, managed by the end of 2001 to head off the
escalation of violence and to prevent Macedonia from proceeding down the
violent path that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo had taken in the recent
past.
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Ceasefire mediation
Once violence breaks out in a country, the OSCE role has generally been
limited. One exception, however, was the first war in Chechnya, which
started with the Russian military assault in December 1994. Shortly after-
wards the OSCE Permanent Council created the OSCE Assistance Group to
Chechnya, which set up operation in Grozny in 1995. Russia, as a country
that still clings to its self-image as a great power, was of course reluctant to
permit any presence by a multilateral organisation on its soil. Therefore, it
was somewhat surprising when the Russian government permitted a small
OSCE ‘assistance group’ to be established in the very vortex of the fighting.
Under the able leadership of the second head of mission, Ambassador Tim
Guldimann of Switzerland, the OSCE expanded its activity beyond monitor-
ing human rights violations and war crimes and assumed a role as an active
mediator between the Chechen leaders and officials in Moscow. Guldimann’s
shuttle diplomacy, involving numerous trips between Grozny and Moscow,
was largely responsible for setting up the meeting at Khasavyurt between
Alexander Lebed and Zelimkhan Yanderbiev that brought an end to fighting
and a withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in August 1996. 
Subsequently, the OSCE assumed the major role in preparing, conducting
and monitoring the presidential elections in Chechnya in January 1997, in
which Aslan Maskhadov was elected. Sadly, the internal situation in
Chechnya degenerated into anarchy, with frequent violence directed at
outsiders, even those representing international humanitarian organisa-
tions. This was followed by a renewal of Russian military action against
Chechnya in 1999, after the OSCE Assistance Group had moved its offices to
Moscow because of fear about the safety of mission members if they
remained in Chechnya. Tragically, this also resulted in a decline of OSCE
influence over the parties, and extensive efforts to re-establish a mediating
role for the OSCE, undertaken at the Istanbul Summit in November 1999 by
the United States and several other countries, failed to bring results; indeed,
only in June 2000 did the OSCE Assistance Group finally return to
Chechnya. This tragic outcome, however, should not cause us to overlook
completely the potential for the OSCE to play an important mediating role,
even in the midst of violent conflict, as it did in Chechnya in 1995–96.
Conflict resolution after a ceasefire is in place
Since the major OSCE conflict prevention functions were created after the
spate of post-Cold War violence in the early 1990s, a major focus for OSCE
missions has been the effort to broker longer-term resolution of the conflicts
that had produced the previous chain of violence. In addition, the OSCE has
sought to prevent the renewal of violence in situations where serious
tensions remain. This has been the major focus of the OSCE missions in
Moldova (regarding Transdniestria), Georgia (especially regarding South
Ossetia and to a lesser degree Abkhazia, where the UN has taken the lead
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role), Tajikistan, and the so-called Minsk Group dealing with the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
In this area, the OSCE record is clearly mixed, and there is probably no
single aspect of the work of the OSCE where performance has fallen so short
of aspirations. On the positive side of the ledger, in none of these regions has
large-scale violence reappeared since the OSCE missions entered. In most
cases, the OSCE has played a useful role in monitoring the performance of
peacekeeping forces, mostly from Russia, operating under a CIS umbrella. In
addition, OSCE activities in democratisation, human rights, the rule of law,
refugee resettlement, and support for the rights of persons belonging to
minorities has assisted local authorities in keeping tensions below boiling
point. Perhaps of greatest importance, in each case the OSCE has played a
third party role in keeping lines of communications open and negotiations
under way between former belligerent factions to try to resolve some of the
important issues underlying these conflicts. Most of these conflicts have
become frozen in place: there is no settlement, but also no return to mass
violence. These outcomes are no small accomplishment, but they also leave
open the potential for the OSCE to improve its effectiveness at managing
negotiations to enhance its ability to bring about long-term settlement of
frozen conflicts, so that life in these divided states may return to some
semblance of normality.
Post-conflict reconstruction and security building
After episodes of significant violence, social relations within society are
usually badly broken. Hatred, anger and the desire for revenge become domi-
nant emotions that often reinforce the differences that produced conflict in
the first place. Rebuilding war-torn societies is often a long and difficult task.
It would not be appropriate to expect Serbs, Croats and Bosnians to forget
about their long and bitter struggle in a few short years. Thus one of the
major challenges facing the OSCE has been to try to assist societies torn by
conflict in their efforts to rebuild. NATO and other multinational forces can
help by providing security, both for international personnel and to prevent
opposing sides from resuming violence. The EU and other international
financial institutions can assist by contributing desperately needed
economic aid to rebuild infrastructure and jump start economies so that they
can begin to grow on their own, and thus reduce the poverty that so often
becomes a breeding ground for violence. But in virtually all cases of violence
in the Eurasian region, the primary responsibility for reconstructing political
institutions and developing a democratic political framework for resolving
differences peacefully – the most difficult task these regions face – has fallen
overwhelmingly to the OSCE.
This activity has been the major focus of some of the largest of the OSCE
missions, including those in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. It has
also been the primary task of the OSCE presence in Albania, as well as an
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important function of the missions in Georgia and Moldova. In many ways,
the OSCE’s activities in this category are those of long-term democracy build-
ing, where the OSCE faces the especially difficult challenge of operating in a
post-conflict situation. The OSCE’s close cooperation with other security
institutions, especially the UN, NATO and the EU, is particularly necessary in
these regions. In the effort to revive these war-torn societies, the OSCE
cannot succeed alone, but its contribution is none the less essential to the
successful accomplishment of this task.
Evaluation and recommendations
In summary, when one surveys all of the myriad activities that the OSCE has
undertaken since the early 1990s in the field of conflict prevention and reso-
lution, one cannot escape the conclusion that, in spite of all its shortcomings
and failures, it plays a much more significant role than it is generally cred-
ited with. The OSCE deserves a place of at least equal status with NATO when
evaluating the role that multilateral institutions play in contributing to
security in the North Atlantic and pan-Eurasian region. The OSCE’s role
often goes unrecognised, in part because it works in so many relatively
obscure locations, and because most of its successes are the consequence of
thousands of small accomplishments achieved day by day, village by village,
rather than any single, dramatic result that can readily be pointed to. 
Furthermore, as noted previously, when it is most successful, very few
people notice and thus very little credit is given where credit is due. The fail-
ures – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya and Kosovo – make headlines. The
successes can be uncovered by outsiders only with painstaking and difficult
research about potential crises that never materialised. The many accom-
plishments on a daily basis, often small achievements individually, but of
great importance collectively, are easily overlooked. The men and women
who serve in OSCE missions, in the staff in Vienna, The Hague and Warsaw,
and in national delegations to the OSCE institutions, are often making signif-
icant accomplishments in heading off crises for which they seldom, if ever,
receive the credit they deserve. The OSCE is certainly not a panacea and
cannot bring peace to Eurasia alone, but without its steadfast work through-
out the region, it is extremely likely that violence, violation of human rights
and degradation of the human spirit would be far more widespread than they
are today.
That having been said, the next question naturally arises: can the OSCE
do better at its conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution functions? And if
so, what needs to be done to strengthen it? The answer to the first question is
definitely ‘yes’. The question of how to strengthen the OSCE is somewhat
more complex.6 One of the strengths of the OSCE is that it is a relatively
small, non-bureaucratic and flexible body, in notable contrast to many other
multilateral organisations. Any effort to strengthen the organisation must
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be careful not to undermine its flexibility and resilience, which are essential
to its ability to respond in a timely fashion to brewing conflicts.
None the less, there are several modest steps that might strengthen the
OSCE’s capacity to work effectively in conflict prevention and resolution
without entailing great costs or the creation of a large, cumbersome bureau-
cracy. First, the OSCE needs a more professionally competent, well-trained
staff, especially in its missions. At present, it depends too much on short-term
volunteers and personnel seconded to the OSCE by the participating states.
Many of these people go into the field with little or no knowledge about the
region where they are being sent, and little or no training about the process,
skills and techniques of conflict resolution. Many are selected to serve on
missions because they are available for short-term assignments, or they are
seconded by governments that do not need their services elsewhere. Most are
on short-term contracts that too often expire just as the people are beginning
to get a grasp of the issues with which they are supposed to be dealing. In
spite of these limitations, many OSCE personnel have done an excellent job.
Yet they could do much better with proper training and enough time in the
field really to learn their job and how to perform it effectively.
The REACT program was initiated at the Istanbul Summit in 1999 to
recruit and train staff for OSCE missions, especially for emergency missions
that must be established with a short lead-time. Each participating state is
expected to maintain a roster of qualified and trained individuals who can be
called up at short notice to be deployed in areas of developing conflict.
REACT has produced some enhancements in training OSCE personnel, but
this programme still depends on each participating state to train its own
volunteers, and the results are inconsistent at best. Heads of missions are
generally very qualified senior diplomats, but they too often have to work
with very limited resources and inexperienced, inadequately trained person-
nel. And the challenge of finding the right people quickly, when they are
most needed to head off developing emergencies, remains a serious one that
the OSCE must figure out how to surmount.
Similarly, the OSCE could benefit from a strengthened analytical office
and information resources in the CPC in Vienna. A small group of highly
trained specialists in each of the major mission functions – elections, human
rights, rights of persons belonging to minorities, democratisation, freedom of
the media, conflict prevention, mediation and conflict resolution – could
provide enhanced support to each of the missions when needed. A better
library and access to Internet resources could provide enhanced information
for missions in the field, which often work in isolated locations. Although the
recently created Operations Centre in Vienna has substantially improved the
OSCE’s capacity to receive and process ‘early warning’ messages about incip-
ient conflicts and get that information rapidly into the hands of those
capable of developing an early response, it depends heavily on the quality of
information received from the field and has only a limited capacity to analyse
The OSCE role in Eurasian security
161
2504Chap8  7/4/03  12:40 pm  Page 161
and evaluate that information when it reaches Vienna. Therefore, the OSCE
is still often challenged by the difficult task of authorising action prior to the
point of no return; when the cycle of violence has escalated out of control,
OSCE preventive action is no longer sufficient to head off an escalatory spiral.
Second, the OSCE also needs to develop a greater capacity to engage
proactively in order to mediate serious conflicts that appear to be on the
brink of violence or that have become frozen in the aftermath of violence.
The HCNM represents a model of an OSCE official who can enter into
disputes rapidly and without any special mandate, enabling him or her to
respond on the spur of the moment. Many other OSCE institutions, however,
remain mired in potential paralysis created by the need to find consensus (or
approximate consensus) within the Permanent Council, where all 55 partic-
ipating states are represented. Moving from the recognition that a problem is
brewing to a political decision to initiate a timely response remains the
Achilles heel of almost all international organisations.
In order to begin to overcome these obstacles to timely response, the OSCE
should create a greater institutional capacity to bring ‘eminent persons’ to
intervene on their own initiative in extremely sensitive or urgent situations.
This can be done in part by upgrading the status of the OSCE’s secretary
general, who now plays primarily an administrative role; as a consequence,
the secretary general is not generally available to play the kind of role played
by the UN secretary general in many severe crises where his or her personal
intervention may produce positive results when all other efforts have failed.
Political leadership for the OSCE is provided by the chairperson-in-office, but
this position rotates every year, so that there is not sufficient continuity or
consistency from one individual to the next to enable this person to play a
long-term role as ombudsman or mediator. Sometimes, of course, the OSCE
can rely on eminent persons coming from among its participating states, as
was the case when Richard Holbrooke assumed an important mediating role
on behalf of the United States in the conflicts in both Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo. However, it is far better in principle for such individuals to
operate within the OSCE framework, except in extraordinary circumstances,
since the representative of a multilateral institution will generally be
accorded greater legitimacy by disputing parties than will the representative
of any single participating state.
In addition, the OSCE often lacks the instruments to influence states to
change behaviours that undermine the commitments undertaken under the
Helsinki Final Act and the other subsequent documents that have been
adopted by the OSCE. In many cases, the more influential states will have to
support the OSCE by exerting pressure on intransigent states that resist OSCE
efforts to promote democratisation and other improvements in the ‘human
dimension’. For example, the United States and the Russian Federation need
to cooperate to encourage highly authoritarian states such as those in
Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Belarus, to live up to their commit-
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ments undertaken within the OSCE framework. They also should work
together more effectively to reinforce OSCE efforts to broker solutions to the
most important ‘frozen conflicts’, such as those in Moldova, Georgia and
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Therefore, the US government needs to encourage the Russians to take
their own rhetoric about the potential for the OSCE seriously. In the early
post-Cold War years, Russian rhetoric emphasised the primacy of the OSCE
among European security institutions. The Russians seem to have largely
abandoned that effort following their failure to block the enlargement of
NATO. But that does not mean that the United States should give up encour-
aging them to make more effective use of the OSCE to deal with the many and
serious security threats that surround them on all sides. Furthermore, the
United States can best convince the Russians to take the OSCE seriously by
taking it seriously itself. The United States should give the OSCE the same
priority it gives to NATO in dealing with broad European security issues,
while recognising the different strengths of both institutions. Unless the
United States can help enhance the OSCE’s capacity to prevent new violent
conflicts and to resolve conflicts that recently produced violence, we are
likely to be faced with a continuing series of hard choices: either the United
States will have to send more troops abroad in politically unpopular
missions, an especially difficult task since the US military priority shifted to
combating terrorism; or the United States will be forced to stand by while
violence and instability spread across regions of Europe and Eurasia, creat-
ing, among other negative consequences, fertile ground for terrorist groups
to form and flourish.
Similarly, European institutions like the EU or the Council of Europe
cannot be counted on to deal with all crises that arise on their own conti-
nent. The Europeans also need to give the OSCE significant priority alongside
their efforts to enlarge and strengthen the EU. They need to be realistic about
the ability of an expanding EU to reach a consensus about foreign and secu-
rity policy. Even if they are successful in that endeavour, their capacity to
implement effective action is likely to be limited without the close coopera-
tion of the United States and/or Russia. And such cooperation can best be
achieved when they work within the framework of the one European secu-
rity institution in which those two countries are represented, that is, the
OSCE.
In the process, US officials and the attentive public might come to realise
that the OSCE also serves long-term US interests by helping to create a more
stable, peaceful and democratic regime in those regions of Eurasia formerly
ruled by Communist governments. Indeed, this is a vital interest that all
OSCE participating states share, even though they do not always fully recog-
nise this convergence of interest. Promoting collective action to support
these goals of cooperative security throughout the OSCE region thus ought
to be a high-priority goal for US foreign policy.
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Finally, the United States should encourage other regions of the world
experiencing insecurity and violence to consider borrowing, when appropri-
ate, concepts and approaches to regional security that have been successful
in the Eurasian context. Of course, security in each region is influenced by
different cultural, political and strategic environments. But the OSCE has
shown that intervention by a regional security institution may be under-
taken with greater sensitivity to the local conditions, greater awareness of
the underlying issues, and deeper understanding of specific regional
concerns than is generally possible for global international organisations
like the UN or global hegemonic powers like the United States. In several
instances the Organisation of African Unity and the Asian Regional Forum
have begun to experiment cautiously with some of the confidence-building
measures and techniques of preventive diplomacy developed by the OSCE.
Thus, with due sensitivity to regional variations, the OSCE also offers a
model of how a regional security organisation can strengthen security and
promote democratic development in volatile regions of the world, and its
value as a model ought to be taken seriously in all regions of the globe threat-
ened with instability and violent conflict.
Notes
1 The CSCE was renamed the OSCE in 1995 to reflect the fact that it had evolved
from a series of itinerant conferences to a fully institutionalised organisation.
2 Ambassador van der Stoel has summarised his philosophy for responding to
conflicts involving the rights of persons belonging to minorities as follows: ‘. . .the
protection of persons belonging to minorities has to be seen as essentially in the
interest of the state and of the majority. Stability and security are as a rule best
served by ensuring that persons belonging to national minorities can effectively
enjoy their rights. If the state shows loyalty to persons belonging to minorities, it
can expect loyalty in return from those persons who will have a stake in the
stability and well-being of that state . . .  solutions should be sought as much as
possible within the framework of the state itself’. Quoted in Connie Peck,
Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing
Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), p. 45.
3 Throughout the decade from 1992 through to 2001, I was engaged in research
to evaluate the effectiveness of OSCE missions and field activities. I was assisted in
this endeavour by support from the Center for Foreign Policy Development at
Brown University in 1992, a Fulbright Fellowship to the OSCE based in Vienna in
1997, and a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellowship at the US Institute for Peace in
Washington in 1998. As part of this research, I conducted extensive interviews
with heads of mission; attended numerous OSCE meetings, including regular
meetings of the Permanent Council; read the activity reports of missions from
throughout this period; and made on-site visits to several OSCE missions in the
field. The evaluations and conclusions presented below draw primarily from my
own observations and analysis in conducting this research rather than from
secondary sources.
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4 For a further exploration of these roles and some primary examples of their
successful performance by the OSCE, see my chapter in a book released by the
Committee on International Conflict Resolution of the US National Academy of
Sciences: P. Terrence Hopmann, ‘The Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe: Its Contribution to Conflict Prevention and Resolution’, in Paul C.
Stern and Daniel Druckman (eds), International Conflict Resolution After the Cold
War (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000), pp. 569–615. 
5 See Bruce M. Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001), Ch. 1.
For a more sceptical assessment of the democratic peace hypothesis, see Joanne
Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999).
6 A more detailed set of suggestions about how to strengthen the OSCE may be
found in P. Terrence Hopmann, Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The
OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace,
Peaceworks No. 39, 1999).
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9Paths to peace for
NATO’s partnerships in Eurasia
Joshua B. Spero
This chapter examines the role of multilateral cooperative efforts and insti-
tutionalised security cooperation in the Eurasian area through a study of
NATO’s PfP programme. In terms of measuring the capacity to increase
Eurasian security, the general track record of the post-Cold War security
institutions in non-traditional areas of societal democratisation, economic
modernisation, civil and cross-border war prevention, and Eurasian integra-
tion presents a mixed picture.1 By focusing on the Eurasian politico-military
partnerships created with NATO, it is possible to gain an understanding of
how targeted policies supported by multilateral institutions can increase
security in the Eurasian area. NATO’s PfP provides a myriad of programmes
between NATO and non-NATO states utilising multilateral military cooper-
ation to educate, train, exercise, and allow military staff and civilian officials
to operate effectively together.2 Since its January 1994 inception, the PfP
has created substantial security enhancements in Eurasia and contributed
directly to the capacity of allied nations to deploy troops to the region in the
post-September 11 anti-terrorist coalition. 
The PfP has evolved into an exemplary model of institutionalised civil-
military cooperation among over forty European and Eurasian states. The
success of the PfP has had an important impact feeding back into NATO,
thus facilitating NATO’s own post-Cold War survival. None the less, the
future of PfP will depend heavily on whether NATO can adapt adequately to
the kinds of post-September 11 threats confronting both allies and partners.
By incorporating the experiences of the PfP into NATO planning, the alliance
may be in a stronger position to adapt to current and future challenges.3
Almost six years of PfP cooperative planning and operations in Eurasia have
laid part of the foundation to counter such non-traditional threats as terror-
ism, the proliferation of WMD, ethnic conflict, resource depletion and
narcotics trafficking in Eurasia. The PfP provides the principal mechanism
through which NATO cooperates with individual and regional groupings of
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non-NATO nations. These cooperative mechanisms focus on long-term
training regimens and have integrated the Eurasian participants into NATO
planning facilities at NATO headquarters in Belgium and at all NATO mili-
tary commands. This chapter concentrates on several aspects of the PfP’s
contribution to Eurasian security. 
The origins of the PfP
During the early to mid-1990s a handful of key American officials, in the
Departments of Defense and State, developed the PfP concept. PfP was born
in 1993, largely from concepts developed by Joseph Kruzel, deputy assistant
secretary of defence for Europe and NATO, and General John Shalikashvili,
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who had served previously as NATO
supreme allied commander of Europe. Though the initial demand for PfP
reflected a desire to provide a short-term alternative to expanding NATO’s
membership, the concept eventually evolved so that it truly changed early
post-Cold War thinking about multilateral European security cooperation.
At its core, the PfP is premised on a belief that the more civilian strategists
and military operators plan together within an integrated civil-military
command structure like NATO, the greater the likelihood of peaceful inter-
national relations. Moreover, by introducing states to western models of
civil-military relations, NATO might help to stabilise weak post-Soviet states
throughout eastern Europe and Eurasia – even those states that would not
eventually seek NATO membership. Such a design required significant build-
ing-block initiatives to proceed in earnest and develop institutionally. NATO
represented the ideal institution through which to promote this goal because
of its multilateral and cooperative focus on shared politico-military
approaches, norms, standards and operating procedures developed over
decades of multilateral cooperation. 
American strategic planners, mainly in the Pentagon, however, needed to
ensure that PfP first survived its early tests. Such challenges included
American initiatives to pursue long-term linkages and then enhanced rela-
tionships through NATO institutionally with the unstable states in the
Caucasus and Central Asia – frequently seen by NATO’s European allies,
except Turkey, as outside the area of European security. Senior US officials,
reinforced with crucial staff initiatives (mostly emanating from the joint
chiefs of staff), made this happen during the administration of President
William J. Clinton.4 Each participant in the interagency debate had different
reasons for backing the PfP, with some seeing it as a means of deferring
debate over expanding NATO membership and others seeing it as facilitating
NATO’s expansion over time. Either way, had this coalition of key senior US
policy-makers not thrown its support and leadership behind the
Kruzel–Shalikashvili initiative, the PfP process, without American leader-
ship, would probably have floundered within NATO.5
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US and NATO allies projected PfP as a non-threatening security strategy
across Europe and Eurasia during the 1990s. Indeed, the PfP process evolved
to become a force multiplier strategy eventually serving the interests of
stability throughout the region. Through PfP, NATO and PfP nations could
project their forces collectively to confront traditional and non-traditional
security threats, as was demonstrated by their crucial role in providing a
baseline for successful engagements in the Balkans and Afghanistan.6 The
PfP initiative became one of the most important tools for the US national
security strategy of engagement and enlargement to promote multilateral
dialogue, planning and operating mechanisms for cooperative security.
Significantly, as the PfP process progressed during the latter part of the
1990s, particularly in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, joint efforts to reduce consistent problems posed
by non-state actors arose from PfP multilateral regional cooperative security
that promoted, for example, counter-terrorist education, training and plan-
ning among Eurasian PfP members.7
Establishing durable procedures and processes for PfP initially presented a
major challenge to NATO planners. By working with key allies such as Great
Britain, Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and
Turkey, and critical PfP partners such as Poland, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden,
Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, America led the
shaping of PfP. Washington gave early impetus to galvanise PfP with
congressionally appropriated funding, titled the Warsaw Initiative. By
working closely on multilateral policy recommendations at NATO head-
quarters and throughout the NATO military command structure, the US-
allied strategy stemmed from the belief that through multilateral leadership
Eurasian security could be enhanced. Even with this political dynamism,
American civil-military planners knew instinctively that the military held
the quickest, most pragmatic capabilities to reinforce the early, nascent and
fragile PfP process in every region involved, including the Caucasus and
Central Eurasia. Crucial US congressional staff members on the Senate
Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
convinced members of Congress to allocate Warsaw Initiative funding to the
joint chiefs of staff in late 1994 to initiate the PfP process. 
The first Warsaw Initiative instalment of $30 million allowed US joint
chiefs of staff planners to formulate and recommend a broad multilateral
vision of PfP to General Shalikashvili, coordinating closely with Kruzel and
his European, Eurasian and NATO staffs in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. To achieve such a vision, General John Shalikashvili, in turn, forged
a dynamic political and military strategy with his strategic plans and policy
staff who covered NATO and Eurasia. As chairman of the joint chiefs of staff,
Shalikashvili gained support from US and NATO European and Atlantic
commanders and built a strong consensus in support of PfP with the secre-
tary of defence, William Perry, and the secretary of state, Warren
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Christopher. That consensus was then taken by the national security
advisor, Anthony Lake, to President Clinton with the necessary game plan to
implement PfP. President Clinton, in turn, was able to persuade NATO allies
and PfP participants alike of the intrinsic value of this programme. 
Long-term civil-military exercise programmes across Europe and Eurasia
were soon developed through the PfP. These often involved thousands of
civilian planners and troops conducting training events and deployments
several months long. In addition to formal PfP activity, US and other NATO
members conducted hundreds of bilateral and multilateral ‘in-the-spirit-of -
PfP’ programmes. As initially conceived by the US joint chiefs of staff and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, many ‘in-the-spirit-of-PfP’ programmes
evolved into formal NATO activities. These institutional mechanisms for
NATO’s PfP process drew, along with important allied and partner contribu-
tions, considerably on American resources, financial support, and equip-
ment leases or purchases to the majority of PfP nations. Consequently, US
Warsaw Initiative funding, increased in subsequent years, gave PfP states
important financial breathing space. Within the constraints of limited PfP
nation budgets, often consumed by personnel and pension costs, American
and NATO strategists pushed PfP states to modernise their militaries as best
they could, while also maintaining or increasing their training and readi-
ness. These were crucial steps for any serious effort to meet the multiple post-
Cold War security challenges in Eurasia. As a result of this vision being taken
from theory into practice, the PfP process accelerated and solidified through-
out NATO’s political and military committees and command structures
while also taking root in many allied and PfP nations’ national planning
structures. As a result, PfP emerged as perhaps the most significant opera-
tional bridge between Europe and Eurasia.8
Bandwagoning towards PfP 
While it is clear why PfP was so appealing to the NATO members, a key ques-
tion remains: why was this particular form of multilateral cooperation so
successful among the participating countries of Eurasia? International rela-
tions theory, especially that which assesses the dynamics of bandwagoning
and balancing behaviour among states, helps to a considerable degree in
answering this question – and also in explaining the sources of regional
stability in post-Cold War Eurasia. As Randall Schweller explains, bandwag-
oning portrays actions that states conduct to gain reward and profit from
aligning with the stronger side, while balancing characterises efforts that
states take to align with the weaker in order to achieve the security of the
state.9 The results from balancing, however, frequently entail more costs to
states because such alignment involves balancing with a state or coalition
vigorously against a strong predatory state or coalition. This balancing,
whether offensively or defensively, by a state or coalition against an external
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threat perceived as serious aims to preserve and protect the state.10 As Glenn
Snyder also maintains, ‘the choice between conciliation and balancing
involves optimising among security, autonomy, and intrinsic values: concil-
iation buys security at some cost to intrinsic values; balancing buys it at the
cost of autonomy’.11 Moreover, antagonistic or aggressive alignment often
comes at a higher cost than cooperative or conciliatory alignment. Security-
seeking states can reduce the potential for conflict by revealing benign moti-
vations, demonstrating foreign policy transparency, and signalling
reassurance to decrease the risks of misperception leading to conflict, there-
fore avoiding spiralling tensions that can lead to a regional security
dilemma.12 This defensive concept of cooperative alignment might describe
state alignment more accurately, as states are choosing multilateral forms of
enhancing their perceived security interests.13 This approach generally
provides the best conceptual framework for understanding why Eurasian
states have chosen to align with NATO through the PfP. 
By choosing a strategy with the least costly alignment policy, a state
decides on its balance of interest. If, as Schweller states, the objective of
bandwagoning centres on the opportunity for a state to gain by joining the
security system it values, the state determines that its cost to achieve secu-
rity defensively might be lower than to defend the existing order, which may
be more unfavourable. The security system comprises a stronger state or
coalition of stronger states and the bandwagoning state attempts to align,
usually during a time of geopolitical change, and not in a manner threaten-
ing to other states – especially those states outside existing security institu-
tions. Building on Schweller’s bandwagoning definition, Mark Kramer offers
what he characterises as non-predatory bandwagoning alignment. States
ally with others not solely because of the external security and stability
sought, but also because of the expectation of distributive gains for many of
the states involved.14 Kramer’s concept of ‘non-military’ state alignment or
non-predatory bandwagoning provides insights as to how the PfP led both
NATO and its participants towards multilateral cooperative security strate-
gies. Non-predatory bandwagoning states, as those joining the PfP, gener-
ally try to attain gains not through aggression, but from extending the
bandwagoning state’s value system. Encouraged by NATO, PfP states have
sought to institutionalise the values of cooperative security even if they do
not actually seek formal NATO membership. 
By becoming more ‘western’ in their geopolitical orientation, PfP coun-
tries hope to achieve a variety of distributive gains resulting from the posi-
tive-sum experiences of non-predatory bandwagoning. PfP participants
have chosen a particular form of cooperative security behaviour as an alter-
native to behaviour motivated by power and threat – which can lead to
aggression and war. Within this conceptual framework, the motivations
behind the general Eurasian trend towards PfP can best be understood. Seen
as the most threatening entity by the majority of current PfP members
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during the Cold War, a post-Cold War NATO provided the non-predatory
bandwagoning states with a practical path for adapting their predominantly
non-threatening foreign policy and military postures, while also signalling
to the international community the depth of their own state identity choices,
as in the post-Soviet geopolitical space. Consequently, aggressive interstate
behaviour in historically war-torn Eurasia has not emerged among PfP
members. 
Despite these historical achievements, there are some negative assess-
ments of the NATO/PfP outreach process in Eurasia. A primary criticism
views the PfP as a means of delaying NATO’s promise to maintain an open
door for absorbing new members – with the collective defence security guar-
antee accompanying membership. Additionally, some critics saw the PfP as
not providing enough of a comprehensive strategy for ensuring the security
of the signatory states. Another critique centres on the risks of overextend-
ing NATO member resources in outreach ventures to non-member PfP coun-
tries – thus diluting NATO’s traditional core mission of collective defence. An
additional concern reasons that overextending already resource-strapped
militaries emerging from the former Warsaw Pact and post-Soviet states
only undermines their prospects for democratisation. Finally, PfP advocates,
both in NATO countries and in the participating non-NATO states, have
generally seen the programme as receiving inadequate resource investment
for it to succeed. Despite these criticisms, PfP has been the principal means
for organising effective multilateral military coordination that both broad-
ens and refines NATO’s new missions and serves as the centre of geopolitical
gravity for the interested post-Communist countries of Eurasia.15
Cooperation between NATO and non-NATO nations, even nations that
contributed troops outside the PfP framework from Latin America, Africa,
the Middle East and Asia, became important foundations of NATO’s post-
Cold War missions in operations such as Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The PfP’s consultative functions
cannot solve the often ingrained domestic problems within any given PfP
member-state. Rather, PfP ultimately provides a critical baseline for NATO
and non-NATO nations to begin grappling effectively with twenty-first-
century perils: WMD proliferation, international narcotics trafficking,
resource depletion and environmental degradation. An important question
arises in the context of these security threats: can the Eurasian countries
achieve more concerted cooperation via the PfP process to overcome, or
significantly reduce, such regional security challenges? Will the relatively
short history of the PfP process lead Eurasian states towards the kind of
successful historical reconciliation witnessed between former enemies such
as France and Germany or Germany and Poland?16 Given the critical
American role in European security within NATO’s intricate structures that
established the basis for Franco-German and German–Polish reconciliation,
arguments might favour similar possibilities for the Caucasus and Central
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Asia, albeit taking into account  Eurasia’s uniqueness. 
When regarded as inducing multilateral political and military coopera-
tion, the PfP promotes an enhanced capacity for states to align with NATO as
a means to avoid historic great power struggles. Such interstate behaviour
may help generate western ideas and state identities based on the norms and
standards defined by NATO as key criteria for PfP cooperation. Nevertheless,
even in such ideal circumstances, anarchy still prevails in the international
system, and state leaders must choose from political alignments that will first
and foremost help them ensure the security of their states. None the less, as
when the United States deployed forces in Eurasia during the autumn 2001
campaign in Afghanistan, its state strategies were indirectly aided by the
years of multilateral cooperation gained through the PfP. 
PfP pragmatism: multilateral and cooperative 
How did PfP evolve to reach the stage where its mechanisms and procedures
provide a supporting baseline for counter-terrorist coalition operations as in
Afghanistan? The PfP processes represent a practical cooperative security
framework between NATO and individual PfP states involving defence, oper-
ational and budgetary planning, military exercises and civil emergency
operations. Its defensive principles and incentives for states to bandwagon
politically and militarily with, but not necessarily to join, NATO make PfP
both practical and realistic. Such cooperative security options presented
Europe’s neutral states (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden)
with creative post-Cold War policy options. These states, as well as most in
the post-Soviet Caucasus region and Central Asia, continually reiterate that
they do not need to join NATO. Rather, they want to strengthen PfP and not
jeopardise relationships with other non-NATO states, particularly Russia.
Therefore, a total of 46 PfP countries plan and operate for crisis management
and directly enhance NATO-led operations. In turn, these states also
contribute significantly to NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation. However, the
way the US-led and non-NATO coalition against international terrorism
develops in Eurasia will amount to a test of the future viability of the PfP. The
sustainability of the PfP will be especially tested after NATO’s November
2002 enlargement. For example, as NATO enlargement supersedes PfP,
there will be fewer incentives remaining to invest resources in this form of
multilateralism. 
Because it does not guarantee the security of its signatories, PfP chal-
lenges the traditional views of NATO as a solely collective defence institution
designed to defend against a threat to its members.17 Increasingly, the oper-
ational distinction between NATO and PfP members barely exists. The blur-
ring of the distinction, however, strengthens rather than detracts from
NATO’s evolution and concomitant missions. As testified to by the hundreds
of PfP events annually and the numerous ties with NATO’s politico-military
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command headquarters and staffs, PfP mechanisms bring together, rather
than separate, Eurasian states. Such a tool provides politico-military link-
ages and critical consultative ties without requiring PfP members to join
NATO. For example, few observers thought it would be possible in NATO’s
first PfP exercise, ‘Cooperative Bridge’, to behold German troops crossing the
Polish border unobstructed for the first time since World War II. As the
newly unified German military re-entered Poland in September 1994, post-
Cold War troops peacefully exercised alongside Americans and half a dozen
other NATO and new PfP nations to conduct a platoon-level peacekeeping
mission.18
Within less than a decade the PfP process has developed considerably. For
example, by 2001, the annual Black Sea-based NATO-led multinational
exercise, ‘Cooperative Partner 2001’, involved 4,000 troops from 13 NATO
and PfP countries, including ships, fighter aircraft and helicopters. Hosted
for the first time by Georgia in June 2001, ‘Cooperative Partner 2001’
entailed a large-scale anti-terrorism operation to release hostages, peace-
keeping operations, and disaster-relief and rescue missions.19 Consequently,
the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC,
only underscored the vital importance of the PfP exercise in Georgia and the
Black Sea the preceding June, which tested the skills and procedures required
to deal with real world crisis scenarios. From Poland to Georgia, Europe and
Eurasia have experienced the evolution of a cooperative security process that
provides the framework for former enemy states to train and operate
together. This framework allows post-Cold War European and Eurasian
states to conduct twenty-first-century missions more effectively, whether via
NATO-led operations or through coalitions of the willing. In effect, PfP has
helped to increase security in Eurasia by lowering the transaction costs of
multilateral joint military action should states decide to act within a multi-
lateral framework for managing regional security threats. 
Eventually, PfP’s practical tools went well beyond NATO’s initial
outreach efforts to former enemies, which initially took the form of confer-
ences, seminars and workshops. Indeed, nearly every major development in
NATO’s post-Cold War transformation can be linked in some respect to the
PfP initiative and evolution. NATO enlargement now proceeds with a base-
line of indicators and criteria developed from PfP. The NATO relationships
with Russia and Ukraine build on and use PfP’s mechanisms and underlying
principles. NATO’s important operations in the Balkans depended upon
initial training and exercises via PfP and utilised PfP’s civil-military interac-
tion between NATO and non-NATO nations to make national force planning
more effective and efficient. Such exercising and organisation, within a cycli-
cal planning–execution–evaluation process, formed the embryonic head-
quarters, staffs and command structures in Bosnia; enabled the procedures
for dealing with the aftermath of the Albanian collapse; provided the foun-
dation for the operations in Kosovo; and figured prominently in the NATO
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mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The PfP framework
also indirectly facilitates NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue with North
African (Morocco and Tunisia) and Middle Eastern states (Egypt, Israel, and
Jordan). The concept underlying the PfP concept has even been raised in US
policy-making circles for application to other parts of the world, even if
without engaging the direct institutional structure of NATO. 
Alone, the PfP cannot be adjudged as having prevented the emergence of
Eurasia’s multiple security dilemmas or resolved them. The PfP framework
did not avert the carnage and destruction in the Balkans or stop the terrorist
attacks emanating from the borders of Central Asia in Afghanistan.
Moreover, PfP cannot give its members the absolute security guarantee
many of them want. The crucial security contribution involves the evolu-
tion, operationalisation and institutionalisation of PfP mechanisms at NATO
headquarters and within individual national planning and bureaucratic
processes. By building upon the early PfP baseline of national defence and
budgetary transparency that upholds the tenets of democratic control of
national armed forces, NATO and PfP nations bolstered military effective-
ness of multinational forces that can operate with NATO.20 Such a broad,
fundamental application by states working within NATO allows politicians,
policy-planners and military commanders to grapple together with global
trans-sovereign challenges.21
Deepening PfP partnerships in Eurasia 
Eurasia is an area challenged by a variety of domestic political, economic
and ethno-national security dilemmas that PfP alone cannot resolve.
Moreover, PfP is unlikely to influence the direction of future challenges
stemming from growing corruption, autocracy, oil and natural gas competi-
tion, great power competition between Russia, China and America, or
competition between regional powers such as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan –
all are quite beyond the capacity of a programme like PfP to influence
directly. Only the states of Eurasia themselves, working in cooperation with
other key states and international institutions such as the UN, World Bank
and IMF, can deal with these problems directly.22 However, NATO’s ongoing
PfP process can apply the successful experiences of nearly a decade of multi-
lateral cooperative programmes within the region towards an ongoing
stabilising role. NATO’s planning for regional and international contingen-
cies, such as counter-terrorist operations or WMD counter-proliferation,
reflects the value of such planning, training and operational linkages devel-
oped over time. Without the PfP baseline established during the latter half of
the 1990s, potential stabilisation, even future democratisation and
modernisation, might not occur as effectively in Eurasia – extending as far
east as Afghanistan.23
If it continues to receive significant support from the NATO countries, PfP
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can maintain the bridge of greater political and military understanding
between Europe and Eurasia. PfP can remain as a directory for its Eurasian
participants to follow for reducing the volatility and danger sparked by
potential civil and international conflicts throughout the region. Without
the consistent PfP cooperation and coordination that allow US and NATO
members to survey potential military training centres and even future
basing areas, regional tensions and attendant state instabilities might
increase in the future.24 Yet, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on
America, the galvanisation of the world community’s opinions on counter-
terrorism may now generate a historic opportunity for reducing future
regional security problems in Eurasia via a deepening PfP process.25
Some of PfP’s prospects, however, may be constrained by the various
mixed signals emitted by NATO towards Eurasia. These limitations include
the criticism that no clear strategic thinking exists for NATO’s efforts and
that individual members such as America and Turkey often pursue goals
diverging from NATO as a whole, while antagonising Russia, China and
Iran. Such problems influence regional security while potentially involving
some NATO members in missions that they would rather avoid.26 Although
some aspects of these contentions appear accurate, there is often a tendency
among some analysts to misrepresent the intent of the PfP process. NATO
never intended, for example, that the PfP define a policy to oppose states
such as Russia, China or Iran. Moreover, although many PfP members may
never seek to join NATO, these countries can continue to forge multilateral
political and military cooperation aimed at reducing regional instability and
preventing future conflict. This alignment reflects non-predatory bandwag-
oning that PfP signatory states in Eurasia seek vis-à-vis NATO. Some
Eurasian states also need reassurances that they will not, in the future, be
threatened by Russia. Consequently, some PfP members will continue to use
their participation as a means of signalling their relative geopolitical inde-
pendence from Moscow. However, the most important gains for these states
stem from their broader linkage with the West as established through the PfP
– and such trends include Russia, too. Alternative regional security group-
ings such as GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and
Moldova) and the SCO (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan) have not yet emerged as functional alternatives to the PfP.
Indeed, tensions in Eurasia have often risen as a result of these kinds of
nascent balancing institutions that run counter to the sort of bandwagoning
being pursued through PfP’s cooperative security architectures. Potentially,
the historical balance of power notions that have driven some of the Russian
or Chinese alternatives to NATO programmes may decline even further as
China and Russia engage in the mutual gains of counter-terrorist coopera-
tion with western institutions in Eurasia. Given the rapid emergence of
American influence in Eurasia via the US-led international coalition to
combat global terrorism, entirely new links among nearly all the region’s
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states appeared more possible in 2002 than ever before.27
Developments following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks indicate
support for the possibility of accelerated cooperation in Eurasia. China and
Russia quickly endorsed UN resolutions in support of US efforts against
terrorism, as did the NATO–Russia council in Brussels. Neither country
raised significant concerns when US troops were deployed in Eurasian states
surrounding Afghanistan. Within the region, the US-supported Central
Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (‘Centrasbat’) is comprised of units from
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. ‘Centrasbat’ trains Eurasian
participants in the spirit of the PfP process. These alignments serve both as a
key basis for multilateral cooperation and for American power projection in
the region. By monitoring the Tajik–Afghan border, ‘Centrasbat’ prevents
elements of Tajikistan’s extremist Islamic opposition, which had fled to safe
havens in Afghanistan, from returning.28 The regional cooperative security
arrangement among all eight Trans-Caucasus and Central Asian states
against the proliferation of dangerous materials and goods is another impor-
tant PfP activity that promotes multilateral cooperation in the region.29
Finally, Central Asia and the Caucasus, because of their geostrategic loca-
tion, now serve as key staging grounds for operations that the international
coalition initiates against terrorist networks. These deployments included
American, British, Turkish, French and other forces already familiar with
the territory because of their years of experiences gained through the PfP.30
Taken together, these crucial international cooperative steps, based on a
new willingness to set aside seemingly intractable geopolitical differences in
order to fight terrorism, delineate a larger framework expanding on PfP
objectives and goals. 
Such expansive PfP cooperation in Eurasia did not arise spontaneously.
Since the mid-1990s, the NATO allies have methodically established and
implemented numerous long-term training and education programmes,
including exercise cycles and familiarisation with facilities across Eurasia.
Without this preparation, the rapid insertion of NATO and PfP nation troops
for operations into and out of areas in Afghanistan and the Pankisi Gorge on
the border with Georgia would have been greatly slowed. The PfP process
took firmer hold in Eurasia when the Americans launched a series of bilat-
eral ‘in-the-spirit-of-PfP’ interoperability programmes, and when NATO
coordinated the ‘Combined Endeavor’, ‘Regional Cooperation’, and
‘Centrasbat’ exercise series. These multiple phased programmes and exer-
cises evolved from dozens of preparatory seminars, workshops, conferences
and small-scale training projects that have annually culminated in field
training, command post exercising, and command, control, communica-
tions and computer systems development. 
Interoperability characterises one of the primary capabilities for PfP states
to possess in order to link and operate with NATO for the range of PfP
missions. The US Defense Department realised from the outset of the PfP
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process that some of its nascent bilateral programmes from the pre-PfP and
post-Cold War era could be adapted to fulfil critical PfP country interoper-
ability objectives. The American strategy of aiding PfP nations to achieve
interoperability with NATO centred on three main programmes intended for
all PfP nations. For the Eurasian participants in PfP, the US Warsaw
Initiative still provides critical assistance towards participation in these
multilateral ‘in-the-spirit-of-PfP’ interoperability efforts. The first key area,
the Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI), focused on developing civil-military
airspace regimes fully compatible and interoperable with west European
civilian airspace organisations and NATO.31 Second, the PfP Information
Management System (PIMS) represents a system of communications
connectivity and information management using off-the-shelf hardware and
software designed to link PfP nation capitals with US and NATO facilities for
planning exercises, sharing information and deepening daily cooperation.
Establishment of close communications between PfP and NATO not only
overcomes practical problems of communications with PfP capitals, but also
ensures that PfP nations feel linked in a close, cooperative relationship to
NATO. PIMS remains fundamental to distance learning and emergency
planning. Finally, the Defense Resource Management Studies Program
(DRMS) provides country-specific exchanges concerning defence planning
and force structure methodology that both sides use to guide resource
management and procurement decisions. DRMS facilitates establishment of
a rationalised defence management system similar to those already in use by
NATO allies. This crucial NATO-related budgeting and planning approach
aids civil-military restructuring, especially infrastructure requirements. All
of these US programmes reach well into the Eurasian area and provide an
instrumental foundation for regional cooperation and integration.32
Since most of the Eurasian signatories started their PfP programmes
during the mid-1990s, the NATO nations now operating in these regions for
counter-terrorist contingencies can acquire an additional operational
foothold via multilateral participation in PfP processes. In the case of exer-
cise ‘Combined Endeavor’, conducted under the auspices of the US, European
Command (EUCOM – Stuttgart, Germany), synchronised with NATO’s
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and held mainly at key US training facilities
in Germany, the participants identify and document command, control,
communications and computer interoperability between NATO and PfP
nations’ equipment to attain compatibility. This exercise now includes most
of the Caucasus and Central Asian states among nearly 25 NATO and PfP
nations. By broadening this training, the US Central Command (CENTCOM –
Tampa, Florida) worked with EUCOM and individual NATO states to start
the ‘Regional Cooperation’ exercise series. This German-based command
post and computer-assisted exercise, located at the US-run Warrior
Preparation Center, concentrates on peace enforcement training for contin-
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gencies of the designated Central Asian peacekeeping battalion and
Caucasus contingents. By 2000, the event involved all of the key PfP states,
except Tajikistan, with observers from Mongolia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Finally, CENTCOM shapes the ‘Centrasbat’ field training exercise to enhance
the Central Asian battalion’s capabilities to conduct peacekeeping opera-
tions to support either UN or NATO missions, while also advancing coopera-
tion between and among Eurasian states and other non-NATO nations.33
Like ‘Cooperative Partner’, ‘Cooperative Determination 2001’, held in
Azerbaijan in November 2001, broadened regional, multilateral coopera-
tion. Through a sophisticated 600-person command post exercise that
focused on a multinational brigade staff and mobile medical centres for
helping civilians, this first-time PfP exercise in Azerbaijan involved signifi-
cant crisis management contingencies. Comprised of many NATO and PfP
nations, including Greece and Turkey, the US and the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the exercise utilised a scenario for both peace-
keeping and humanitarian operations.34 Given the success of PfP exercises
in the Caucasus, there is every possibility that such exercises can be
expanded throughout Eurasia and possibly extend to include Afghanistan,
Pakistan and even, over time, China and Iran. 
Toward future NATO partnerships in Eurasia 
This chapter has addressed several issues for the PfP process and its coopera-
tive security framework within the larger security context of Eurasia. First,
PfP reflected cooperative security policies and processes, best understood
within the theoretical framework of realistic and pragmatic state align-
ments. These alignments symbolise non-predatory bandwagoning with PfP
signatories seeking close relations with the once-threatening NATO institu-
tion they opposed as part of the Warsaw Pact and former USSR during the
Cold War. This broad Euro-Atlantic, European and Eurasian post-Cold War
structural transformation affects the way its members have defined NATO’s
new missions, specifically via PfP. NATO members and PfP signatories
synchronised their threat perceptions over the last half of the 1990s and
formed the practical cooperative security needed to change NATO as an
institution. 
Second, PfP has evolved into an important international cooperative
security framework since the early 1990s. The PfP mechanisms underscored
the progressive and advanced international security standards and proce-
dures required for former enemies to operate together and to confront the
complexities and often violent upheavals of the twenty-first century. The PfP
process serves as one counter-measure against such crucial security threats
as terrorism. From the practical civil-military cooperation and coordination
arising from thousands of political and military events and real world opera-
tions during the 1990s, PfP stands alone as the principle NATO means of
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multilateral security cooperation in Eurasia. PfP provides a unique set of
tools for NATO and non-NATO policy-makers, planners and operators to
tackle together the challenges of the twenty-first century. 
As the PfP process gains greater acceptance in Eurasia, NATO appears
destined for unforeseen, although not surprising, further evolution.35
Indeed, NATO’s 1999 New Strategic Concept established the basic frame-
work for a broader concept of NATO’s twenty-first-century mission. The
1999 Strategic Concept provides PfP states with the ability to consult, coop-
erate and coordinate during crises, and to operate with NATO forces in a
variety of contingencies. Although the NATO outreach to Eurasian nations
cannot begin to solve all of the region’s security challenges, PfP has served as
a crucial baseline from which to forge the political and military ties needed
for the United States and its allies to establish and maintain an effective inter-
national coalition against global terrorism. 
More lessons can eventually be learned about how well policy-makers,
planners and operators functioned in and around PfP countries surrounding
Afghanistan as well as in the Caucasus and in Southeastern Europe. As a
region long left out of Euro-Atlantic security calculations, the Eurasian area
conceivably will represent a more important geostrategic space for the major
world powers. Whether interests lie in access to natural resources, environ-
mental challenges, or multilateral efforts to combat international terrorism,
the Eurasian area is destined to become increasingly important to NATO’s
operational interests. PfP’s pragmatic and realistic mechanisms provide the
needed foundation from which a far different type of international coalition
can confront non-traditional security challenges. Ultimately, the PfP’s
future success will depend on its resource requirements and NATO member
resource investment. With an adequate degree of NATO attention, progress
can be sustained towards enabling international coalitions of the present
and future to launch operations – counter-terrorist and otherwise – based on
lessons learned and training areas provided. As NATO’s most important
member, the United States must figure prominently, however, in this multi-
lateral cooperative security process if PfP is to survive. Moreover, the United
States, its NATO allies and PfP partners together must reshape NATO to deal
more effectively with training, planning and operating to counter the
twenty-first-century challenges of terrorism, WMD proliferation, ethnic
conflict and narcotics trafficking.36
Countering the original criticism that NATO’s PfP project signalled
western hesitation and lack of resolve on NATO enlargement in the early
1990s, PfP now provides the key operational planning tools for multilateral
security cooperation in Eurasia. PfP remains the only proactive multilateral,
cooperative and political/military institutional procedure for NATO and
Eurasia to test, modify and develop current and future plans for joint efforts
at combating the non-traditional security challenges in the region. The
initial American unilateralism in its war on terrorism and its policies
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towards ‘rogue’ states have no doubt increased transatlantic tensions more
than the regional problems of Eurasia. As a result, the means for ensuring
the preservation of the NATO and PfP regional Eurasian cooperation
requires a consensus – particularly between Americans and Europeans – on
their interests inside and outside of Europe. In the absence of such a consen-
sus, it will become increasingly difficult to coordinate the effective planning
of future operations out of area. If a consensus can be reached and sustained,
then troop deployments will occur multilaterally, or US planners will
synchronise their much more powerful and rapidly deployable US troop
contingents for phased multilateral PfP operations after first-stage deploy-
ments. The question remains of whether NATO itself can adequately adapt to
the dramatically changed twenty-first-century security environment by
going sufficiently beyond its core Altantic orientation. 
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10
Russia, the CIS
and Eurasian interconnections
John P. Willerton and Geoffrey Cockerham
Central to post-Soviet Eurasian security calculations and economic stabilisa-
tion efforts are Russia’s power interests and efforts to reclaim a leadership
role in the region. Since the break-up of the USSR, states of the FSU have
pursued foreign policies based upon their own mix of interests and prefer-
ences rather than those of a central set (Moscow) of policy-makers. It is
hardly surprising that more than a decade after the Soviet collapse, all FSU
states remain wary of the Russian Federation’s intentions as it struggles to
re-establish its lost regional leadership position. Yet the disintegration of the
Soviet Russian empire did not obviate the numerous significant economic
and security linkages among the FSU states and to Russia. Russia still
possesses many resources with which to assert its Eurasian power interests.
Russian authorities have used various means toward this end, promoting
the CIS, participating in other Eurasian multilateral fora, and giving special
attention to the country’s own bilateral relations with FSU states. Moscow
has used both military and trade arrangements to reassert its interests in
Eurasia.1
Nationalism has continued to be widespread throughout the area of the
FSU and it has further invigorated post-Soviet concerns over national auton-
omy.2 States once dominated by Moscow have pursued various bilateral and
multilateral means to consolidate their sovereignty, lessen their economic
and security dependence on Russia, and integrate into the mainstream
global system. All of these states face the reality of geographical location and
a history of economic and security interconnections, while they still share
considerable common infrastructure. As demonstrated by an eager Belarus’s
desire for stronger integration with Russia or by a reluctant Ukraine’s need
to maintain and even expand commercial and military connections with
Moscow, reality dictates that the FSU states rely on one another – and to
varying degrees on Russia – to safeguard their security and commercial
vitality. The manoeuvrings of Belarus and Ukraine, however, also reflect the
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complexities of balancing entangling external linkages with the preservation
of unique domestic economic and political programmes and prerogatives.
There has been an understandable post-Cold War tendency to discount
Russia’s continuing regional capabilities and commitment to its Eurasian
leadership position. Indeed, the dramatic September 11 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States and consequent insertion of American military
power in Central Asia further complicated Russia’s FSU leadership aspira-
tions and may launch a new era in the Eurasian ‘Great Game’.3 Western
scholarship on post-Soviet Russian foreign policy and the FSU has
predictably emphasised Russian power contraction and dilemmas in the
conduct of Russian–FSU relations.4 This development may be inspired by the
sort of western triumphalism some have noted, but it does reflect the realities
of significant Russian power contraction.5 Yet, while Russia’s power has
been diminished, it continues to be the state of regional standing with an
ambitious agenda of Eurasian infrastructural and policy arrangements
which has been promoted by all Russian Foreign Ministry teams. Russian
officials have used the FSU states’ heavy reliance on Russian fuel, among
other dependencies, to influence those states’ actions. Meanwhile, interna-
tional economic conditions have complicated the efforts of FSU states both to
distance themselves fully from Russia and to build extensive commercial –
and security – ties with the more advanced western economies. Destabilising
conflicts or political instability in selected areas (e.g., Caucasus, Tajikistan
and Transdniestria) have significantly complicated the policy choices of
involved states while providing Moscow with enticing openings for involve-
ment. For all of their highly publicised failures, FSU multilateral fora such as
the CIS have permitted intergovernmental policy coordination in a number
of areas, not only in the economic transformation of states but in collective
security and anti-terrorism arrangements as well. These fora suggest an FSU
‘economic and security space’, and they have been manipulated by Russia to
bolster both the legitimacy and viability of a Russia-led grouping of
concerned states.
We argue that all FSU states, in spite of natural desires to distance them-
selves from the legacy of the Russian empire and Soviet Union, must counte-
nance relatively high levels of regional economic interaction and
cooperative security arrangements. Indeed, some of these states (e.g.,
Belarus and Kazakhstan) have promoted longer-term and intrusive
economic and political intergovernmental arrangements.6 Both multilateral
and bilateral relations amply demonstrate the push–pull relationship
between integrative and disintegrative tendencies in post-Soviet Eurasia,
and they illuminate the challenges in ensuring some level of regional inter-
state cooperation. A major function of the CIS has been to help identify and
coordinate common security arrangements among members, and it has
been the primary intergovernmental vessel used by the Russian Federation
to consolidate its security relationships with FSU partners. Unfortunately for
Institutions of security governance
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Moscow, a decade of CIS multilateral arrangements has yielded little by way
of common policy solutions.7 Russia and other FSU states have relied prima-
rily on bilateral arrangements with one another to advance their agendas.
Yet, even a decade after the Soviet collapse, we wonder if a common FSU
economic and security space continues to obtain, and – if so – what its impli-
cations would be for efforts at long-range Eurasian cooperation under
Russian tutelage. We think this is an especially important question given
President Vladimir Putin’s energetic commitment to consolidating Russia’s
position in the FSU area; its importance only underscored by the region’s
changed power politics in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and
resultant enhanced western power presence.
In this chapter, we examine the fledgling organisational arrangements,
under the aegis of the CIS, which have been used to channel the transforma-
tion of the FSU area and to re-establish a zone of linked FSU states. We adopt
a two-pronged approach. First, we look at CIS security arrangements, with
our examination revealing the problems in consolidating firm intergovern-
mental institutions and effective policy positions. We contend that the
confused and evolving interests of FSU states must be considered against the
background of ongoing entangling infrastructural, resource and security
needs among these very states. While loaded with powerful connotations,
the term ‘interdependence’ may be appropriate in describing numerous FSU
bilateral relationships. Second, we turn to underlying resource and
economic realities which structure states’ actions, using the limited trade
data available to explore systematically the potential for a ‘common
economic space’ among FSU states. Our desire is to balance the predictable
focus on dynamic, country-specific considerations by giving attention to
those underlying interconnections which structure long-term behaviour;
interconnections which could facilitate longer-term engagement among
FSU states, especially under assertive Russian prodding.
Continuing Russian hegemonic interests and the FSU
Governing elites of collapsing multinational empires struggle to maintain
their hegemonic position even as their relations with the regions of the
periphery are fundamentally restructured.8 This has proven true in the
Soviet and Russian case, as all Moscow-based politicians endeavoured to
maintain Russian influence in Eurasia. The desire of anti-Soviet Russian
Republic officials to maintain Russia’s sphere of influence and to limit full
independence for the Soviet republics was communicated during 1990–91,
well before the August coup and subsequent appearance of the CIS.9 Boris
Yeltsin’s government may have championed the rights and policy preroga-
tives of the republics as it challenged the Gorbachev government’s position,
but it simultaneously manoeuvred to reinforce other republics’ political and
economic linkages with Russia. The Yeltsin government did not unduly
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support republics’ independence drives. Rather, it used often broad-ranging
political agreements and more focused economic treaties to tie the republics
together – and to Russia. In November 1990, Russia, together with Belarus
and Ukraine, agreed to coordinate price changes: the first multilateral agree-
ment to enhance economic cooperation among the successor states.10 Only
a few months later, the presidents of these three republics, together with the
Kazakh president, met to consider a new union arrangement as an alterna-
tive to Gorbachev’s Union Treaty. Thus, the logic of common FSU economic
and security needs and structures had already been laid out when the CIS
emerged in December 1991.
Russian priorities in the immediate post-Soviet period
After the Soviet collapse, Russia’s major strategic goal within the area of the
FSU was the establishment of a relatively unified and reliable system of mili-
tary control and mutually advantageous economic cooperation. The CIS
was to be the major organisational mechanism for ensuring these goals.
From Moscow’s perspective, the CIS would help prevent and resolve conflict
within the FSU, help defend the CIS’s external borders, and serve as the
primary forum for addressing common regional infrastructural and
economic issues as all countries moved towards regulated market
economies.
In this environment, multidimensional issue agendas drove multilateral
bargaining efforts. President Yeltsin and other Russian officials stressed the
common economic and security needs which bound the FSU states together,
while the representatives of the other FSU states postured against potentially
intrusive intergovernmental arrangements involving Russia.11 It is not
surprising that initial CIS meetings entailed unilateral chest beating, with
politicians predictably opportunistic in advancing their own states’ resource
claims as multilateral jockeying intensified. But the exhilaration of national
independence quickly gave way to the growing awareness that domestic
economic and political problems transcended national borders and were
interconnected. Worsening economic conditions within all of the FSU states
compelled politicians to acknowledge their states’ continuing economic
reliance on Russia, its natural and energy resources, and its markets. During
1992, Russia had a 1.5 trillion rouble trade balance with other CIS states,
with its early unilateral moves (e.g., the introduction of non-cash rouble
accounting to settle bilateral trade transactions for rouble-zone countries)
revealing a continuing proclivity to manipulate its resource and infrastruc-
tural advantages to influence other states’ commercial and security calcula-
tions.12
The June 1992 Russian–Ukrainian summit and the Minsk CIS heads of
government meeting brought momentum to reinforcing more collective
ways of addressing policy problems. Whether in finalising a scheme for the
division of Soviet property or in agreeing to establish joint peacekeeping
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forces for eastern Moldova, FSU states became more engaged in regional
multilateral fora. Substantial agreements on economic and trade issues
resulted, while some FSU states committed themselves to collective security
and ‘peacekeeping’ activities.13 As the momentum for regional intergovern-
mental cooperation grew, Russian officials pressed for an acknowledgement
by both the FSU states and the West of Russia’s unique regional leadership
role.14 It was Russia that would assume primary responsibility for the
conduct of relations among the successor states.
Meanwhile, most FSU states, including those building firmer intergovern-
mental ties with Russia, concomitantly attempted to balance Russia’s power
position by creating smaller regional associations and arrangements which
excluded the regional hegemon. Such efforts at interstate policy coordina-
tion were generally among states of a common region (e.g., the Baltic,
Central Asia). The developmental pattern was, in the initial phase, to address
broad policy concerns, with more specific agreements and resource commit-
ments negotiated later.
Throughout the decade 1992–2001, multilateral protocols and agree-
ments revealed a potential attitudinal and policy base for viable multilateral
institutions, but dilemmas in policy implementation – combined with
dynamic domestic situations within the FSU states – indicated the inherent
fragility of all arrangements geared towards the reintegration of the FSU.
Thus, while security and economic agreements were hammered out, states
did not commit the necessary resources or engage in the development of
intergovernmental institutional arrangements necessary to translate stated
common interests into tangible policy results. Meanwhile, Russian unilater-
alism in its economic policies took precedence over its stated foreign policy
multilateralism.15 With the massive costs of regional economic and security
reintegration becoming more immediate, Russia exhibited mounting
caution in transforming its hegemonic power interests into concrete exter-
nal resource commitments. Formal multilateral and bilateral negotiations
did not yield large-scale Russian financial or resource commitments. There
was a decided gap between Russian rhetoric and actions.
The push–pull of Russian unilateralism and FSU regional cooperation
The irony of FSU regional developments by the mid-1990s was the coming to
power of FSU regimes more willing to engage Russia just as Moscow was
becoming more cautious about potentially costly foreign entanglements. A
fundamental reality of post-1991 Eurasia has been the near-impossibility of
reconciling the contrasting domestic agendas of evolving states, especially in
the context of government turnovers and consequent policy reformulation.
We cannot survey all of the unique domestic settings within the FSU, but it is
fair to observe that domestic economic imperatives and the desire to engage
positively with Russia encouraged many states to re-evaluate the payoffs of
CIS and other multilateral arrangements. Once strongly anti-Russian
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governments in Azerbaijan and Lithuania were replaced by regimes headed
by more moderate leaders (with significant past experience with Moscow),
while hotly contested presidential elections in Belarus and Ukraine brought
to power more pro-Russian and pro-CIS officials. These regimes, and their
voting publics, confronted the structural realities of now-independent states’
mounting unpaid bills for deliveries (e.g., of energy) from Russia and their
continued need for Russian credits to finance such deliveries. Resource and
market needs compelled even sceptical states such as Turkmenistan and
Ukraine to engage with Russia.
These developments, however, were met by Russian policy caution,
reflective of Russia’s own unilateral concerns over the resource costs of
external commitments. Developments within the Russian polity, including
the autumn 1993 executive-legislative crisis and the December 1993 elec-
tions, led to a more cautious Yeltsin government stance towards external
entanglements, even though those domestic developments also required the
articulation of a more assertive public line towards the FSU.16 Russian offi-
cials maintained a careful balancing act, with their often blunt and occa-
sionally harsh rhetoric masking the absence of substantial and binding
external commitments. In all policy areas – from the use of ‘peacekeeping
forces’ to the setting of new banking and currency policies – the Yeltsin
government’s public positions reflected national calculations rather than
Commonwealth interests.
In its public profiling, Russian efforts to consolidate regional cooperation
efforts relied much more on high-level summits, formal protocols and regu-
larised multilateral negotiations to convey the image of common community
interests and obligations. These ongoing meetings centred on the construc-
tion of common CIS issue positions to reinforce the notion of a regionally
defined community.17 Meanwhile, Russian politicians used economic and
even military pressure to advance their policy interests vis-à-vis the FSU.18
But the divergent interests of individual CIS members, with their continuing
worries over the re-emergence of a domineering regional hegemon, led
Russia to rely more upon bilateral negotiations and smaller multilateral fora
to consolidate its Eurasian position. An impressive diversity of formal
economic and security arrangements was negotiated with most FSU states,
ranging from the economic and troop withdrawal agreement with Lithuania
in November 1993 to the 1997 formation of Turkmenrosgaz, a
Russian–Turkmenian gas joint-stock company, to the 1999 (re-)establish-
ment of Russian military bases in Tajikistan. Such arrangements signified
that Russia would regularise its regional security and economic interests in
a more focused and piecemeal way. Moreover, external pressures, in partic-
ular those stemming from western political and economic influence east-
ward, only further reinforced Russia’s use of such bilateral and focused
multilateral means.
Overall, Russian resource constraints, combined with unclear strategies
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of action, complicated Moscow’s efforts to re-establish its former regional
leadership position. Comparable dilemmas within the CIS, compounded by
the lack of common perspectives and goals, denied the CIS the ability to be an
effective instrument for advancing common (Russian-led) regional interests.
Russian officials seemed to have lost confidence in the utility of the CIS, with
one observer characterising Russian actions involving the FSU as ‘compla-
cent’.19 Even the March 1996 ‘group of four’ accords among Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – intended to forge such multilateral
consensus on economic and security issues – could take on meaning only
when Russia had sorted out and normalised its bilateral relations with each
member. A lack of Russian strategic focus and listlessness would charac-
terise the duration of the Yeltsin period, with a re-energised FSU policy
emerging only with Vladimir Putin’s ascension to power.
Two illustrative bilateral relationships
A dilemma in characterising Russian policy interests in the FSU involves the
diversity of states involved, each with its own dynamic domestic environ-
ment and evolving political and security needs. Russian–Belarussian rela-
tions reflect one extreme of potentially intrusive intergovernmental
arrangements between Russia and a former Soviet republic. Relatively
compatible security concerns and interrelated economic needs, set against a
background of shared historical and cultural interests, made this bilateral
relationship a promising candidate for a more profound integration process.
The April 1996 Russian–Belarussian Union and December 1999
Russian–Belarussian Treaty specified the institutional arrangements and
common policy positions that would undergird the mounting cooperation –
and anticipated future integration – of the two countries. These union agree-
ments were said to entail the development of common political and
economic organisational arrangements and policies to facilitate long-term
integration.20 Institution and policy-building efforts within this framework
would help in developing arrangements that could be applied to a broader
regional or CIS community (e.g., creation of a customs union, setting of
common duties, tax standardisation, and the creation of common civil and
economic laws). Irrespective of the political implications of Belarussian
deference to Russian regional leadership, the Russian Federation would
assume considerable resource costs for a bilateral economic union.21 As an
intermediary step, the Russian–Belarussian ‘union’ would be suggestive for
the FSU ‘group of four’, which had committed itself to the lowering of
economic barriers and the enhancement of multilateral security arrange-
ments.
Russian observers complain that Belarus has made few real policy conces-
sions while securing political and economic gains.22 In reality, the peculiar-
ities of the Lukashenko regime and its unpredictability, combined with the
anticipated massive costs inherent in integration, contributed to uncertain-
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ties in the bilateral relationship. Such uncertainties continued to be evident
in the post-1999 Putin–Lukashenko period, as both presidents publicly
promoted an acceleration of the integrative process without committing
serious resources to it.23 Overall, Belarus has been as active a CIS member as
any, and it has loyally supported Russian regional security preferences, but
the domestic base upon which this posturing is constructed has not been
fully reliable.24
As a suggestive contrast, Russian–Ukrainian relations have proceeded
cautiously as both countries contend with the past legacy of bilateral cleav-
age and Russian imperial control. The reduction of economic barriers and
the regularisation of bilateral political and security consultations became
policy priorities of both the Kuchma and Yeltsin governments. A series of
lengthy and tortuous high-level negotiations permitted the two regimes to
realise piecemeal economic agreements, while domestic opposition in both
countries undercut tentative security arrangements arrived at by the two
countries’ executive branches. Resolution of fundamental disagreements
was not helped by Russian efforts to link Ukraine’s energy dependence with
concessions on political-security issues. Such issue linkage was highly risky
– and could be counterproductive to longer-term cooperation – but negotia-
tions between the Kuchma government and Yeltsin’s second-term govern-
ment did eventually result in concessions on both sides regarding the Black
Sea Fleet and trade issues.25 Indeed, the 1997 Russian–Ukrainian Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, in effect for ten years and with an
automatic extension, yielded a trade-off between Russia’s payments to use
Black Sea facilities and Ukraine’s state debt to Russia (each worth between
$2.5 and $3 billion). Subsequent negotiations led to an agreement to end
value-added taxes on one another’s exports, thus ending a costly trade battle
which complicated efforts to consolidate CIS trade structures.
Russian attempts to maintain Ukraine’s more extensive bilateral relation-
ships with both the CIS members and with Russia bore some fruit at least in
terms of ongoing economic interactions. The two countries’ chief executives
publicly acknowledged Ukraine’s continuing intention to ‘make sparing use’
of the CIS even while bilateral economic relations were consolidated.26
Indeed, after eight years of debate, Ukraine finally joined the CIS Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly and pushed to make the CIS area a free trade
zone.27 Ukraine’s limited engagement with the CIS and the modest improve-
ments in Russian–Ukrainian relations were realised fundamentally through
direct bilateral arrangements – hammered out by high-level executive
branch officials – rather than through multilateral negotiations under CIS
auspices. The underlying mistrust and suspicions each country has of the
other’s intentions have made all negotiated political arrangements tenuous
and vulnerable to domestic pressures.28
Belarus, caught by compelling security needs, and Ukraine, vulnerable to
pressing economic and energy needs, confront continuing dependencies on
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Russia a decade after the Soviet collapse. Each has developed a unique bilat-
eral relationship with the Russian Federation which entails vulnerabilities
that are simultaneously dynamic and unpredictable, and subject to exploita-
tion by Moscow. Such a characterisation could be offered for nearly every
FSU state, whether considering Armenia and its security and economic
needs, Georgia and the Russian Federation’s involvement in its secessionist
problems, Moldova and the Russian Federation’s role in the Transdniestria
conflict, or Uzbekistan and continuing sales of Uzbek cotton to Russian
consumers. Russian authorities have attempted to utilise such vulnerabili-
ties and dependencies to recreate a common FSU space, with the Putin
regime exhibiting an energy seemingly absent throughout most of the
Yeltsin period.29 Indeed, in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks
in the United States and the new Russian–American strategic relationship,
Russian regional power consolidation efforts only grew – and along not only
political and security but economic dimensions.
The CIS and an unrealised common security space
The CIS was to be the central intergovernmental institutional focus for the
expression of FSU regional security maintenance, with Russian support crit-
ical to its long-term viability. A decade after its formation, the CIS has
accomplished little, its mandate is minimal, and its resources are extremely
limited. Its primary achievements have had less to do with foreign states and
external threats and more to do with arranging capabilities and interests
within the CIS/FSU region.30
Reviewing the wide array of issues addressed by CIS fora during the past
decade, this international organisation proved most effective in helping
structure the smooth dismantling of the USSR. Its early years yielded a
semblance of intergovernmental cooperation, but with the emergence of
internal decision-making norms such as the ‘dissent norm’ – whereby
members are free to ignore any collective CIS decision – it has not proven
possible to construct a consensus agenda of issues, let alone adopt binding
policy responses. There is a predictable irony in the long-term negative
impact of decision-making rules such as the ‘dissent norm’: these rules were
essential to draw reluctant states into the CIS, but they then served to rein-
force states’ unilateral resolve to diverge from common CIS positions. Thus,
wary states could countenance CIS participation, but they were provided
with an effective institutional means to void CIS action.
In the security realm, the fundamental goals of CIS operation revolved
around three basic concerns: the acknowledgement and creation of a
‘common FSU security space’; the creation of formal integrated security
structures; and the development of a coordinated system of member states’
security forces. Russia’s security calculations were intimately tied to all
three of these broad concerns, with top Russian officials communicating this
from the CIS’s earliest days.31
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The overriding goal of creating a common FSU security space emerged
with the first CIS summit in Minsk in late December 1991. Nine FSU coun-
tries (excluding Turkmenistan and Ukraine) ultimately signed the May 1992
Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, with subsequent documents suggesting
interconnected security interests and regional collective response. All states
had concerns regarding Russian power and its potentially hegemonic role in
the CIS and the region, making it difficult to construct a meaningful regional
security regime with confidence-building arrangements. Russia’s continu-
ing disproportionate military assets meant there would be a central role for
Russian forces: a reality that encouraged member-states to focus on external
threats rather than security dilemmas within the FSU. Russia’s efforts in
promoting an extended border defence did yield some fruit, for instance, as
Central Asian states confronted mounting terrorist threats. However, the
CIS’s inability to cope collectively with threats within the region was evident
from the start, as Azerbaijan learned in 1994 when it sought CIS help over
the Karabakh conflict. Security dilemmas within the CIS/FSU area were
addressed through bilateral – or more regionally focused multilateral –
means. All states, starting with Russia, resorted to bilateral arrangements,
but a decade of such arrangements did not cumulate into a broader regional
collective security network.
Regarding the goal of creating a formal integrated security structure, a
fair amount was accomplished on paper, suggesting multilateral progress in
basic CIS institutional preparation. The key issues of border cooperation,
constructing an air defence system and peacekeeping operations necessi-
tated immediate institutional construction, with many key bodies created
during the CIS’s first year. Especially notable were the Councils of Heads of
State and Heads of Government, along with subordinate Councils of Defence
Ministers and other top government officials, and dozens of other coordinat-
ing multilateral bodies. Beneath these broader guiding entities were
specialised bodies such as the General Headquarters of the CIS Joint Armed
Forces and the Council of Commanders of Border Guards. The utility of creat-
ing these bodies was immediately apparent, as numerous multilateral
consultations addressed wide-ranging issue agendas. Difficulties in crafting
common policy responses, however, quickly overwhelmed such formal insti-
tutions. The over three dozen high-profile meetings of the Heads of State and
Heads of Government Councils proved more useful in at least permitting the
articulation of members’ concerns and grievances, with modest policy
results. Lower-level bodies, useful for consultative purposes, were more effec-
tive when less formalised, leading to the replacement of ‘standing’ organisa-
tions (e.g., the General Headquarters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces) with
looser coordinating staffs.
Looking beyond broad CIS goals and institutional preparation, were there
identifiable policy results? As regards establishing a formal coordinated
system of CIS members’ forces, piecemeal agreements were hammered out
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that reflected individual states’ unilateral security capabilities and needs
rather than a genuinely collective multinational entity with a supranational
identity and mission. In a fiscally constrained environment, regional secu-
rity concerns were a low budget priority as states’ scarce resources were
devoted to unilateral security capabilities. Under the CIS aegis, both
command and support capabilities were brought together for joint defence
planning, military training and conducting of military exercises.
Commencing as early as December 1991, integrated border guard units
emerged with a continuing interest and commitment made by roughly half
of the CIS members.32 Arrangements varied by state, ranging from Russia
providing technical assistance and training (e.g., Belarus and Kazakhstan)
to Russia participating in joint forces with a host CIS member (e.g., Armenia,
Georgia and Tajikistan).33 Likewise, after a number of years of difficult nego-
tiating and a severe push by Moscow, several CIS states committed to the
1995 CIS Unified Air Defence Agreement, though not all actively partici-
pated in joint operations.
More important in these cases were bilateral arrangements between
Russia and individual CIS members which, like the border guard arrange-
ments, varied by state. The CIS’s putative air defence system included the
active involvement of six members’ forces,34 though the regional gaps left in
the FSU area raised questions about the system’s overall strategic value.35
Under the rubric of CIS-sponsored ‘peacekeeping missions’, Russia used
the cloak of supposed joint action to legitimate and bolster its military pres-
ence in a variety of settings throughout the FSU. Active CIS/Russian peace-
keeping operations arose in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova
(Transdniestria) and Tajikistan. CIS meetings and agreements have been
used to justify what is essentially Russian involvement (e.g., the October
1994 CIS conference addressing Abkhazia). The CIS took credit for
contributing to the ceasefires reached in all four of these conflicts. These
brokered ceasefires only legitimated Russian meddling and underscored the
continued inability of local actors to resolve their fundamental differences.
Overall, the CIS facilitated consultations and piecemeal security arrange-
ments that are member- or region-specific, but with no emergent common
security space. Where the CIS has been relatively forceful, we find strong
Russian interests and the commitment of Russian resources, including mili-
tary forces. What have proven central in the security arena are the unilat-
eral responses of member states, whether in Belarus seeking security vis-à-vis
perceived western threats, Armenia addressing the Karabakh issue and
Azerbaijan, or Kyrgyzstan coping with destabilisation from the Tajik civil
war and threat of terrorism. In addressing these security concerns, CIS states
have primarily relied on their bilateral relationships with Russia, whether in
gaining access to Russian equipment and intelligence information or seeking
a more intrusive Russian military presence.
By the end of the 1990s, the various forces driving individual states’ secu-
Russia, the CIS and Eurasian interconnections
195
2504Chap10  7/4/03  12:57 pm  Page 195
rity calculations had led to discernible regional alignments among selected
CIS members. Surveying the constellation of FSU states, with their varying
degrees of commitment and involvement in the CIS, we find that essentially
two groupings of states emerged. The first, a seemingly ‘pro-Moscow’ group-
ing, and including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, encompassed states which had remained in collective security
arrangements, had sought more intense bilateral political, economic and
military ties with the Russian Federation, and were members of – or consid-
ering inclusion in – a newly formed and Russian-sponsored EEU. Meanwhile,
the second group was more active in developing ties with western countries
and more circumspect in their political and economic proximity to Moscow.
This grouping included Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan, and together they composed a new political-security-economic
pact, GUUAM. Beginning in 1999, several of the GUUAM states had begun to
explore a wide array of initiatives (e.g., lessened trade barriers, creation of
common transportation projects, peacekeeping activities) outside of CIS and
Russian Federation auspices. Their September 2000 decision to form their
own free trade zone had serious implications for developments in the Caspian
area and Central Asia, and it was no accident that the other CIS members, at
a meeting in Moscow a month later, were spurred on to form the EEU. These
divisions within the CIS ranks only further accentuated the importance – for
Moscow – of creatively using more focused bilateral means to advance its
interests vis-à-vis individual FSU partners. Russian regional leadership
became a top priority of Vladimir Putin, as he tried to revive the notion of a
common FSU space and give new life to moribund CIS arrangements.
A common FSU economic space?
We have seen piecemeal FSU military-security arrangements, but also a
profound inability to create firm, institutionalised regional arrangements
that tie CIS members together in politically meaningful ways. Yet after ten
years of tedious negotiation and frequent public disagreements among
member-states, the CIS survives. Surveying the entirety of the CIS’s history,
we wonder if other factors – besides security concerns – continue to bind
together even reluctant member-states. Geographical realities interconnect
the security needs of the FSU states, but underlying infrastructural and
resource linkages constantly complicate any CIS member’s unilateral calcu-
lations and behaviour. Such ongoing interconnections – or to use a more
loaded term, interdependencies – compel some level of regional cooperation,
and it would be naive to judge security arrangements without reference to
underlying infrastructural and economic linkages. In the wake of a decade of
powerful centrifugal forces, are such underlying linkages still present and
strong? We think that they may be, and as a fundamental precondition for
any common FSU space – economic or security – they merit our attention.
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To suggest the existence of a common FSU economic zone, we must at
least demonstrate systematic evidence of commercial interconnection
among CIS members. We wonder if, holding economic and geographical
factors constant, CIS states will exhibit relatively high levels of trade between
themselves. This is not to deny the reality that the Soviet collapse loosened
all the states of the FSU’s ties with one another and permitted them to
develop new or more extensive relationships with other states. Indeed, by
definition, the removal of Moscow-based Russian central planners signified
that the newly independent states would have a more diverse group of
trading partners.36 The proportional share of FSU states’ trade with one
another would automatically decline as a result of the collapse of the Soviet
empire.37 A cursory examination of available FSU trade patterns reveals that
trade levels among FSU states dropped significantly, by one estimate from
$139 billion in 1991 to $59 billion in 2000.38 However, FSU historical,
infrastructural and other logistical realities would severely constrain any
state from fully escaping significant economic intercourse with other FSU
states.
In the past decade there has been an explosion of political science litera-
ture concerning trade flows and their political and security consequences.
The initial interest was concern about the impact of interstate conflict
and/or diplomatic cooperation upon trade flows. Several studies found that
conflict generally has a negative impact on trade, while cooperation gener-
ally has a positive, if smaller and less robust, impact.39 Progressively more
complex research has sought either to establish the direction of causality
between conflict and trade or to investigate the impact of other types of polit-
ical conflict or cooperation upon trade.40 Most relevant here is work that
deals with institutionalised or quasi-institutionalised political arrangements
and their impact upon bilateral trade.41
It is undeniably in Russia’s best security and economic interests to
attempt to foster trade to develop the degree of dependence necessary to
create a de facto if not de jure alliance structure.42 Furthermore, we might
expect to see FSU states, beyond Russia, trade among themselves, if for no
other reason than to strengthen themselves vis-à-vis the regional
hegemon.43 And those FSU states which calculate that their security is
dependent upon Russia (e.g., Belarus) may choose to trade with it to create
positive trade externalities which would mollify any future Russian aggres-
sion.44
A favourite political factor employed by both economists and political
scientists in their models of trade flows is some measure of preferential
trading arrangements (PTAs).45 These range from the virtually inconse-
quential Commonwealth Preferences to such extensive common markets as
the EU and even the old Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. It stands to
reason that trade flows between nations that have negotiated some sort of
preferential arrangement should be greater than those between nations that
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have neither bilateral nor multilateral arrangements between them.
The CIS is neither a strong PTA nor a true alliance. However, the CIS
leaders’ own stated commitment to the ‘economisation’ of the CIS and the
creation of a free trade system reveals their ongoing commitment to region-
ally defined preferential arrangements.46 We borrow from the estimation
strategies of those investigating alliances or PTAs and model the impact of
CIS membership upon bilateral trade flows of member-states. We wonder if
there exists a common economic space inhabited by these states and
whether, as a result, even though they attempt to trade with other nations,
they must still engage in considerable trade with each other.
We model the bilateral trade flows of FSU states using the IMF’s data set
for the most recent period for which complete data are available, 1992–97.
Our examination includes all dyads involving a CIS member-state. Our strat-
egy is dependent on being able to estimate a model of trade flows that
controls for economic and geographic factors. Fortunately, such a model
exists, commonly referred to as the ‘gravity model’ of bilateral trade flows; it
is well known and often used in the econometrics literature.47 The gravity
model is based upon the premise that trade flows are a function of the size of
participating economies. The theory is a simple one: bilateral trade between
small economies will be exponentially smaller than trade between two large
economies. Economic size is operationalised as both income and population.
Thus, we hypothesise that both of these factors have positive effects on trade.
Factors other than the size of the economies involved are taken into account
as so-called resistance terms. Economists commonly include the physical
distance, or proximity, between the two trading partners as the primary
resistance term. By using the gravity model we are able to control for
economic determinants of trade flows and turn our attention to the political
ties between CIS states that we will factor into the resistance term in the
simplest possible manner.48
What we find when we systematically examine the trade of CIS countries
for the period 1992–97 is that the bilateral trade between pairs of member
states is consistently and significantly higher than economic factors alone
would suggest (see Table 1). The results reveal that the dummy variable for
the CIS has a robust, consistent, statistically significant and positive impact
upon trade flows for all years considered. Pairs of CIS members trade more
between themselves than standard economic theory would suggest. This
result points to a common FSU economic space which continued at least
throughout most of the Yeltsin period. This is unmistakable evidence of the
continued interdependence of the CIS area, though these economic data and
findings do not permit us to assess the impact of CIS negotiations and fledg-
ling arrangements. Moreover, when we look at trade flows involving three
leading FSU states, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Table 2), we also find the
dummy for CIS member state dyads to be consistently positive and consis-
tently statistically significant for the 1992–97 period.49 The estimated coef-
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Table I Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the determinants of trade for all CIS states, 1992–97
Parameters 1992–97 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
ln GDP 0.43*** (0.032) 0.60*** (0.136) 0.36 *** (0.086) 0.51*** (0.078) 0.47*** (0.069) 0.47***   (0.066) 0.42***  (0.067)
ln population 0.26*** (0.043) 0.44*** (0.149) 0.32 *** (0.126) 0.263*** (0.103) 0.128 (0.094) 0.231***  (0.091) 0.239*** (0.094)
ln distance –1.12*** (0.047) –1.45***  (0.194) –0.82 *** (0.126) –1.08  *** (0.114) –1.20*** (0.104) –1.24***  (0.096) –1.22***  (0.099) 
Dummy for CIS 1.24*** (0.100) 2.09*** (0.439) 1.35 *** (0.253) 1.41***  (0.232) 1.44*** (0.219) 0.929*** (0.211) 1.04***   (0.225)
Dummy for Ukraine 1.15*** (0.118) 0.78 (0.469) 1.15 *** (0.314) 0.445 (0.280) 1.68*** (0.259) 1.20*** (0.249) 1.38***  (0.254)
Dummy for Belarus 0.64*** (0.115) 0.44 (0.454) 0.59  * (0.313) 0.32    (0.286) 1.00*** (0.249) 0.55**   (0.238) 0.73***   (0.246)
Dummy for Russia 1.30*** (0.109) 0.66* (0.341) 0.75 *** (0.270) 1.45***   (0.263) 2.04*** (0.254) 1.39*** (0.242) 1.61***  (0.245)
Constant –12.52*** (0.663) –20.88*** (2.94)   –11.82 ***   (1.76) –14.78***     (1.61) –11.32*** (1.47) –12.65***   (1.38)   –11.58***   (1.40)
N 3125 190 478 556 610 673 613
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.41
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***indicates statistical significance at the >0.01 level. **indicates statistical significance at the >0.05
level. *indicates statistical significance at the >0.10 level.
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ficients on the dummy variables for trade with each of the three countries,
while consistently positive, are variable. Russian–Ukrainian relations look
more consequential, especially for Ukraine, though the trade coefficients
involving Belarus – while positive – are not always statistically significant.
These results reveal that CIS members trade more between themselves
than they trade with other states, once economic and geographical factors
have been controlled for. The results are especially impressive given the time
period considered: all CIS states had experienced economic collapse and
significant domestic political cleavages, with these problems only complicat-
ing the conduct of interstate commercial activity. The years since this
1992–97 period have been dynamic ones for the economies of Russia and all
FSU states. The 1998 Russian financial collapse, for instance, momentarily
undermined the Russian Federation’s foreign economic relations, but by the
end of 2000, nearly all FSU economies were growing, with FSU area trade
levels rising accordingly.50 The strengthening of the Russian economy was
central not only to the economic recovery of the region, but to the prospects
for more substantial regional commercial linkages. Even the sceptical Uzbek
president Islam Karimov publicly linked the improved state of the Russian
economy to the prospects for Eurasian economic integration, while Russian
politicians and commentators more openly discussed the use of economic
pressures to advance regional security and business linkages.51 We surmise
that were more recent, Putin-period, systematic trade data available for an
updated analysis, the trends evinced in Tables 1 and 2 would be even
stronger.
Conclusion
There is ongoing uncertainty in the reorganising of the post-Soviet space
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Table 2 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the determinants of trade for selected
CIS states, 1992–97
Parameters Russian trade Ukrainian trade Belarussian trade  
1992–97 1992–97 1992–97
Ln GDP 1.07*** (0.184) 0.85***  (0.107) 0.42*** (0.089)
Ln Population 1.19*** (0.305) 0.42** (0.180) 0.19   (0.126)
Ln Distance –1.08*** (0.118) –1.56***  (0.107) –1.30*** (0.123)
Dummy for CIS 1.44*** (0.333) 0.61** (0.281) 0.71**   (0.284)
Dummy for Ukraine 1.84* (1.05) N/A 1.42*     (0.810)
Dummy for Belarus 0.23   (0.900) 1.00 (0.760) N/A
Dummy for Russia N/A 2.17** (0.859) 1.23 (0.810)
Constant –45.92     (5.56) –25.62 (3.11) –10.44*** (2.09)
N 515 322 308
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.51 0.43
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***indicates statistical significance at the >0.01
level. **indicates statistical significance at the >0.05 level, *indicates statistical significance at
the >0.10 level.
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and understandable pressures upon FSU states to structure their relations
with the former regional hegemon carefully. The political pluralism which
has characterised the FSU complicates Moscow’s efforts to reconstruct some
semblance of Russia’s past leadership position. We have seen contradictory
factors at work in the region. On the one hand, there is a mixed – but under-
whelming – set of multilateral security-related institutional and policy
arrangements which has not proven immediately responsive to Russian
security interests. But on the other hand, even in the midst of powerful
centrifugal economic and political forces, there are continuing, underlying
infrastructural and commercial FSU interconnections, their long-term
viability unclear. An important missing element during most of the Yeltsin
period was a firm Russian commitment to the creation of a common FSU
security and economic space. The ascent of Vladimir Putin, set against the
backdrop of an improved domestic economy, may have altered this.
From the onset of his presidency, the FSU area and CIS have been a top
foreign policy priority of Putin.52 This has been signalled in speeches,53 in
numerous trips abroad,54 in the appointment of key figures to address multi-
lateral and bilateral issues in the region,55 and in the commitment of
resources.56 While granting that Putin went on a foreign policy offensive
during his first two years in office, visiting dozens of countries and offering
policy initiatives in various areas, immediate high-level attention was given
to CIS meetings and arrangements and to bilateral relationships involving
such FSU states as Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.57 Only a
month into his presidency, Putin asserted his commitment to a more active
CIS, and since then Russia’s FSU initiatives could be characterised as multi-
faceted and pragmatic.58 This momentum was not detoured by the
September 11 2001 terrorist attacks. Indeed, Putin’s regime exhibited
considerable creativity and resolve in both its bilateral and multilateral
Eurasian relationships, whether in a new engagement of Azerbaijan or in
promoting the notion of an FSU ‘alliance of gas and oil producers’.59
The desire to reverse the seeming Russian irrelevancy to many interna-
tional issues, including those in Russia’s own Eurasian backyard, has driven
the Putin-period Russian actions. A combination of positive and negative
incentives has been used, with a more targeted approach that reflects the
policy of ‘selective engagement’ articulated by Russian foreign policy
specialists.60 Thus, the Putin regime has engaged Belarus with loans to
support the Belarussian rouble, to restructure its gas debts, and to finance
joint industrial programmes; resolved energy debts with Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, forgiving sizeable debts for shares in state companies or other
concessions; and manipulated Russian troop presence and the promise of
future economic deals to pull Eduard Shevardnadze’s Georgian government
away from outside countries and back towards Russia.
Russia’s unilateral FSU efforts have been facilitated by the country’s
economic upturn, but anxieties over costs reinforce the targeted nature of its
Russia, the CIS and Eurasian interconnections
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initiatives: it has been estimated that direct and indirect subsidies to FSU
states still represent 3–4% of Russia’s GDP.61 Thus, not all developments
conducive to enhanced integration are championed: while promoting the
EEU, the Russian Federation has been cautious in not creating a free trade
zone that would be likely to cost the country tens of millions of dollars in
transporting energy and other resources.62 However, as in many policy
areas, there are trade-offs here, and not only has the EEU been a useful public
platform for countering GUUAM, but it could eventually facilitate the coor-
dination of member states’ economic policies and foreign relations.63
Tying together the various Putin initiatives, evidence is mounting that
Russia will selectively manipulate and augment those linkages and interde-
pendencies that were still in place from the Yeltsin period. It is now building
on the CIS organisational shell and consolidating the set of multilateral
agreements that had emerged during the CIS’s first decade.64 It has inten-
sively engaged those FSU states that have been traditionally receptive to CIS
integration (e.g., Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan), while
focusing on perceived common regional threats (e.g., terrorism) to garner
support from more reluctant FSU partners (e.g., Azerbaijan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan).65 It is not surprising that Putin’s emphasis on developing rapid-
deployment forces and sponsorship of a multistate anti-terrorism centre
have found resonance with many CIS members. The heightened American
military presence in the FSU, reluctantly agreed to by Moscow, raises new
questions about the Eurasian power balance, but it has infused new energy
in the Putin government’s efforts to consolidate Russia’s regional position.66
Two years into the Putin presidency, the long-term prospects for revived
FSU regional cooperation – and integration – are unclear. Will Putin’s
government remain committed to the integrating initiatives so far spon-
sored? Will Russia’s economic growth continue and permit the expenditure
of the resources needed to consolidate the CIS and at least the half-dozen FSU
bilateral relationships targeted? The preferences of other CIS states will no
doubt continue to be mixed, but an underlying wariness about a new
regional hegemon will confront any Russian action. More than a decade
after the Soviet collapse, the long-term regional security implications of
Russian power contraction have yet to be determined fully. Uncertainty also
surrounds Russia’s role in twenty-first-century Eurasia. Developments of the
post-Cold War period reveal a constancy in the Russian leadership’s commit-
ment to a Eurasian leadership position. The dynamic 1990s and early 2000s
may have altered Russian calculations, but its goals remain the same. Only
time will tell whether Russia’s power resources will be up to its ambitious
regional agenda.
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11
The Black Sea Economic
Cooperation: what contribution
to regional security?1
Panagiota Manoli
The Black Sea region has been extensively referred to as a bridge, indicating
its link with Europe to the West and Asia to the East. As a crossroad of geog-
raphy, cultures and religions, the Black Sea region presents opportunities for
both cooperation and conflict among the region’s states. Developments in
this area cannot be viewed in isolation, but always in the context of events
taking place in Europe and in Central Asia. The Black Sea region is a
connecting point with Europe and Central Asia owing to institutional and
geopolitical links. This unique geopolitical context suggests that the Black
Sea states constitute an interesting paradigm of cooperation and conflict in
the international system. 
In the early 1990s, the newly emergent states in the Black Sea area
arrived at the fundamental understanding that an institutionalisation of
their relations at a regional level would do much to promote their security.
Eleven countries in the Black Sea region responded to a Turkish initiative to
form the BSEC. In Istanbul, at a summit conference, Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey
and Ukraine signed on 25 June 1992 the Summit Declaration on Black Sea
Economic Cooperation, thereby launching a new subregional scheme.
Today the organisation, apart from its 11 members, also numbers nine
observer states – Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Austria,
Italy, Germany and France. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Iran and Uzbekistan are in line for full
membership. 
The BSEC was not a marriage born of mutual empathy, but an arranged
marriage reflecting a confluence of the individual states’ common needs,
problems and objectives that signalled a new era for the region. It was the
first time that 11 countries stretching from the Caspian to the Adriatic
adhered to the same institutional framework. As diverse as their individual
motivations might have been, the prime objective for joining BSEC was their
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greater integration into the European and world economies. With its inter-
national secretariat in Istanbul, the BSEC provided an agency for opening
communication links among neighbouring, newly established states and for
upgrading their international stature, particularly vis-à-vis the EU. The
architects of the BSEC identified economic development as the main pillar of
regional security and promoted three objectives: cooperation rather than
conflict, regionalism as a step towards global integration, and avoidance of
new divisions in Europe.
The BSEC’s agenda has mainly restricted itself to functional and economic
issues, where consensus is more readily arrived at, and has generally placed
hard security issues beyond its scope. It is, however, explicitly mentioned in
BSEC’s founding documents that the search for security and stability in the
region is the main goal and aspiration of the initiative. Principles laid down
in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the OSCE are basic to the
BSEC. Its subregional dimension emerges from its functioning within the
framework of the OSCE2 and, one might also argue, from its dependence on
the evolution of the EU. 
The BSEC was officially transformed from an initiative into a ‘regional
economic organisation’ on 5 June 1998, when a charter was signed that
made it into a formal organisation.3 The BSEC is neither an economic
community along the lines of the EU nor a security alliance like NATO. In
addition, its capacity for authoritative decisions over economic and political
issues is restricted. It envisages neither the creation of a preferential trading
area nor the introduction of a common external tariff. Discussions on the
establishment of a free trade area, which led to an initial agreement, were
soon dismissed as premature.4 In turn, any advanced subregional military
cooperation still remains out of reach for some BSEC states, since some, like
Azerbaijan and Armenia, are still locked in a military confrontation with one
another. Although one might argue that it is a nascent ‘security commu-
nity’, in the sense that force is rejected in its statutory documents as a way of
settling disputes among its members, ongoing military conflicts, even if
frozen, indicate something quite different. 
If the BSEC provides neither a regional security umbrella nor a constituted
‘economic bloc’, then what is its raison d’être? Essentially, the BSEC is a
subregional group that functions as a ‘diplomatic community’, bringing to
the same table the policy-making elites of its 11 member-states. For a decade,
elites from the governmental, parliamentary and business sectors, as well as
from local administrations, have been regularly meeting to discuss, negoti-
ate and coordinate action around common priority issues. Regional institu-
tions have not only brought together local elites, but have also opened links
between them and third party international organisations and actors.
Defining security in a comprehensive way, the BSEC has become engaged in
disseminating security concerns in fields such as environment, energy and
economy.5
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How has the utility of regional cooperation through the BSEC come about
in this new era in terms of security provision? How can we place the BSEC
within the broader institutional framework consisting of actors such as the
UN, NATO, the OSCE and the EU? What should one reasonably expect from
the BSEC? Has it the ability to bring about a positive change in regional secu-
rity? The foundations of the BSEC’s security role lie in its statutory docu-
ments and agreements as well as the declarations adopted by its members. Its
future development and potential remain hostage to the political will of its
members and to the level of recognition accorded it by the international
community.
Security mechanisms of the BSEC
Declarations and treaties adopted by the BSEC during its ten years of exis-
tence are important tools in identifying and assessing mechanisms for
dealing with security issues within the BSEC framework. The BSEC was initi-
ated at a time when the region was already facing serious conflicts and the
prospect of new tensions emerging was high. How do the statutory and other
documents of the organisation refer to the security situation and the conflict
management in the region?
Although the BSEC was established ‘to ensure that the Black Sea becomes
a sea of peace, stability and prosperity, striving to promote friendly and good-
neighbourly relations’,6 the founding declaration, adopted on 25 June 1992,
did not include specific security measures to accomplish this main goal.
Promotion of economic cooperation received the most attention as the
vehicle for attaining prosperity and long-term stability. The Bosphorus
Statement, also signed on 25 June 1992 in Istanbul, restated the commit-
ment of the heads of state and government ‘to act in a spirit of friendship and
good neighbourliness and enhance mutual respect and benefit, cooperation
and dialogue in the relations between them’. The Bosphorus Statement deals
with the settlement of disputes, emphasising ‘the need for the peaceful settle-
ment of all disputes by the means and in accordance with the principles set
out in the CSCE documents’.7 The signatories committed themselves to
resisting aggression, violence, terrorism and lawlessness in order to restore
peace and justice while relying, as a basis of their common understanding,
on the general principles of the UN Charter and Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. 
The BSEC defines security in a comprehensive way, referring not only to
its military dimension, but also to political, economic and social factors.
Consequently, in order to achieve the overall goal of stability, the Istanbul
Declaration includes actions which constitute a framework for BSEC cooper-
ation in the fields of trade and investment, environment, agriculture, trans-
port, communications, energy, tourism, information, science and
technology.8
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The first specific reference to security concerns, though of a non-
traditional nature, appeared in the Bucharest Summit Declaration of 30
June 1995, which stated that the members ‘will take coordinated actions by
the conclusion of the bilateral agreements, aimed at the struggle with organ-
ised crime, drugs sales, illegal transportation of weapons and radioactive
materials, acts of terrorism and illegal crossing of borders’.9 In subsequent
declarations, BSEC members steadily expressed their political will to enlarge
their partnership from a strictly economic relationship to one undertaking
measures in soft security and even more explicit security issues, such as
terrorism.10 That the BSEC was not initially established with the objective of
forming a multilateral forum for cooperation on military, defence, peace-
keeping or conflict management issues is also reflected in its institutionalisa-
tion, which foresees regular meetings of the heads of governments and
meetings of the foreign affairs ministers, but not meetings of defence minis-
ters or military staff. 
BSEC states are striving to build confidence, familiarity and understand-
ing of each other’s positions on international affairs through a system of
informal and formal meetings among the leaders, ministers and senior offi-
cials of the member-states. All decisions within the organisation are based
on consensus, and divisive issues are put aside in order not to hamper the
appearance of unity or to impede cooperation in areas where it is feasible. In
other words, ‘consensus building’ has been a byword for establishing the
lowest common denominator among member-states. The BSEC’s basic prin-
ciple necessitates that actions taken in the name of the organisation must
either contribute to or be neutral towards – and not detract from – the stated
and unstated interests of the individual member-states.
Calls for a regional security framework 
There have been numerous proposals for a regional security framework.
None of the calls, however, has led to formal discussions or to any tangible
outcome. In 1996, the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU)
issued a call for security to be incorporated into the existing subregional
cooperation structures, including the BSEC. The proposal projected that, in
the long term, structures for political and security dialogue would need to be
set up in order to ensure systematic headway in developing the stability
essential for consolidating economic progress.11 Although the EU has been a
distant voice in Black Sea affairs, it has supported engagement in soft secu-
rity issues, but has been less encouraging on the inclusion of hard security.
The European Commission, in its 1997 report to the Council, suggested that
cooperative efforts could constructively focus on the promotion of political
dialogue, the strengthening of human rights, democracy and the rule of law,
as well as on the reduction of drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal immi-
gration throughout the region.12 From within the region, stronger calls
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have been heard, particularly from Georgia and Ukraine. In June 1994, the
Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, proposed seven security measures:
• agreement among the Black Sea basin states on the limitation of large-
scale naval exercises in the Black Sea; 
• agreement among the Black Sea countries on banning manoeuvres or
exercises in the Straits zones and adjacent areas of the Black Sea; 
• agreement on advance notifications about the purpose of movement and
routes of any formations of assault craft, missile ships and gunboats
consisting of more than three craft; 
• a memorandum of the BSEC countries on refraining from joint military
exercises and manoeuvres in the Black Sea with those states not party to
the BSEC, and informing other Black Sea basin countries about the entry
of foreign naval ships into territorial waters; 
• a declaration on the inviolability and intangibility of the sea frontiers of
the coastal countries and on relationships among their naval forces and
border-guard detachments; 
• a memorandum of the Black Sea countries on the inadmissibility of the
use of naval forces, in direct or other form, against each other;
• a declaration of the Black Sea basin countries on the refusal to provide
their territories for any aggressive or subversive acts carried out against
other Black Sea countries.13
Within the same framework, President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia
has regularly argued in favour of a ‘Peaceful Caucasus Initiative’ that would
involve the BSEC. At the 1992 Istanbul Summit he had suggested the estab-
lishment of a Council of Defence and Foreign Ministers to tackle subregional
crises, a proposal that found little support.14 On 17 November 1999, on the
eve of the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit, he once more proposed an enhanced
BSEC and called for greater balance between the interrelated economic,
political and security issues facing the BSEC member-states: 
Perhaps the time is ripe for BSEC to strike an appropriate balance between
economic cooperation and cooperation on regional security, and determine its
place within the family of the other regional alliances and intergovernmental
organisation in the new European architecture of the 21st century. These
issues are increasingly relevant and BSEC’ s ultimate success depends on them
. . . you will perhaps concur that an increasing threat to the regional stability
prompts us to think in this direction as well.15
At the same time, four leaders in the region – Heydar Aliev (Azerbaijan),
Robert Kocharian (Armenia), Eduard Shevardnadze (Georgia) and
Suleyman Demirel (Turkey) – supported the development of some kind of
stability or security pact for the Caucasus. Following up on this proposal, the
Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels drafted a Stability Pact for the
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Caucasus. Elaborated by Michael Emerson, it proposed that, in order to
upgrade its effectiveness, the BSEC could enlarge its activities in the field of
politics and security, be renamed the Black Sea–Caucasus Cooperation
(BSC), and sponsor meetings of a wider political forum, the Black
Sea–Caucasus–Caspian Political Forum (BSCC). Thus, the BSC members
would be joined by the Caspian states and also by the United States to discuss
the broader political concerns of the region.16 The inclusion of the United
States in the BSEC framework, although welcomed by most of the countries
in the region, has generated strong opposition as well.17
Neither of the other ‘leading’ countries in the BSEC (Russia and Greece)
has, however, been actively asking for an active security role for the organi-
sation. These states have clearly refrained from creating a regional security
complex in the area, preferring in practice either bilateralism (as in the case
of Russia) or broader multilateralism (as in the case of Greece).
Concurrently, a main concern for an active BSEC security role stems from
the suspicion with which several BSEC states view an enhanced role for
Russia (or Turkey) within the organisation. Instead, these states prefer
frameworks where an EU or American presence is guaranteed. Most of them
presume that the BSEC’s future depends upon whether the EU, the United
States and international organisations such as the OSCE will become
engaged in BSEC affairs, thereby increasing its credibility and effectiveness
while relaxing the concern held by many of its members that the BSEC might
evolve into an organisation not recognised by the EU or NATO.
Dealing with soft security politics in a zone of hard security concerns
Traditional security issues have by no means lost their relevance. In fact,
following the end of the Cold War, they have increased in importance in the
region. There are ongoing or frozen conflicts involving Transdniestria,
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Chechnya. The Black Sea
region also harbours the potential for other conflicts generated by long-
standing animosities, territorial disputes, military rivalries, ethnic tensions,
the presence of foreign military forces, minority issues and mutual suspicion.
Moreover, the region is vulnerable to the security threats associated with
organised crime, drug trafficking and corruption, which grow out of the
endemic economic hardship, social inequality and civil unrest in the area.18
The internal weakness of most BSEC countries in transition and their
vulnerability to outside pressures, as well as their inadequate or absent inte-
gration into new security frameworks, have intensified the overall climate of
regional insecurity. These states are at different stages of the political and
economic transition towards democratic societies and market economies;
they face concurrently an often antagonistic external environment. The
main domestic barrier to the peaceful and effective settlement of disputes lies
in ineffective state institutions and leaderships that are either unwilling or
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unable to impose the rule of law. Moreover, a number of states have incom-
plete control over their territory or population. 
In the post-Cold War era, there is growing recognition of the need for
conflict prevention and conflict management mechanisms to cope with the
challenges posed by economic and soft security concerns. Subregional
groupings like the BSEC that emerged in Eurasia during the 1990s, although
dedicated to mainly economic and developmental goals, have assumed
implicit security and conflict prevention dimensions. They have sought to
establish a normative and legal framework that governs interstate relations
and establishes regional policy priorities, both of which establish the basis for
the relaxation of security concerns.
The BSEC has a political and security dimension derived from the institu-
tionalisation of economic relations, which has both a normative and a polit-
ical dimension.19 Subregional organisations might lack the ability to
mediate interstate conflicts, but they have the competence to respond to
‘soft’ security challenges. Alyson Bailes’s ‘security spectrum’, which distin-
guishes between ‘existential’ and ‘soft’ security levels, is a useful analytical
tool for understanding the levels of the BSEC’s security engagement.20 The
organisation acts as a ‘diplomatic community’ with three dimensions:
interovernmental, interparliamentary (Parliamentary Assembly of the
BSEC), and business (the BSEC Business Council). It contributes to regional
identity building by increasing solidarity, opening up lines of communica-
tion, and increasing mutual knowledge (the ‘existential’ level). Policy elites
from the levels of government, parliament, business and local authorities
meet regularly. Biannual meetings take place at the level of foreign ministers
and frequently at that of experts within working groups. Parliamentarians
regularly meet at biannual general assemblies and committee meetings on
economic, political and social affairs. The BSEC has also granted observer
status to other European assemblies – the Assembly of the OSCE, the
Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament – which
helps fulfil the goal of involving international organisations more closely in
the region. Although the actual power of the interparliamentary dimension
in influencing the decisions taken by the BSEC Council is limited, interparlia-
mentary diplomacy has a role to play in the regional task of building demo-
cratic institutions. It was the Assembly of the BSEC, for example, that placed
issues such as trafficking in people, migration, organised crime and social
rights on the regional agenda. 
The BSEC has thus kept open channels of dialogue that could be impor-
tant for emergency situations, fostered the accumulation of shared knowl-
edge, and contributed to confidence building among its members.21 It aims
to undertake projects and identify issues which provide the opportunity for
increasing confidence and reduce the risk of conflict. However, BSEC inter-
ventions are always in non-military issues. Interventions in the fields of
energy, transport and communications, trade and banking have produced
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the realisation of concrete projects and the concluding of agreements, action
plans and memoranda of understanding. Improving economic conditions in
participating countries, establishing an integrated infrastructure network,
and supporting measures for the protection of the environment are the main
areas where the BSEC tries to engender cooperation.22
The BSEC has taken concerted action in the non-traditional but explicit
security issues of organised crime, terrorism, drugs and illegal migration,
which pose a common threat for all the member-states. Specific initiatives,
including a police liaison centre and a task force on money laundering, are
currently under discussion. Initiatives on cooperation in emergency situa-
tions, crisis management and soft security (organised crime, trafficking,
terrorism) all point to the BSEC’ s interest in addressing the elements of the
soft security agenda and in carving out a security competence. 
Combating organised crime and terrorism was the main concern of the
BSEC interior ministers beginning in 1996.23 At the Yerevan meeting in
October 1996, the interior ministers produced a joint statement that marked
the launching of interaction between law-enforcement agencies in combat-
ing organised crime, terrorism, trafficking of drugs, illicit trade and illegal
migration. At the next meeting, held in Istanbul in October 1997, the minis-
ters agreed to establish a joint front and common institutions of cooperation
in the sphere of combating crime,24 followed by a subsequent agreement in
October 1998.25 In the aftermath of September 11 2001, and in response to
the urgent need for implementation of the BSEC Agreement on Cooperation
in Combating Crime, in Particular its Organised Forms, an additional proto-
col was agreed upon that envisaged the establishment of a central network of
liaison officers on combating crime. This protocol was designed to provide for
a speedy regional response in urgent cases and to inform members of
transnational crime trends in the region. The agreement covers acts of
terrorism, corruption, smuggling, trafficking in people and weapons,
economic crime, ecological crime, high-tech crime, trade in human organs,
kidnaping, maritime crime, and illegal trafficking in vehicles. 
The BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future, adopted by the Council of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow in April 2001, established a set of
short- and long-term security priorities for BSEC. The agenda governs the
organisation’s activities in the security realm and makes explicit reference to
soft security measures within the framework of multilateral economic coop-
eration. The BSEC agreed to develop policies for three categories of the soft
security agenda: 
• National anti-corruption: the member-states agreed to build on existing
programmes and create new ones, and to develop the legislation, insti-
tutions and practices needed to combat corruption. 
• Ethics infrastructure: the member-states acknowledged the need for a
more explicit political commitment, a stronger legal framework, better
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accountability measures, and a workable code of conduct.
• International action: the member states agreed to joint international
action by drawing on the advice and assistance of Transparency
International.26
Cooperation in emergency situations became another field of successful
engagement with the April 1998 signing of an ‘Agreement on Collaboration
in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-
Made Disasters’. The agreement covers cases of extraordinary natural or
technological disasters which require a collective response and are beyond
the ability of individual states to cope with alone. While this category of
agreement is not specifically related to security, it does generate the exter-
nality of increasing confidence building within the region. 
A central concern of the BSEC is to promote collaboration with interna-
tional organisations, on the premise that further institutionalisation of
regional affairs increases stability, makes interstate behaviour more
predictable, and binds national policies around broader, common political
objectives. The BSEC and its Parliamentary Assembly have acted as channels
through which regional and international institutions, particularly the UN,
the OSCE and the Council of Europe, have been engaged in the area. Outside
the BSEC framework, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Black Sea
Naval Cooperation Task Group, signed on 2 April 2001, made an important
first step towards the institutionalisation of naval cooperation among all
littoral states on the Black Sea. The agreement is intended to be an on-call
force – christened BlackSeaFor – composed of naval units from the partici-
pating states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine).27 The
purpose of BlackSeaFor is to foster cooperation in search and rescue opera-
tions, mine clearing operations and environmental activities, and to organ-
ise goodwill visits among the Black Sea navies. Although all six signatory
states of the BlackSeaFor participate in the BSEC, most of the members
preferred none the less to pursue that initiative outside the BSEC framework.
The relationship between the BSEC and security initially seems tenuous.
It is increasingly evident that the BSEC, like any other subregional group in
Europe, has an implicit security function. Since the BSEC’s geographic delin-
eation includes areas with interstate and civil conflicts, the only way for it to
survive is a ‘desecuritisation’ of relations within the group, by building coop-
eration around seemingly unrelated areas, and by undertaking confidence-
building measures which will have the cumulative effect of helping its
members stabilise the regional environment.28
Constraints on the BSEC’s security role
The difficulties attending the BSEC’s aspiration to play a role in the peaceful
settlement of disputes in the region is underscored by the European
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Commission’s acknowledgement that the ability of the BSEC to bring
together representatives of all Black Sea states is itself a notable achieve-
ment.29 In fact, neither the states of the region nor the international
community have requested the BSEC to undertake an active role in arms
control issues or direct involvement in conflict management crises. It would
be hard for such a heterogeneous group of neighbouring states with no
formal competence for conflict management, no shared military resources,
and no large economic sticks or carrots to undertake such a role.30
The primarily economy-oriented mandate and relevant competencies of
the BSEC have conditioned its security potential. As a regional economic
organisation, it has developed no mechanisms or competencies in the ‘hard’
security field. In general, one of the most significant shortcomings of the
BSEC has been the lack of implementation mechanisms in all areas of its
competence. Security expertise, adequate resources and international expe-
rience are three other features that the BSEC lacks. At the same time,
outstanding territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes have been the
chief obstacle to formal multilateral security cooperation. The divergent
regional interests of the individual BSEC states have resulted in the absence
of a clear sense of regional interest and a common perception of threat. 
Since the region’s actual geographic delimitation is not clear, the scope
and the area of intervention are also unclear. The large number and the
diversity of BSEC member-states, although enriching the organisation in
terms of its plurality and resources, generate problems on drafting common
‘region-wide’ policies. Fishing rights are a case on point. There have been
several cases of ‘hot incidents’ regarding fishing zones in the Black Sea, but
the signing of a multilateral agreement has been delayed, because there is no
consensus yet as to whether such an agreement should engage only the
Black Sea coastal countries or all BSEC members.
The BSEC is both too small and too large to assume hard security roles. It
is too small in the sense that it cannot call on the resources of the western
powers or extend a credible defence guarantee to its members; it is too large
in that its diverse membership hinders effective coordination. Subregional
organisations, in general, do not have the military or economic leverage to
meet the necessary conditions for an effective security organisation.31
The BSEC’s role has been likewise undermined by the low degree of
member-state commitment to cooperation within the institution. Its weak
political voice results from the fact that all of the member-states prefer other
foreign and security fora to the BSEC for meeting their security objectives.32
Some BSEC members therefore place greater priority on pursuing their
foreign policy objectives in the region by other means.33 At least one of the
major players, Russia, displays a lack of interest in using multilateral institu-
tions in the area. It has not revealed any enthusiasm for building a
Caucasian or Black Sea regional community. However, states from the
region formed other smaller groups, such as GUUAM, in an effort to counter-
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balance Russian influence and in response to their particular security
concerns. Historically rooted animosities and distrust have undermined
close security cooperation and weakened the commitment to a common
front against new security challenges, including terrorism and organised
crime.34
The fear of being dominated by larger neighbours, such as Russia or
Turkey, has been another undermining factor. BSEC members are reluctant
to establish a strong regional security framework in which large countries
from within the region – often seen as a part of the region’s security problem
– might prevail. States have chosen to place their security concerns within
broader security fora like the OSCE, where the weight of larger states, partic-
ularly of Russia, can be balanced by the presence of other powers.
Finally, there is no functional interface between the BSEC and other
organisations with security and political functions such as the OSCE, the EU,
and NATO. Consequently, even where the BSEC could play a constructive
role in regional projects such as civil society building, limitations have been
placed on its potential role. The BSEC has also failed to function as the
conduit for member-state cooperation with other organisations and interna-
tional financial institutions. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have coop-
erated on soft security issues and undertaken common actions as part of
their pre-accession strategies for NATO, but that collaboration does not
extend to the BSEC. None the less, the failure of close collaboration between
international organisations and the BSEC should not be laid at the latter’s
door. The BSEC has been eager to integrate the region with the rest of Europe
and to become a partner in the EU processes. Towards that goal, the BSEC
has proposed the institutionalisation of its affairs with the EU through a
Platform of Cooperation, while the BSEC Assembly has unilaterally provided
the European Parliament with observer status. The EU response to these
initiatives has varied between the vague and the negative. Notwithstanding
BSEC deficiencies, the EU’s reluctance to engage the BSEC might be rooted in
insufficient knowledge in EU policy-making elites of BSEC’s actual role and
functions; or perhaps, as a locally initiated project, the BSEC lacks the inter-
national recognition that it would attract if it were an initiative sponsored by
Brussels or Washington.
Further engagement: why and how?
The relative strategic equilibrium of the Cold War has been replaced by a
relative strategic vacuum. The subsequent instability of the Black
Sea–Eurasia region matters profoundly to the world for several reasons.35
First, regional instability permits the operation and growth of terrorist move-
ments that have not only local but also global ramifications. Second, and
relatedly, the surge of illicit narcotics trade throughout the region also
provides a major source of funding for these groups. Third, the Caspian Sea is
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an emerging oil-producing region that requires unimpeded access to western
(and Asian) markets. Finally, regional conflicts have the potential of devel-
oping into major power confrontations that cannot but affect the security of
Europe and beyond.
Regional cooperation plays a large role in ameliorating security condi-
tions, particularly now that one witnesses a higher salience of non-tradi-
tional security threats – environmental, economic and societal – which have
regional dimensions and implications.36 How can subregional institutions
like the BSEC assume an operational security role? First, they must cultivate
cooperative attitudes, integrate regional economic and political regimes into
the global system, and increase dialogue among peoples of different cultures
and religions. Importantly, a subregional organisation such as the BSEC,
which functions as a political, economic and cultural bridge between Europe
and Central Asia, should receive additional external support for its activities.
Subregionalism best serves stability by closing the political, economic and
social gaps between western and Eurasian states that pose a barrier to
greater cohesion and solidarity. 
The BSEC’s operation as a ‘diplomatic community’ generates two indirect,
positive effects for interstate relations in the region. First, the overall security
environment is improved because the BSEC keeps open the channels of
dialogue; and second, it recasts challenges and threats as a common concern
in the interest of enhancing a sense of regionalism. The international
community long ago recognised that subregional initiatives contribute to
promoting regional security and stability through political dialogue and
shared economic development.37 Though weak in military power, subre-
gional organisations can become relatively strong in diplomatic power or in
economic activities.38
Most subregional economic initiatives in Eurasia, which support sustain-
able models of development and growth, promote self-confidence and
encourage greater self-reliance in matters of security. What appears as
economic subregionalism is, in fact, driven by political, military or cultural
considerations.39 It thus addresses domestic sources of insecurity resulting
from economic inequality, poverty and economic exclusion, while soothing
the unease with which countries of different cultural backgrounds face each
other. Major threats to security and stability are increasingly understood by
regional elites as originating from within the region itself and reflect the
destabilising effects of poor economic and political performance.
What constructive forms of interaction can be developed between the
BSEC and other, larger organisations? To date, the BSEC approach has not
dealt directly with local conflicts; if anything, it has dealt with them by
putting them aside. Direct involvement of the BSEC in high security issues,
such as the demilitarisation or denuclearisation of the region, cannot be
expected or encouraged in the short or medium term. Subregional groups
within the OSCE contribute to the overall institutional structure of the secu-
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rity space covered by the OSCE.40 They are devoted to security in this
broader sense, but are not specifically or directly engaged in the military
aspects. Instead, these subregional institutions concentrate on policies that
promote regional and domestic stability and address the non-military
aspects of security: financial and technical support for the transition to the
market and democracy, economic development, a stable energy supply,
environmental cooperation and the networking of civil societies.
Subregional groups thus consolidate the OSCE model of security building by
offering a means for the dissemination and adoption of the norms and stan-
dards of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU. Subregional institutions
cannot, however, compensate for the denial of the benefits attending EU and
NATO membership.41
An important undertaking of the BSEC is reducing intra-regional tensions
by creating and sponsoring a process of community building. By encouraging
the involvement of actors other than state ones (NGOs, business people, local
authorities), subregional institutions cultivate a bottom-up approach to
conflict prevention and management and adhere to a ‘pre-emptive’ diplomacy.
The BSEC should be assisted in its attempts to sustain the evolution of demo-
cratic civil societies in the region, control unwanted migratory flows, amelio-
rate the sources of conflict attending the soft security agenda (trafficking,
organised crime, terrorism), and foster cooperation on economic development
and environmental cooperation. Constructive engagement of subregional
institutions like the BSEC in these fields produces appreciable value added and
facilitates crisis prevention, conflict containment and post-settlement recon-
struction.42 The main instrument of the BSEC for crisis prevention is diplo-
matic (and potentially economic), and thus its dialogue channels could assist
‘proximity talks’ as a mode of interaction.43 A division of labour between the
BSEC and other institutions, particularly the UN, the OSCE and NATO’s PfP, for
the purposes of the regional verification of agreements and monitoring of
conflicts could also be established.44 At the same time, the BSEC’s diplomatic
power might be deployed to contain conflict through its influence within the
framework of UN debates and actions. The links of communication and confi-
dence already existing among policy-making elites in the area could be used to
forestall conflict situations and prevent the outbreak of hostilities or other
forms of disruptive behaviour. The deepening of institutional ties between the
BSEC and the EU, NATO, the OSCE and specialised UN agencies could assist in
the formulation of clear economic objectives for the region towards the supple-
mentary goal of conflict prevention and management. The BSEC process of
region building could also lead to the redefinition of the identity, interests and
capacities of its member-states, which would, in turn, help create conditions
for a system of institutionalised negotiation or conflict resolution that would
enhance regional security and stability. 
The area where the BSEC can make a positive contribution is in post-
conflict rehabilitation of conflict zones. The area covered by BSEC states is
Institutions of security governance
220
2504Chap11  7/4/03  12:41 pm  Page 220
still characterised by ongoing or frozen conflicts, but the BSEC’s agenda is
not so ambitious as to include resolution of these conflicts. The BSEC
acknowledges the comparative advantage of other organisations long prac-
tised in the art of crisis management, particularly the OSCE and the UN. The
BSEC could prove an effective mediator and manager in the post-settlement
period when there is the need for financial assistance to reconstruct
destroyed housing stock and economic infrastructure, as well as re-estab-
lishing normalised flows of goods, services and people. The BSEC is well
equipped to sponsor rehabilitation programmes for those areas.45
The BSEC’s effectiveness is as contingent upon the support of the interna-
tional community as it is upon the efforts and will of its members. As part of
the Eurasian security architecture, the BSEC cannot be seen as a viable alter-
native to any larger European organisation. Its potential for contributing to
regional security is located in its ability to bring together diverse groups of
states in a cooperative framework and to tackle specific elements of the soft
security agenda. At the same time, within the context of NATO and EU
enlargement, it sustains cooperation between NATO/EU members, those
seeking NATO/EU membership, and those states remaining aloof or excluded
from the enlargement processes.
The long-term political aim of BSEC members is an institutionalisation of
relations with the EU. That shared political goal very often becomes the only
common ground of discussions held within the BSEC framework. EU support
for subregional actors such as the BSEC is crucial, because it sends an impor-
tant political signal to states within the region, testifying to the legitimacy of
the subregional group and reassuring them that subregional cooperation is
a step towards further integration with the world and European structures.
The EU presence in the region, and especially the development of modes of
practical BSEC–EU interaction, acquires a strong security dimension for the
accompanying stabilising effects.
A subregional organisation cannot fulfil its role if certain internal and
external conditions are not present. The recognition of its role by the states
from within the region as well as by external powers is decisive for the reali-
sation of the BSEC’s security potential. Intra-BSEC solidarity depends heavily
on the unifying effect of common threat perception, which, though weak,
has mainly evolved around issues of soft security. It has now become
increasingly obvious that the fight against organised crime in all its forms is
a priority security concern for all countries in the region and beyond. The
determination of the Black Sea Eurasian countries to cooperate on common
policies meeting the soft security agenda has increased over time. 
Regarding the internal requirements for a successful and effective BSEC,
the most important objectives are strengthening institutional functions and
enhancing the legitimacy of its member-states. Conflicts and insecurity
surface in areas of ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states where the vacuum of state author-
ity permits the deployment of destabilising actors. Weak states and frag-
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mented societies constitute the main factors of instability; well-functioning
states remain the main actors for the provision of security. In the absence of
the latter, a necessary condition for interstate cooperation on security
matters is seriously impaired. 
The future of the BSEC as a security actor is hostage to a number of devel-
opments largely outside its immediate control.46 First, an enhanced role for
the BSEC is contingent upon successful economic cooperation. Without
economic growth, the political stability necessary for sustained cooperation
in security affairs is unlikely to materialise. Second, the political instability in
the Eurasian region and the ongoing conflicts create conditions conducive to
the emergence of criminal groups and the growth of organised crime. Either
development, left unchecked, would impede the development of market
economies in the region, weaken the evolution of a democratic civil society,
and debilitate state institutions. Third, the readiness of the international
organisations (and the great powers) to integrate the BSEC into their plans of
action for the region will be decisive for the organisation’s future. In the
absence of external legitimisation, the BSEC will be less likely to foster secu-
rity cooperation in the Black Sea region, a key security zone along the
borders of Europe. 
Conclusion
Eurasian security has come to the forefront after several years of neglect
owing to the Balkan conflicts, which monopolised international interest and
great power resources for much of the 1990s. Eurasia suffers from pervasive
misrule and accompanying economic difficulties, and thus a security
approach for the region should have a broad, comprehensive perspective.
Subregional organisations have their own multidimensional security poten-
tial to be exploited by the international community in its search for appro-
priate instruments to address the security challenges originating in Eurasia.
The BSEC, a formal economic institution, has already served security in the
region by keeping communication channels open and bringing policy-
making elites to the same negotiating table. It has established regional
regimes in the domains of economy, infrastructure and the environment.
Region building, per se, has a security dimension, because it increases socie-
tal stability, contributes to the process of confidence building, makes state
preferences more transparent, and facilitates the exchange of information by
policy-making elites. Security and peace are promoted through the BSEC
approach, which combines the two basic tasks of confidence building among
peoples and strengthening cooperation between governments. The BSEC’s
geographic delimitation straddles Europe and Asia. It forms one nexus
linking together their security. A constructive mode of collaboration by the
international community with the BSEC would have long-term stabilising
effects, and it would indicate to the states of the area that cooperative atti-
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tudes, first of all towards their immediate neighbours, have added value for
security. In an era when globalisation has not only changed the economic
and social domains, but also altered the preconditions of security and made
territorial state borders very porous, the constructive reliance upon subre-
gional institutions like the BSEC, which provide stability mechanisms span-
ning sovereign jurisdictions, should be encouraged and supported by the
broader international community. 
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12
The EU and Eurasia:
a bounded security role in
a greater Europe
Simon Serfaty
Entering the twentieth century, the most important strategic location in the
world was said to be a ‘pivot area’ that consisted of the northern and interior
portion of the Eurasian continent, ‘where the rivers flow either to the
icebound Arctic Ocean or inward to salt seas and salt lakes having no
oceanic outlets.’1 So it was viewed then, and so it is often viewed now as
other ‘Great Games’ are being staged in or around this same ‘pivot area’ for
the never-ending struggle among or against great powers.
Notwithstanding the significance of the area, the EU has little involve-
ment with ‘Eurasia’ as compared to the extensive relations it has developed
with other parts of the world. Going west, the EU and the United States are
forming an ‘ever closer union’ of their own – a Euro-Atlantic community
that would complete a vision that was born out of the ruins of two world
wars half-way into the past century. Moving east, the EU is extending this
vision to enough new members to make the continent west of Russia ‘whole
and free’ – while cautiously progressing with a special bilateral relationship
with Russia as a power in Europe that need not be, and cannot become, a
power within the Union. Going south, the empires have come home and past
EU dreams of becoming a power in the Middle East have resulted in the
fear that too many immigrants are making of the EU a Middle Eastern
power – a condition that reinforces the Union’s intention of making the
Mediterranean the continent’s final geographic boundary (notwithstanding
its historic presence in a series of islands that would include Malta and
Cyprus) while keeping Turkey separate from its institutions.
By comparison, the EU’s presence in Eurasia is elusive. For one, it is
diluted by the very nature of a ‘region’ that escapes any reliable definition:
thus, while Halford J. Mackinder remained faithful to his concept of a ‘pivot
area’, he redefined it periodically throughout his life, expanding its reach
farther east and south.2 Moreover, the area is so diverse as to present the EU
with challenges that exceed the limits of what its institutions can do.
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Politically, the EU lacks a common foreign and security policy, and none is
likely to emerge any time soon. Economically, the Union’s attention is else-
where as it attends to the consequences of its enlargement and other dimen-
sions of a heavy parochial agenda. As a result, outside Russia and Turkey,
whatever influence is exerted by the EU in Eurasia results mainly from the
interests of individual member-states rather than from the presence of the
institutions to which they belong. After the events of September 11 2001,
however, and in the context of an expanded war on terrorism, this may cease
to be true as ‘Eurasia’ includes or touches upon a number of pivot countries,
including Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the EU will be asked by its
members, as well as by the United States, to play a separate, distinctive and
even vital role.3
End game? 
By any standard, the EU does not qualify as a sovereign state, either as a
matter of fact (in its territory, population, government and army) or as a
state of mind (in its loyalty, values, identity and history). Yet, not only does
the EU matter but also, for some of the issues that seem to matter most, it
often matters more than its members. Moving in an increasingly integrated
space – peaceful, affluent, democratic and de-ideologised – the states of
Europe are playing out an ambitious end game: widen in order to deepen,
deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both.4
Deepening is Euro-speak for doing more. It has to do with increasing insti-
tutional cooperation in more and more substantive areas, thereby leaving
less room for the exercise of national sovereignty. Because each new initia-
tive often sets the stage for the initiative that follows, there seems to be no
end to the process and, accordingly, for most of the past 50 years few
attempts have been made to define that end point before it is reached.
Widening is Euro-speak for bringing more members in the community – from
six to nine to ten to 12 to 15, and possibly twice as many by 2010. Yet,
enlargement is not open-ended and its limits – part geographical, part
cultural and part organisational – are real even as they remain unstated.5
Finally, reforming the institutions has to do with devising new ways whereby
an expanding institutional discipline – the acquis communautaire – can be
effectively imposed on the community.6 Predictably, the more the process
unfolds and the more institutional reforms are needed through intergovern-
mental conferences (IGCs) held to modify the original treaties – as will have
been the case on three occasions during the period 1996–2004.
This reorganisation of Europe’s political space is historically awesome.
Yet because the process remains very erratic, moving from setbacks to
relance, many continue to dismiss it. That will puzzle future historians. When
dealing with contemporary Europe and its future role as security actor,
particularly outside Europe proper, it is best to think retroactively – what
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used to be once upon a time and has been achieved over time, rather than
what is and is being attempted at a given time. Thinking in time helps gain
the perspective needed to follow Europe’s revival during the second half of
the twentieth century when, with America’s encouragement, its mosaic of
nation-states gained unparalleled cohesion and stability as a union of
member-states. 
Jean Monnet, who viewed the 1957 Rome Treaties as a feeble and ‘rather
vague’ idea, would be astounded.7 Can the young member-states of the EU
be the old great powers of Europe that celebrated the horrific deaths of tens of
millions in the name of a mythical white man’s burden, an elusive mission
civilisatrice, a constrained Kultur, or self-appointed and barbaric Soviet
commissars? Living in an increasingly integrated and civil space, the new
Europeans show an identity that is increasingly common. Over the years,
there has emerged a community of people living in a collage of regions whose
shared characteristics overcome national stereotypes. Forget the clichés:
with cultures increasingly compatible, attitudes have become complemen-
tary. Now, the ‘ideal’ European is found most convincingly as a composite of
what the idealised German, French, Spaniard, Italian and Englishman used
to be – enhanced by the cultural colours brought by the defunct overseas
empires, and completed by the US influence that has spread throughout
much of the continent. 
Even as Europeans gain a better sense of the reality communautaire they
form, they fail to understand how their emerging community serves them,
and why. Not surprisingly, that creates new tensions with institutions that
often seem to proceed ‘as if’ they knew better than the states they serve. ‘The
concept of “as if”’, wrote Timothy Ash, ‘is a subjective, idealistic self-defini-
tion in which the idea takes absolute precedence over reality and conscious-
ness determines being.’8 For the EU, the concept means treating ‘Europe’ as
if it holds the same legitimacy as each of its members, even though their citi-
zens view it as a cage within which their democratic institutions are impris-
oned and their national identity is diluted. The agenda could not be any
more parochial. For the citizens to accept a recycling of their cherished
nation-state within an ill-defined union of member-states, the European
institutions will have to do more in such areas as jobs, income distribution,
ageing populations and inadequately funded pension funds, immigration
flows, education, national cohesion, political leadership and much else. Not
‘as if’ but ‘what if’ the EU could save the nation-states, once again, from their
inability to attend to issues that cannot be resolved individually as effectively
as collectively.9
On September 11 2001 an unpredictable ‘what if’ entered the transat-
lantic and Eurasian mix within which the EU was to play out its end game.
History need not unfold further to conclude that America’s loss of its territo-
rial invulnerability, assumed to be inviolable, will impact not only on the
United States and its vision of, and role in, the world, but also on every region
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and, within each region, every country too. With all nations asked to choose
sides – ‘with us or against us’, insisted President George W. Bush on 20
September – alliances and adversary relations will be tested in ways that are
likely to change them significantly, for the much better or the much worse.
With the EU countries open to catastrophic, terror-ridden scenarios devel-
oped south of the Mediterranean, new ‘civilisational’ hostilities could seri-
ously impact on their relations with the Greater Europe that lies outside the
EU’s institutional boundaries, including Russia as well as Turkey and its
immediate neighbours in the Caucasus and Caspian region – all institutional
orphans that receive limited attention from the EU.
On the whole, however, the end game that began in the latter part of the
1990s will still be nearing completion at the end of this decade. This means
that by that time, Europe will have progressively become: larger, with 25
members or more, but excluding, under any conceivable circumstances,
Turkey, Russia and any former Soviet republic except the Baltic countries;
deeper, with a functioning euro zone comprised of at least all current 15 EU
countries, including Great Britain; more globally engaged, with an increas-
ingly common (but still incomplete) foreign policy that would reflect the
improved cohesion of EU countries, but with none of the political will
required for evoking yet a common defence policy; somewhat stronger, with
some early elements of a common security policy in place, including institu-
tions but also minimal capabilities for rapid deployment in and beyond
Europe; and more united as a reborn superpower, though not as an emerg-
ing superstate.
Going west: an ever closer union
After World War II and throughout the Cold War, America’s embrace of the
idea of Europe was never unconditional. Nor, for that matter, did it ever need
to be. Instead, the US commitment to a united and strong Europe relied on
criteria of political, economic and societal convergence that would help the
countries of Europe act more like the United States, even if they could not
quite ‘be’ the United States. But these were also criteria of institutional
convergence that would enable an emerging European Community to join
the United States in a community of action where the values and the inter-
ests shared across the Atlantic would be translated into common policies. In
other words, an ever more united and stronger Europe would become insep-
arable from the United States, even as it remained separate from America.10
During the formative Cold War phase of Europe’s construction, US appre-
hensions were significant but also comprehensible. Keeping the Communists
out of coalition governments in NATO countries was a matter of common
sense. With hindsight, the passions aroused over US opposition to Euro-
communism, in Italy and elsewhere, are baffling. Whatever else was said,
Communist participation in allied governments would have adversely
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affected NATO cohesion. Sustaining the US dollar as the Euro-Atlantic
currency of choice was also compelling. As was shown during the monetary
storms of the 1970s, an erratic dollar rattled more than the sole US
economy. Preserving the US control of the nuclear deterrent should not have
been a matter for serious debate either: who else? Even assuming that de
Gaulle had a visionary sense of the future, being right 25 years too early
would also mean having been wrong for 25 years too many. And so the
discord went – never so far, however, that any country in Europe withdrew
from the alliance, and never so disruptive that the United States might wish
to derail the unfolding process in Europe.11
Early in the 2000s, US concerns over the conclusive phase of the
European construction are different. Centrist republics in Europe can hardly
raise fears comparable to those raised by political changes during the Cold
War. The ‘foreign national parties’ of yesteryear have become ‘European
national parties’ as they enter into domestic coalitions that barely move from
centre left to centre right. As Europe expands to the east, criteria of member-
ship are comparable to the criteria that were implicitly outlined earlier for
the Euro-Atlantic community, including democratic structures, market
economy and the ability to compete. For 50 years, the United States remod-
elled the countries of western Europe to its image, and now it is their turn to
refashion eastern Europe to that new image. 
Some ambivalence remains, however. A united Europe whose strength
would rest ultimately on the joint pillars of its single currency and a common
security and defence policy could be viewed either as a counterweight or as a
counterpart of American leadership and power. The distinction is real. The
defining image of a counterweight is adversarial, as the ‘weight’ to ‘counter’
would be primarily, if not exclusively, that of the United States.12 Fears of
such a counter have to do with the assumption that Europe’s follower-ship
must be absolute lest America’s leadership be weakened. As the image gains
focus, the euro emerges as a challenger, even a threat, to the dollar – a global
reserve currency whose economic clout would make it an effective force de
frappe aimed at deflating or reversing US influence everywhere. A common
security, foreign and (eventually) defence policy would provide this counter-
weight with capabilities that might confirm the rise of Europe as an option to
the United States in areas where American leadership was traditionally
tolerated for lack of available alternatives. The additional risk raised by such
emerging military capabilities would not be that they might be used in spite
of the United States and NATO. The risk would be that the ‘authorised’ use of
an ‘autonomous’ force would be so ineffective (or premature) as to force
subsequently an American involvement that the United States might not
have considered otherwise. In this case, far from being a counterweight,
‘Europe’ and its alleged new power would have proven to be a counterfeit.13
Standing in exaggerated opposition to the counterweight view of Europe’s
future is a more united, larger and stronger Europe acting as a counterpart
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to the United States.14 The driving assumption behind this view is that what
has been happening in Europe over the past 50 years has been generally
good for America, and that more integration would be just as good (and
certainly better than any alternative). Admittedly, the rise of a strong euro
as a global currency could harm a dollar that has provided well for Europe’s
(and America’s) affluence, and an autonomous Europe could hamper a US
leadership that has served well Europe’s (and America’s) security. Yet, while
differences between the two sides of the Atlantic remain – geopolitical,
economic and cultural – these have been narrowing significantly as America
becomes more European, and Europe more American. In sum, more integra-
tion in Europe need not mean less America in an integrated Europe.
The political, economic, strategic and even cultural indivisibility of the
Euro-Atlantic space will be sorely tested in the early 2000s. Predictably, an
America targeted by ‘evildoers’ intent on turning back the clock of their
history, as well as that of other nations, a thousand years will not be satisfied
with half-hearted support. The magnitude of the killing – approximating the
official total of the Revolutionary War or of Pearl Harbor’s ‘day of infamy’ –
made the peaceful resolution of this ‘act of war’ neither possible nor desir-
able. This shared threat was also promptly perceived in Europe, where heads
of state and government quickly understood their own vulnerability. ‘Ich bin
ein New-Yorker’ – this was Europe’s time to respond to these events with
tones of solidarity voiced in the name of their own interests as well as on
America’s behalf. Coming days after the unprecedented NATO decision to
view the attack against New York and Washington as an action covered by
Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty, the EU pledge of ‘unlimited soli-
darity’ for the campaign against the ‘barbaric acts’ of September 11 provided
the United States with a powerful reminder that even a nation without peers
needs the comfort of its allies. To paraphrase John F. Kennedy again, enter-
ing the new century, it is Europe’s turn to ask not what America can do for
the Old World but what the Old World must do with America.15
Bigger is safer
After World War II, the division of Europe was not preordained. Rather, the
United States envisioned a whole and united Europe that would rely on the
Grand Alliance, including the Soviet Union, to achieve a lasting reconcilia-
tion with the defeated states, including Germany. Sensitive to the conflicts
that had followed the end of the previous world war, the Truman adminis-
tration reasoned that Europe’s instabilities would be best overcome within
an integrated, democratic and affluent continental space. In June 1947, the
American offer of Marshall aid was extended to the east, but Moscow’s
refusal was imposed on neighbouring countries that were to start a ‘commu-
nity’ of their own a few years later. As the Cold War was unfolding, the
Atlantic idea, which was a European idea, helped overcome resistance to a
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European construction that the United States was more determined to
pursue than the Europeans themselves.16
Entering the 1990s, the end of the Cold War briefly appeared to threaten
both ideas and both institutions. By then, however, Europe and America’s
earlier choices had become irreversible. Now, talks of dissolution of NATO
(in the United States) or withdrawal from ‘Europe’ (for any of its members)
had become meaningless. Instead, enlargement to the east quickly became
the favoured option that would move NATO but also the EU beyond their
Cold War areas so that neither could be moved out of business. In 1995,
Europe’s fourth enlargement  – to Austria, Finland and Sweden – involved
nearly all the European states that had chosen to be, or were compelled to
remain, neutral during the Cold War. In 1999, NATO’s fourth enlargement
to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland involved three of the four coun-
tries in Central Europe that had previously constituted the dividing line
between the east and the west. 
EU enlargement is a vital dimension of Europe’s future and a central
dimension of an evolving Euro-Atlantic security partnership in the twenty-
first century. First, a larger EU is the most effective way to extend the demo-
cratic stability of western Europe to the continent. What else is there? The
transformation of Europe’s hard core – France, Germany and Italy – is a case
in point: it is within a united Europe that France ended its wars of the
republics, Italy began to complete its unification, and Germany exhausted its
appetite for living space. Examples of domestic upheavals within the
European community have been few and have become fewer. At the margins
of Europe, Ireland first, then Spain and Portugal, and Greece next, also
gained unprecedented democratic stability and affluence thanks, in part at
least, to the advantages of EU membership: economic gains, financial trans-
fers, political centrism and western legitimacy. Finally, domestic challenges
to stability mounted by ideological or separatist groups could be all the more
successful as the EU progressively helped contain the risks that the govern-
ments’ reaction might raise for civil liberties that would have otherwise been
left unprotected. 
A sense of failure resulting from unfulfilled promises of enlargement
would be destabilising. The EU timetables for enlargement must be robust
and credible, and deadlines that serve short-term political interests at home
but cannot be met within the EU – or are not met because of these interests –
are self-defeating. In the 1990s, too many target dates for enlargement were
postponed when the prerequisite of institutional reform within the EU
imposed criteria on member-states even more difficult to meet than the crite-
ria for membership faced by applicant countries. But, unlike the case with
NATO, the benefits of EU membership are as quantifiable as their costs, and
a failure to make membership work after it has been granted would be no less
significant than a failure to grant it. After the Cold War the countries of
central and eastern Europe endured many years of economic pain and turbu-
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lence, even under conditions of growth, as the need to prepare for the acquis
communautaire denied the generous peace dividends expected by the people.
Now, these sacrifices must be justified not only with the fact of membership
but also with its rewards – meaning, rewards of economic affluence and
democratic stability. A decade after the end of the Cold War, these rewards
remain far short of public expectations.17
Bidding for NATO membership does not help bids for EU membership, but
achieving one does help the other. Admittedly, because both institutions are
distinct, the two processes of enlargement should remain separate. Yet, a
parallel enlargement of both institutions would enable them to work
together more effectively than under conditions that keep European NATO
states that are not EU members away from EU initiatives, and EU states that
are not NATO members away from NATO initiatives. Such convergence
occurred during the Cold War, when the European Economic Community
grew from six to 12 – and NATO from 12 to 16 members. By 1986, only one
of the new European Community states (Ireland) had failed to join NATO as
well, and only three of the 14 NATO European countries were not European
Community members, with only Turkey wishing otherwise (unlike Norway
and Iceland). After the Cold War, the gap widened again: the three neutral
states that joined the EU in 1995 did not seek NATO membership, and none
of the three countries that joined NATO in 1999 were in the EU although all
were included in the short list of EU applicants. 
A strategy of dual enlargement would keep the two processes of enlarge-
ment separate, but it would recognise that EU and NATO decisions are not
separable as the two institutions best equipped to serve as primary guaran-
tors of the new European security order.18 To achieve this goal, each institu-
tion should also reach out to European states that already belong to the
other. Thus, by 2005–7, most European members of an enlarged NATO are
likely to be in the EU, while most members of an enlarged EU will probably
have joined NATO, thus extending the boundaries of a Greater Europe to the
Baltic region, central Europe and Slovenia. By that time, too, the reorganisa-
tion of a common Euro-Atlantic space may begin to cover the former neutral
states that objected to NATO membership, including Austria (and even, in
the not-too-distant future, Sweden and Finland), as well as persistent Euro-
sceptics that stood away from the EU (including Norway). Thus, the conver-
gence between NATO and EU membership would have been restored in the
east and the south, thereby building new common ground for complemen-
tary strategies in these areas. NATO does not command the wide variety of
diplomatic and commercial tools available to the EU to influence the deci-
sions that might lead to unwanted military actions. The EU does not
command the decisive type of capabilities available to NATO to shape events
after these decisions have been made. For both NATO and the EU, dual
enlargement is a vital dimension of a western strategy for the unfinished
security business in and beyond Europe.
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With NATO and the United States thus standing on each sideline of the
playing field, the transatlantic dimensions of the EU’s end game are clearly
drawn. Entering the twenty-first century, America has a relationship with
Europe that is no longer reversible. It may not be, and not wish to become, a
European power, but it is, and is bound to remain, a power in Europe. Such a
conclusion is not an invitation to debate America’s membership in the EU,
but it is a plea to debate the consequences of America’s status as a non-
member member–state within the EU. In short, a vital but carefully hidden
dimension of EU enlargement has to do with the structure of US relations
with the EU, as well as with the nature of EU–NATO relations. 
Going east: smaller is better
Farther to the east, it is politically ironic that the disintegration of the Soviet
Union initially moved Moscow and its former republics farther away from
the Europe that Mikhail Gorbachev hoped to lease as a common home. At
least the Soviet Union had an ideology that many in Europe were seemingly
prepared to endorse for a while. But it also had a history inherited from a
Russian state whose steadfast expansion to the west sought to define a terri-
torial niche – ‘a safe and productive location’, according to Robert Legvold –
on a continent that Dostoevsky and Tolstoy understood much better than
Marx, Lenin and Stalin.19 Now, nothing is left of the Soviet Union except a
leadership that has more to do with the remnants of the amputated
Communist empire it inherited by default than with la grande Russie of an
earlier Europe.
Throughout the Cold War, the Kremlin never viewed ‘Europe’ on its own
terms. Rather, an emerging European community was misrepresented as a
sort of NATO without America’s (nuclear) teeth – too tempting for Moscow
to ignore but not strong enough to fear. Accordingly, Soviet policies towards
the then-European Community were policies towards the United States,
whose periodic tensions with one or more EU states provided opportunities –
usually illusive – to drive a wedge between the two sides of the Atlantic. After
the Cold War, however, a sense of neglect and even harassment by the
United States progressively sharpened Moscow’s interest in Europe and its
union. As Stephen Cohen observed at the time, ‘By 2000, some 81 per cent
[of Russians] believed that US policy in general was anti-Russian and even
pro-Western Russians thought a “reverse iron curtain” was being imposed
on the country’s borders.’20 In July 2000, a newly elected president,
Vladimir Putin, readily approved a ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian
Federation’ that identified the EU as Russia’s second highest priority – after
the CIS, but before any other part of the world, including the United States
and China. Confirmed in Putin’s state-of-Russia message in April 2001, this
new Russian vision was offered as a direct response to the EU’s earlier
Common Strategy on Russia – the first of its kind on both accounts, form
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(‘common strategy’) and substance (Russia).21 In October 2001, the
EU–Russia summit tasked the High Level Group on Common European
Economic Space, a joint group formed earlier that year, to elaborate a
concept for closer bilateral economic ties over a 15-month period and in
ways that seemed to parallel the EU’s approach to creating a single market.
With Russia’s primary interest thus moving towards the EU, and with the EU
responding in kind, Moscow’s interest in privileged ties with individual
European countries – especially France and Germany – has acquired a
double significance: not only on their own merits but also in terms of their
role in, and influence over, European integration.22
The consequences of Russia’s belated discovery of the EU should not be
exaggerated, however. Their relations are complicated by a tenacious idea of
Russia’s place in Europe – an idea that has defied the realities of geography,
withstood the trials of history, adjusted to repeated waves of authoritarian
governance, and never integrated those convictions that some rulers occa-
sionally sought to import from other countries. Tim McDaniel has described
this idea as the certainty that Russia has a distinctive cultural and historical
tradition that sets it apart from the rest of Europe and guarantees its future as
a great power.23 Not surprisingly, the problem with this idea of Russia – la
grande Russie and la Russie éternelle – is that the Russian state can no longer
support it, the Russian people can no longer endure it, and Europe can no
longer afford it. 
Russia is too close to ignore, too big to integrate, too unstable to rattle,
and too nuclear to offend: neither the United States nor the states of Europe
could afford for long to neglect the risks of disintegration within Russia and
its related spillovers elsewhere. Yet, while tensions between the petty reali-
ties of what Russia is and the grand illusions that shape its self-image
remain, they have become less urgent because Russia can no longer have
the sort of universal ambitions that still characterised Russian policies
during their most recent Soviet phase. Even Moscow’s regional aspirations
are illusive: the 300 million Muslims systematically antagonised by Russia
since the Cold War, the 1.3 billion Chinese whom Russia repeatedly offended
after World War II, and the hundreds of millions of neighbours that Russians
have openly harassed throughout history are poised for geopolitical
revenge.24 The conclusion for Russia is all too obvious. Isolation is not an
option, and the best of all available choices is a closer relationship with its
former adversaries in the West, individually but also with the institutions to
which they belong or hope to join. That is well understood by Putin, whose
attempt to bring Russia deeper into the EU need not clash with his post-9/11
bid for a special relationship with the United States as a non-member
member-state of the military organisation, NATO, that was initially designed
to contain the Russian empire.
Russia’s territorial intimacy with Europe is reinforced as enlargement
brings the EU and NATO closer to, and even into, Russian territory through
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the enclave of Kaliningrad, where Moscow’s demands for special transit
rights will have to be addressed by the time the Baltic countries became EU
members. Admittedly, Russia was from the start a main feature of NATO
enlargement, if only because of an implicit need to accommodate its objec-
tions when NATO moved into central Europe in 1999, and, after that,
prepared its entry into former Soviet territory – before the ‘wars of 9/11’
seemed to marginalise that decision even before it was to be announced at
the NATO Prague summit in November 2002. But even then, EU countries
too had to show sensitivity about the impact of their own decisions on
Moscow, a feat initially less complex than for NATO because there could be
no ambiguity over a Russian membership in the EU, which could not be an
option either then or for the predictable future. 
Short of opening the doors of either institution, NATO and EU members
are somehow learning to live cooperatively and lastingly with Russia. A
Janus-like Russian face that smiles at one and frowns at the other will not
work because a frowning Russia, wherever it looks, is likely to scare even the
side at which it is smiling. Admittedly, the security questions raised after the
events of September 11 made of Russia a most valuable and capable ally –
one whose resources, institutions and experience would suit especially well
the security needs faced in and beyond Afghanistan. Yet, a separate grand
bargain with the fallen superpower in search of a mission and an institu-
tional home would have dire consequences for both NATO and the EU. With
regard to the former, an ever-closer bilateral relationship between the United
States and Russia would introduce new ambiguities within and about
NATO, where the EU allies (with the possible exception of Britain) would fall
at the margins of US interests. That in turn would redirect the EU efforts
towards a Common Security and Defence Identity that would be asserted
within or in spite of NATO, leaving Britain torn between the aspirations of its
prime minister, Tony Blair, across the Atlantic and his ambitions across the
Channel.
Going south: farther is safer
Passion was the glue for the collective ‘We’ of the nation – the passion that
kept the few different from (and better than) the many who were to be kept
away across territorial and ideological lines. Notwithstanding the erosion of
much of that passion, some of its darker sides linger, especially to the south.
Thus, in June 1955, the choice of Messina as the site of Europe’s relance after
the French defeat of the European Defence Community was ironic. Messina
was the small Italian port where the Christian fleets had paused before going
to battle with the Turkish fleet, whose destruction in Lesanto kept the
Infidels away.25 Nearly five hundred years later, and half-a-century after
Messina, Europe’s Christian ‘We’ still aims at a rigid separation from the
Muslim ‘They’: the farther, the safer. 
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That may change, but not yet. For Europeans whose loyalty is evolving
from the nation-state to the institution to which it belongs, the related ques-
tion of identity is best answered with a recognisable sense of a plausible
‘They’ whose leaders must be feared and kept at a distance. Lacking that
threat, it may be tempting to turn against something (the post-World War II
idea of Europe or a post-Cold War idea of America) or someone (the elusive
foreigner or the intrusive Iman). Populist calls to arms follow readily: these
are the déjà entendus of yesteryear – close the borders and protect the sacred
patrimony from intruders that must be denied access or worse. This is a
Cartesian logic turned inside out – I am, therefore you are not. Each affirms
its specificity in order to escape the other’s – ‘foreign, different, if not barbar-
ian, fundamentalist or fanatic’ are words that can define both Europe’s worst
vision of Islam and Islam’s worst vision of the West.26 In sum, there is little
debate where enlargement ends: at the border of the Eurasian countries that
Moscow used to control, and across the Mediterranean where individual EU
countries used to find the size and the resources they lacked on the conti-
nent. 
As EU boundaries move in the direction of Malta and Cyprus, an ever
more populous and religious Middle East is feared as a dagger pointed at the
soul of an older and depopulated Europe. Admittedly, Turkey and its neigh-
bours in the Caucasus and Caspian region are hardly part of the Middle East.
Yet a cultural self-definition of the EU pushes them away from the European
landmass and conditions the debate surrounding Turkey and its meagre
prospects for EU membership, notwithstanding the vague promises extended
in December 2002. Indeed, if Turkey were given a role in Europe commen-
surate with its size, power and potential, the EU would be transformed into a
power in the Middle East. But that is unlikely. While Turkey’s bid for
membership is thus stalled in the maze of institutional reforms that will
make access negotiations even more tedious and inconclusive after enlarge-
ment to the east is completed, the millions of immigrants who have over-
come the increasingly higher legal and physical ramparts raised on their
way into Europe are transforming the EU into a Middle Eastern power.
The Euro-Atlantic dialogue about Turkey and its place in Europe points to
an ironic reversal of roles between an America that thinks in geopolitical
terms and a Europe that responds with semi-formulated cultural or ethnic
arguments. Geography, as well as history, explains Europe’s (and America’s)
position. Turkey is a pivot state for nearly every issue of importance to the
United States (and its EU allies) on the Eurasian continent, including but not
limited to the needed transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas.27 For the
wars of 9/11, it is one of America’s two most significant NATO allies (with
Britain) – and, accordingly, one whose dependability ought to be reinforced
with the secular rewards of democratic affluence expected from EU member-
ship. In the American view, therefore, EU enlargement to Turkey would
make NATO stronger as its borders are extended to Syria, Iraq and Iran, as
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well as the Caspian states. Indeed, according to some who worry about
alleged anti-American sentiments in the new Europe, America’s most reli-
able European allies are non-EU countries that include Turkey but also
Russia.28
That view is not shared in Europe, where Turkey is still feared as an
unwanted community partner – an alien and even hostile neighbour that
would make the EU weaker by threatening the institution’s internal balance,
especially but not exclusively culturally. Yet with a large and growing range
of EU activities and projects dependent on some kind of consultation with, or
cooperation from, Turkish ministries and agencies in order to operate or
develop effectively, there is no escape from closer ties. In short, with
prospects for Turkey’s membership in the EU dim to non-existent for the
balance of the present decade and beyond, their dialogue should focus more
explicitly on the best ways to strengthen Turkey’s European-ness within the
EU with cooperative projects that would weaken that country’s own concern
over the influence of an anti-Turkish, pro-Greek sentiment among EU
members.29
The tensions faced in building a multicultural community within the EU,
and separately within each of its members, serve as reminders of the obsta-
cles facing its extension to Eurasian states and former colonial dependencies
in the Greater Middle East about which the EU and its members show a
considerable interest, but which they have no intention of including in their
institutions at any time in the foreseeable future. Pretending otherwise can
only arouse self-defeating expectations among Europe’s neighbours, and
worsen Europe’s own concerns about them. Most generally, regions that
remain politically diffuse and elusive can only afford or generate a security
structure with Europe and with the United States that remains invisible.30
Thus, more realistic than a broad Mediterranean community is the limited
free trade area envisioned by the Barcelona framework as the centrepiece of
an architecture that relies on performance-linked financial support and even
new institutional linkages for dialogue, security and otherwise. After
September 11, the case for a free trade area to which the United States might
be associated was strengthened further. Non-state groups and even regimes
that advocate terror will not be defeated, let alone pre-empted, by the use of
overwhelming military power alone. After the war has been won militarily,
it still needs to be ended politically: reconciliation demands reconstruction,
and reconstruction will be especially needed if these wars spread further to a
distraught and hopeless populace among adversaries and allies alike. The
logic applies to the totality of the Greater Middle East, going from North
Africa to the Persian Gulf, but it also applies to the newly independent states
of the Caucasus and Caspian region – with the latter countries grossly
neglected by the EU and most of its members despite a geopolitical signifi-
cance that was vital long before September 11.
While NATO will remain the security institution of choice for the foresee-
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able future, it is not a full service institution – no more and possibly even less
than the EU. Soft security issues that impact on stability can be addressed
most effectively by the EU, with the direct support of its members and with
occasional assistance from the United States and even NATO. Conversely,
hard security issues are best managed by the United States, within or outside
NATO, whose members should be entitled to a right of first refusal when
their support is sought, and within or outside the EU. This is not a recipe for
an ill-defined ‘multilateralism à la carte’ or an artificial division of labour:
both sets of issues are separable but they cannot be separated, and, accord-
ingly, so are policies that address them. A neglect of soft security issues
would exacerbate issues of hard security, while the neglect of hard security
issues would stall issues of development and reconstruction. 
In the Greater Middle East more than anywhere else, EU countries hold
and respond to different priorities and vulnerabilities that stand in the way of
common policies among them, let alone between them and the United
States. Now as before, laissez-les faire is not an option. The region is just too
important (energy supplies), reckless (terrorism), dangerous (four major
wars), unstable (fin de régimes), expensive (for keeping the peace and waging
war) and intrusive (because of the domestic spillovers of instability and war
in the area) to be abandoned to the goodwill and capabilities of others. Yet,
on the whole, differences within the EU have been getting smaller, and initia-
tives based on specific national interests now embody a European policy
rather than the interests of one EU country only. As shown in 2002, over
President Bush’s denunciation of a so-called ‘axis of terror’, but also over
Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s attacks against a so-called ‘coalition of
terror’, such convergence could not be seen as readily between Europe and
the United States. Indeed, the reverse may prove to be true, and the compat-
ibility of US and EU views for the region will be sorely tested in coming years.
Going global 
During the Cold War, the Atlantic idea helped develop a community of
values that protected its members from military aggression. Simultaneously,
the idea of Europe also helped develop a community of interests that could
protect its members from war with each other. Both ideas were complemen-
tary as neither could have been launched and blossomed without the other.
The Atlantic idea and the organisation that embodied it helped keep the
peace, but the idea of Europe and the institutions to which it gave birth
helped do away with the very idea of war. Neither the peace of the bullies nor
the peace of the braves, the peace achieved by the EU is a peace of content-
ment and assimilation that was initially guaranteed by NATO. No gain,
however construed, could compensate the ‘winners’ for the losses that
would result from a war between EU countries, whatever its origin. In truth,
within the EU, there is no threat of a return to past conflicts: in the 1990s,
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post-Cold War conflicts in Europe all took place in countries that were not
eligible for membership any time soon, notably those in the Balkans and the
former Soviet republics.31
While the EU, unlike NATO, cannot protect its members or its neighbours
from external aggression, it can help keep peace between them, within and
outside the European continent. In several primary areas of conflict in
Europe, including the Balkans, credible prospects for membership can
encourage moderation: arguably, some of the horror that plagued the
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s might have been avoided had the EU been
involved earlier. While no country in southeastern Europe, with the excep-
tion of Slovenia, can realistically expect to enter the EU before 2010, every
country in southeastern Europe should still be able to view the EU as part of
its future. The process is not open-ended, however, and the geographic ‘E’ of
the EU may prove more restrictive than the historic ‘North Atlantic’ defini-
tion of NATO. Yet, short of membership the EU can still play a useful role in
helping its non-EU neighbours by acting more like a bilateral donor than an
international financial institution.32
While the institutional and budgetary consequences of enlargement will
continue to limit such a role for the years to come, the EU is none the less
making substantial contributions to the management of soft security issues
at its extended boundaries. Thus, at the January 2002 conference held in
Tokyo in the context of the war in Afghanistan, the EU (both the Commission
and the member-states) pledged a total of 2.3 billion euros for the period
2002–06, amounting to 45 per cent of the total pledges made in Tokyo.
Concerned with a spillover of the war onto the European continent, the EU
also made substantial commitments for Pakistan, including aid and prefer-
ential trade treatment extended to textiles, and for Central Asia it doubled its
allocations.33 In future years, more will be expected from the EU, especially
for the Arab–Israeli conflict, where a pronounced pro-Arab bias often leaves
the EU at odds with the United States, and in the Persian Gulf, where the
United States and most EU members continue to hold different views on the
political rehabilitation of both Iran and Iraq. But for the EU to respond to
these lofty expectations, its members will first need to agree over the bound-
aries of a common foreign policy that is still debated not only among them
but also between the institutions that represent them. 
As to traditional security issues, there should be no misunderstanding.
For many years to come, significant capability gaps and interest divergences
among EU countries themselves will continue to stand in the way of coordi-
nated, let alone common, EU action. Predictably, these differences are even
sharper, and getting wider, in a Euro-Atlantic context – between the United
States and the states of Europe within NATO, and even between a US-led
‘NATO at 20’ (cum Russia) and the EU from which both the United States and
Russia are excluded. Indeed, in 2001–02, the military campaign in
Afghanistan pointed to a new American doctrine of strategic relevance that
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provided for ‘mutually assured recrimination’ across the Atlantic. Because
large ‘coalitions of the willing’ might confuse or dilute the mission, as had
been shown during the 1999 war in Kosovo, credible offers of usable capa-
bilities from willing coalition partners were mostly ignored or dismissed as
unnecessary. With the transatlantic ‘capabilities gap’ scheduled to grow
dramatically in coming years, the military ‘need’ for allies may, therefore, be
questioned increasingly in the United States. When recognised within or
outside NATO, such a need will be determined by the unavailability of US
capabilities (for lack of interest or lack of will) or by the availability of new
allies (on grounds of geographic location or political convenience) more
than by the capabilities of traditional European allies. 
Yet the security agenda for the twenty-first century is an agenda tous
azimuts of traditional and new security issues. This agenda will demand large
coalitions of countries, including but hardly limited to NATO countries, that
are not only willing but also capable of administering the full range of
national power, hard and soft. None of the global wars waged in the twenti-
eth century is likely to serve as a model for what President George W. Bush
dubbed the ‘first war of the twenty-first century’. To each mission its own
coalition, with all coalitions assembled into a pyramidal structure that
would keep the few national powers at the top still dependent on the many
countries and even institutions grouped at the wider bottom. How these
coalitions are managed – and how they perform – may well determine the
future of NATO and the conditions under which the EU will evolve as a secu-
rity institution of primary or complementary choice for its members. The
goal for NATO and the EU, as well as for their respective member-states, is
not to do everything together but to be sure that together they all do every-
thing that is needed for attending to the security of a whole and free Euro-
Atlantic area.
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13
Reflections on Eurasian security
David P. Calleo 
It seems an especially appropriate moment for American scholars to consider
the long-term issues of Eurasian security. At this time, of course, it is not easy
to have a long-term vision of anything. Since the atrocities of September 11
2001, the world seems to have changed for us in fundamental ways. Old
trends, therefore, may no longer apply.
It is not true, however, that the hatred of the United States that exploded
on September 11 began on that same day. Indeed, even among our closest
allies, there has been serious opposition to the role that we have often
seemed to assume for ourselves since the end of the Cold War – the role of
global hegemon and of the world’s only superpower. It is particularly impor-
tant that we not mistake the profound sympathy that we have received from
our friends around the world as unconditional support for a forceful new
assertion of that hegemony. Global hegemony is probably not the real direc-
tion of things in the world – not before September 11 and not thereafter.
Most probably, the real direction is towards a more plural world order with
several great powers. That has been, I suspect, the general drift in Eurasia
over the past ten years and it will not now change. 
Europe’s postwar retreat 
Thirty years ago it was fashionable to observe that Europe was only a
regional power, whereas the United States was a global power. When
Americans talked about being ‘global’, they meant the Far East. Our atten-
tion was focused there because American diplomacy was about to play its
‘China card’, its greatest coup of the Cold War. By exploiting the breach
between China and the Soviets, the US hoped to rein in both. The Asian pres-
sure on Russia did seem to stabilise and prolong détente in Europe at least –
a situation that encouraged the germination of Gorbachev’s reforms and
undermined the Soviet system. Thus, the ‘global’ United States seemed able
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to determine the fate of Europe through the Far East.1 Europe, being merely
regional, had little role in the Asian game that held the key to Europe’s own
destiny. Hence our patronising view of the time.
It was rather disingenuous to fault Europeans for lacking interest in Asia.
It was also rather indelicate, given America’s fervent enthusiasm for
‘decolonisation’ after World War II – that is to say, for the ejection of the
Europeans from their old empires. Many Europeans, mindful of this history,
watched the American discomfiture in Vietnam with more than a touch of
Schadenfreude. In any event, European states were not uninterested in Asia;
they simply had few cards to play there. The geopolitical hands dealt at the
end of World War II left Europe devastated and truncated, menaced by a
huge Soviet military force planted in the middle of a divided Germany.
Security depended heavily on the Americans. Europeans lacked the geopolit-
ical leisure or resources for a big independent role in Asia. With the
Americans occupying and protecting Japan, East Asia’s postwar political
climate was set by its own Cold War – by the antipathies between the United
States, China and Russia. China, isolated and paranoid, was left to the
domestic preoccupations of its Revolution. 
America triumphant
The end of the Cold War saw this postwar geopolitical situation radically
changed. All parties – the United States, Russia, China and Europe – were
dealt new geopolitical hands. The United States, the obvious victor of the
Cold War, began the new era as the only superpower in an increasingly inte-
grated global system. Remarkable American growth in the 1990s reinforced
the sense of American predominance. Of course, the United States may never
have been as strong as it seemed in the 1990s. Today, we are painfully aware
of our physical vulnerability. But signs of our economic weaknesses have
been visible for a long time. We have, for example, had a huge external
deficit for several decades. That deficit reflects a long-standing habit: the
American economy absorbs more than it yields; it consumes and invests
more than it produces. The difference is the habitual external deficit and it
has to be financed, one way or another, by Europe and Japan. In other
words, America’s high growth and high standard of living are borrowed, in
part, from the rest of the world. Financing this deficit has generally been
easy, thanks not least to the international role of the dollar. But European
Monetary Union (EMU), with its emerging euro, creates an international
alternative to the dollar.2 As a result, it is not at all unlikely that the cost of
our deficits will grow more and more burdensome to us. Nevertheless, it will
not be easy to reduce the deficit very substantially. It will require cutting
consumption or cutting investment – probably both. Cutting consumption
means lowering America’s standard of living, cutting investment means
lowering its rate of growth and technological advancement. Reducing our
Conclusion
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external deficit will not be pleasant for the rest of the world, either. Asia’s
trade surplus is the counterpart to America’s current-account deficit. At a
time when Asia is suffering from many signs of overproduction, a drastic
reduction of the American deficit spells deep trouble for many Asian
economies, perhaps including China. 
Russia demoted 
If the end of the Cold War left America triumphant, Russia’s new geopolitical
hand seemed a terrible demotion. America’s economic problems, real or
hypothetical, seem minor by comparison with those of Russia. Indeed, the
abrupt economic decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of
the major economic catastrophes of modern history. Amazingly, Russia is
now one of the poorest countries of the world. Nevertheless, it was the
Russians themselves who dismantled the Soviet construction and their long-
term prospects are probably much better for having done so. Russia has
gained a fresh chance to develop its own version of a constitutional state and
a market-based economy. The country still has its vast economic potential.
Perhaps it is slowly acquiring a stable and competent government. In any
event, it is liberated from its diplomatic isolation of the Cold War, particu-
larly vis-à-vis Europe. Arguably, its long-term geopolitical position is
thereby greatly improved.
Europe released
Europe’s new hand seems a less ambiguous improvement. Europe no longer
faces the Soviet threat with its accompanying need for American protection.
Instead, Europe is restored to its pan-European space, including Russia.
Western Europe’s states, led by France and Germany, have reacted by accel-
erating their integration into the EU, while broadening its scope and
membership. Hence the EMU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the attempts to
reform NATO through the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI),
the negotiations with prospective new EU members in central and eastern
Europe, along with the struggle to recast the EU’s constitution. In effect, the
EU seems determined to make itself the dominant institution in the new pan-
Europe.3 Europe’s big ambitions leave it rather vulnerable. Completing the
European Union on a pan-European scale will require, at the very least, a
long period of digestion and internal preoccupation. Too rapid an expansion
risks making the whole system ungovernable. Still, the EU has tested and
resilient institutions; its leading countries retain a strong geopolitical
consciousness. It should not surprise anybody if, in our new century, Europe
is once more a major force in Eurasia and around the world – a major global
power. 
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China unbound
China, too, has a new hand. Since 1978, its growth has been very rapid. Its
GDP is already the second in the world; its per capita income, however, is still
extremely low, which suggests that rapid growth should continue.4 Like
Russia, China is no longer isolated diplomatically. To be sure, it faces severe
short-term problems – uncompetitive state firms, a precarious banking system,
poorly developed fiscal institutions. Beyond are deeper questions about China’s
place in a global system. Nevertheless, so far China’s government has managed
the contradictions of its evolving system with great skill, even if Tiananmen
Square suggests what happens when problems spin out of control. 
A more plural world order
Looking at the geopolitical positions of the United States, Russia, Europe and
China since the end of the Cold War, all four have reason to believe that their
basic situations have improved. Three are deeply preoccupied with develop-
ing new national or regional prospects. Only one, the United States, has the
resources and geopolitical leisure to be a major presence in the regions of all
the others, a presence that seems likely to swell with America’s new preoc-
cupation with international terrorism. Nevertheless, given the favourable
long-term prospects of the others, the global system seems unlikely to remain
unipolar. The post-Cold War prospects of Europe, Russia and China point to
a more plural global system, perhaps still highly integrated but not domi-
nated by any single power. To work, such a system will require a high degree
of multilateral cooperation. But that cooperation will depend not only on the
wisdom and goodwill of statesmen and publics, but also on the degree to
which the four centres of power – and perhaps others – develop interests and
expectations that can be reconciled. It is frequently said that our present
world is looking more and more like the world in 1900. As in 1900, the
world system faces the problem of how to accommodate rapidly rising
powers. Then, it was a question of appeasing Germany and Japan and, of
course, the power that was really rising, the United States. And, as is often
said, the failure of Britain, France, Germany and Russia to make room for
one another led to two world wars and the mutual ruination of Britain and
Europe together. In retrospect, considering how much was destroyed, we
tend to believe that the great powers of 1900 ought to have been able to
accommodate each other, and we fault them for failing. 
But what about our own future? How easy will it be for today’s four big
powers to live together on an integrated planet? Obviously, this is a huge
question. Let me explore two aspects of it. First, can the United States – still
bemused by its unipolar vision – react successfully to a more plural world?
And second, can a plural system absorb the rise of newly powerful poor
states, in particular China? 
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American global policy in a plural world system 
In the 1990s, only the United States had an active foreign policy beyond its
own sphere. But that American foreign policy in the 1990s, even though
informed by a rather hubristic self-consciousness about being the world’s
only superpower, had no great organising theme – other than shoring up the
global economy and furthering American economic and financial interests
within it. Otherwise, the Clinton administration’s foreign policy can best be
described as a sort of low-grade imperialism – meddling everywhere, often to
prevent local horrors, as in Somalia or Haiti, but without much conviction
and with a paralysing aversion to casualties. In principle, the president
favoured a stronger, more self-sufficient Europe, and gave ritual support to
the ambitious European goals of Maastricht. But, as time went on, the
Clinton administration adopted a more aggressive view of international rela-
tions, a view promoted by ‘peace theorists’ equating ‘perpetual peace’ with
the spread of American hegemony. With Congress in the hands of the
Republicans, the Clinton administration felt constrained to make many
concessions to the prejudices of the unilateralist right. 
A decisive change in European policy came when the president decided
to press for NATO enlargement in 1994. American policy began to
reaffirm NATO’s role as the manager of European security, and America’s
role as NATO’s hegemonic leader. As the European intervention in Bosnia
faltered, the United States came to the rescue. Thereafter, American rhetoric
was much less diffident about reaffirming American primacy in Europe.5
After Bosnia came NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, this time with Americans
firmly in charge from the start. Meanwhile NATO enlargement took on an
open-ended character. In 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary
were the first to be admitted, but the United States made clear that the next
round might well include at least one of the Baltic states and that Ukraine
could not be ruled out. In its early days, the new Bush administration sharp-
ened the unilateralist tone of America’s European diplomacy. Its favourite
project, National Missile Defense, implied destabilising the existing regime of
nuclear deterrence, while renewing Europe’s military and technological
subordination to the United States. 
This direction of American policy did not sit well with the EU’s ambitious
plans to assert its own primacy over the new pan-European space. Early in
the 1990s, Europeans put on the table their project for a European Security
and Defence Identity, designed to make NATO less hegemonic. The idea was
to transform NATO’s traditional integrated and pyramidal framework, with
a designated enemy and an American commander at the top, into a looser
structure that would rely on ad hoc coalitions for specific purposes. But, as
the Europeans discovered painfully in Bosnia, they first needed to create EU
institutions to coordinate common security and defence policies among
themselves. Ultimately, they needed to create effective military forces of their
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own. By now, the Europeans have undertaken to build a rapid reaction force
and have made considerable progress towards consolidating and rationalis-
ing their defence industries, an important step in building support for more
defence spending. 
It is still far too early to judge Europe’s reaction to the Bush administra-
tion’s American campaign against international terrorism. The atrocious
attacks on New York and Washington triggered a strong outpouring of
sympathy for the United States. But whether this powerful current of sympa-
thy will also restore Europe’s traditional subordination within NATO seems
doubtful. In the short run, much will depend on how the Americans conduct
their anti-terrorist campaign. The wider and deeper the effort, the greater
the need for allies, and the more those allies will weigh on American policies.
A good part of European enthusiasm for joining the American ‘crusade’ can
be traced to apprehension over what the Americans will do unless checked
by their allies. Most European governments feel the Americans have consis-
tently mismanaged their relations with Israel and the Palestinians, Iran and
even Iraq. Europeans, who feel themselves far more vulnerable to Muslim
fanaticism, are unlikely to entrust their security to an unchecked American
hegemon. Nor are Europeans likely to tolerate intense American presence in
their domestic security arrangements. This does not mean that Americans
and Europeans will no longer remain allies. But the trend towards a more
balanced and autonomous transatlantic relationship seems unlikely to be
reversed.
Russia’s reaction 
US policies that irritated the Europeans in the 1990s infuriated the Russians.
Arguably, NATO’s first enlargement – to Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary – was not very significant to the Russians. They seemed less inter-
ested in blocking the enlargement than in extracting as many concessions
from it as possible. Similarly, the Russians did not so much oppose the
Kosovo intervention as insist upon joining it, and thus limiting American
action. But the second enlargement of NATO, particularly its extension to
the Baltic states, is a much more serious assault on Russian strategic
interests. 
One Russian option was to oppose enlargement vociferously and thereby
perhaps persuade the Europeans to stall it. The other was, as before, to
accept the enlargement but to extract concessions. But what concessions
would be adequate for so serious a deterioration of Russia’s strategic position
as NATO in the Baltics or American forces deployed in Central Asia? Perhaps
the most obvious way out is to have the Russians themselves join NATO, in
one fashion or another, thereby transforming it from an implicitly anti-
Russian alliance into a pan-European security system. The creation of the
NATO–Russian Council in May 2002 seems to be a step in that direction.
Conclusion
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NATO may now become a more potent version of the OSCE, with elaborate
military staffs and great prestige. Full Russian membership in the future
would almost certainly mean the end of NATO’s traditional hierarchical
structure dominated by an American SACEUR. The alliance would be most
likely to move towards the flexible, ad hoc structures proposed by the
French. In reality, this has already been NATO’s pattern during the various
Balkan interventions, where NATO’s forces are a de facto coalition, directed
by a ‘Contact Group’ of the major participants, with the Russians among
them.6
Arguably, NATO’s fate ultimately depends upon its not becoming a
serious obstacle to European–Russian cooperation. This cooperation, of
course, is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, NATO enlargement clearly can
threaten its further development. Having Russia as an at least de facto
member of NATO – as a result of NATO’s own ambition to expand – would be
a highly ironical outcome. Geopolitically, such a step would end the explicit
western alliance against Russia. Europeans, left without any formal
American protectorate, should logically accelerate the building of their own
structures for collective defence. More European–Russian military coopera-
tion might also seem a logical step as the way to control European problems
in the Balkans, and possibly also Russian problems in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. Russia, in short, is getting ready to play its European card.
US policy towards China
American policy in the 1990s had been abrasive not only towards Europe
and Russia but also towards China. The Chinese have grown acutely sensi-
tive to signs of a growing American taste for interventionism. They have
been uneasy about NATO’s excursions into Central Asia through PfP and
highly critical of NATO’s role in the Balkans. They are also among the most
vociferous critics of NATO enlargement. They take a dim view of American
enthusiasm for the Dalai Lama. Most of all, they are angry and fearful over
the shift in US policy towards Taiwan. And they see Bush’s National Missile
Defense as designed primarily to neutralise China’s deterrent, a project
revealing that American strategic planners believe a major confrontation
with China is inevitable and are fast preparing for it. If the United States soon
grows heavily engaged militarily in Afghanistan and Central Asia generally,
Chinese apprehensions are unlikely to diminish. It will be difficult for the
Chinese to avoid thinking of American counter-terrorism as a new version of
hegemonic imperialism. This judgement will be still more difficult to avoid in
so far as the United States refuses to conduct its campaign through the UN
Security Council, where China has a veto.
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Eurasian reactions
Antagonising China and Russia at the same time has had a not unpre-
dictable consequence: the two have moved closer together. Both have
started promoting together a new organisation of Eurasian states.7 A China
card is being played again, but this time by Russia rather than the United
States. Official American analysts apparently have decided, a priori, that
such a development cannot occur. The inherent conflict between declining
Russia, endowed with Siberia’s energy, and fast-growing China, hungry for
it, is supposedly too great for a durable alliance between the two. This judge-
ment may seriously underestimate the capacity of the Russians and Chinese
for rational behaviour. Russia, after all, needs to develop the potential of
Siberia and needs to sell its products to someone. Why not to China – soon
the world’s biggest economy and probably for a long time among its fastest
growing? Given the dangers, Russia would not want to see a real confronta-
tion between the United States and China. But continuing tension would
increasingly tie down the Americans and allow Russia to bargain for conces-
sions in the West. 
The other key element in Russia’s grand strategy is a closer relationship
with western Europe. Given Europe’s need for Russia’s resources and taste
for collaborative rather then confrontational diplomacy, a Russian–EU
entente seems not at all unlikely. This should not mean a definitive break
between the EU and the United States. But it would tend to detach the EU
from any aggressive anti-Russian policies from the United States that do not
seem in Europe’s interest. Without European support, or at least acquies-
cence, it would be more difficult for the United States to continue such poli-
cies.
A developing European relationship with China would complete the
Eurasian geopolitical revolution. It is difficult to imagine Europe playing a
heavy and direct military role in Asia, except by refusing to support the
enthusiasms of the United States. But Europe already has enormous
economic interests in Asia generally. America’s huge current account deficit
already depends heavily on European support to finance it. Since Europeans
could expect to profit from peace but not from war, they would presumably
use their influence to dampen aggressive military enthusiasm on all sides.
Having the Europeans present in the region should inhibit the tendency of
Americans and Chinese to demonise each other and polarise relations.
Geopolitical realignment?
In summary, four great power centres have been active in the nascent post-
Cold War Eurasian system – the United States, the EU, Russia and China. All
were dealt new geopolitical hands. Everyone’s cards seemed to promise a
bright future. For the short term, the US cards seemed far and away the best.
Conclusion
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Gradually, the United States began to play the unipolar game that went with
its cards. ‘Peace theory’ and ‘globalisation’ provided the ideological cover.
The United States began to find itself everywhere opposing the ambitions of
others in their own spheres. As a result, the United States has, little by little,
been building a global consensus against itself. The world’s other three great
powers have begun to see the United States as a sort of rogue hegemon,
increasingly self-centred, unilateral and inconvenient to their own regional
ambitions. Not surprisingly, they have begun moving closer to each other.
American diplomacy is thus provoking a pan-Eurasian coalition – as a way
for the rest of the global system to balance and contain the superpower. 
Is this a threat to our interests? It depends on whether we define our inter-
est as being the global hegemon – struggling to frustrate the rise of the
others. If we do not, if instead we work to create a genuine multilateral
system, one that leaves generous room for the aspirations of the others, it is
difficult to see how this pluralist trend in Eurasia threatens our vital inter-
ests. Our assets remain huge, our ties to each of the others intimate. We can
no doubt remain pre-eminent for a long time but will have to evolve a less
bombastic style and vainglorious notion of our role. This is perhaps not the
worst outcome for the post-Cold War system, or indeed for the United States
itself. Ideally, it will provide a global Treaty of Westphalia, without first
having to go through a Thirty Years War. 
Accommodating the newly powerful poor
Considering the possibilities of coexistence in a pluralist system necessarily
brings up my second question, raised at the chapter’s outset: can a concert of
mostly very rich states find a place for a newly powerful but still very poor
China? The global conflict between rich and poor states is hardly a new topic.
But we have developed a rather abstract way of talking about it. We note
that 60 per cent of the world’s people live in ‘poor countries’, those with a per
capita income of less than $2,900. We also note that rich westernised states,
with incomes averaging $20,000 to $30,000 per capita and higher, make
up only 15 per cent of the world’s population. But our abstract category,
‘poor countries’, blurs a critical geopolitical distinction. Among these poor
countries are China and India. Indeed, their populations together constitute
roughly two thirds of the world’s poor and two and a half times the popula-
tion of all the rich states combined. China alone has 21 per cent of the
world’s population, India 17 per cent. Nothing in the long history of human-
ity leads us to presuppose that China and India must be poor, and Europe and
America rich. Indeed, even as late as the eighteenth century China’s growth
and living standards were, in many respects, comparable to those in Europe.
China’s decline came as the nineteenth century progressed.8 In recent years,
China has started growing very rapidly.9 In an OECD study of China’s likely
growth pattern from 1995 to 2015, written by Angus Maddison, a leading
Reflections on Eurasian security
255
2504Chap13  7/4/03  12:42 pm  Page 255
analyst of comparative economic history, China’s GDP is forecast to overtake
the American by 2015. But the same projections foresee a Chinese per capita
income in 2015 of still only $6,398 (adjusted for purchasing power) as
opposed to $30,268 for the United States; $25,533 for Japan; $23,199 for
‘32 advanced capitalist countries’; and $3,120 for India.10 In other words,
even when China’s national GDP equals the American, US per capita income
is expected to remain five times greater than China’s and ten times greater
than India’s. China will thus be a rich state but with a poor population. 
Having China among the world’s economic and military giants will, in
itself, empower a large proportion of the world’s poor. And the superpower
status that seems quite near for China is not unimaginable later for India.
Both states have nuclear weapons and an already impressive scientific infra-
structure that could grow formidably with the vast new wealth their
national economies are expected to generate. Both countries enrol substan-
tial parts of their populations in first-class educational systems. Under the
circumstances, demands to reduce the global income gap are likely to grow
more insistent. Even those who are complacent about the inequality of
wealth will be compelled to pay attention to the narrowing gap of power. 
World redistribution?
Would a major global redistribution be a bad thing? The answer, from a
western point of view, depends on whether more equality is brought by a
zero-sum allocation – the poor taking from the rich – or by growth – where
the rich stay rich but the poor get richer too. Zero-sum redistribution can
happen when highly competitive industries in poor countries destroy indus-
tries in advanced countries and leave many people jobless. Some of that has
been occurring over the past half century, with the rise of Japan or the
various smaller Asian ‘tigers’. Western labourers have faced very consider-
able competition and displacement. But, as Asian wages have risen sharply,
new markets have been created and new industries and services have sprung
up in the West. 11 The resulting production is more efficient worldwide and
the benefits to the West have, we say, greatly outweighed the costs.
China, however, is much poorer per capita than Japan and the Asian
tigers.12 It is also several times more populous than all of them together.
Thanks to China’s radically low income per capita and radically high popu-
lation growth, even very modest per capita growth in China requires very
large aggregate growth. To fulfil Maddison’s projection and equal the US
GDP by 2015, China will have to triple its GDP of 1995. Even so, its per
capita income is then expected to be equivalent to only one fifth of the
American. But in achieving this goal, over two decades, China’s new growth
will alone equal the whole size of the American economy of 1995.13 If
growth on such a scale is achieved by taking wealth away from others, the
consequences will be very unpleasant for those who are the losers. But even
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if China’s growth is achieved entirely by expanding the world’s collective
GDP, expansion on such a scale will constitute enormous new pressure on
the price of raw materials – oil being the obvious example.14 And the vastly
increased energy use implicit in China’s growth cannot help but have a
serious impact on environmental conditions – all the more because China
relies heavily on coal.15 In short, accommodating China, let alone India, will
be a big problem for the world as a whole and, of course, for China itself.
Compared to this huge Malthusian problem that we seem bound to face, the
challenges of 1900 – accommodating imperial Germany and the United
States – seem relatively minor.
Nevertheless, it would be unwise to forget that the great wars of modern
times have been among the most rich and highly developed countries.
Today’s intensely competitive free trade leads to a high commercial tension
among the rich states. All struggle to find specialisations in high technology
and finance that will permit their outsized standards of living to be sustained.
Governments are deeply involved. Industrial espionage intensifies and trade
disputes grow increasingly acerbic. As China’s competition weighs more and
more heavily on all advanced countries, the competition among them can
only increase.
In short, no one should be too optimistic about the prospects for resolving
peacefully the intractable conflicts of interest among powerful states, rich or
poor, that seem clearly foreseeable in the new century. It will help greatly, of
course, if technology continues coming to the rescue. Malthusian crises have
been predicted regularly over the past two centuries, but have been avoided,
as stunning technological mutations have repeatedly changed the parame-
ters of economic possibilities. Cultural change is another way to adjust.
Perhaps China can find a better model for itself than simply aping the
consumerism of western societies. And perhaps western societies themselves
can find a better way to sustain their democratic legitimacy than the expec-
tation of ever growing consumption.
The most promising geopolitical framework
Would a reborn Westphalian system for Eurasia be a better framework for
managing these grand questions than the hegemonic model imagined by
American triumphalists? I would argue yes. The experience of the 1990s
does not suggest that the unipolar vision brings out the best qualities of
American statecraft. The general thrust of American diplomacy, admittedly
only languid until now, has been to oppose Europe, Russia and China
together. This does not seem a helpful direction. Acton’s dictum about power
corrupting may even apply, it seems, to the United States. 
A self-consciously plural system is perhaps more promising. Given the
realities of modern warfare, if the great problems of the future are to be
addressed successfully, they must be addressed in a collaborative rather than
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a confrontational fashion. No one country has the political, economic and
military resources, let alone the moral imagination, by itself, to manage the
great problems looming in our world. A unipolar vision of the world thus
seems inherently unstable. It creates a single target for all the frustrations
inevitable in a rapidly changing world. Instead of promoting a generalised
sense of responsibility for world order, the unipolar vision encourages free-
riding and opportunism. In such a world, self-righteous confrontation is all
too easy. 
Westerners will, for example, be inclined to complain bitterly as a rapidly
growing China notably degrades the world’s environment. Chinese will have
every reason to answer: ‘Who are you in America – with your colossal waste
of energy – to complain about our pollution?’16 If China were Korea, that
might be an adequate answer. But China is already a great power in the
world. In due course, it will be greater still. Great powers have a particular
responsibility for dealing with the world’s problems. In the coming genera-
tions, they must find a way together to ease modern societies into a world
order that is sustainable – politically, economically, environmentally,
culturally and morally. If they, or rather we, try to resolve our differences by
force, we run a very high risk of repeating the fate of the world system of
1910. To avoid such an outcome requires a new concert of mutual respect
and responsibility. Ideally, a self-conscious plural system in pan-Eurasia
would be more conducive to such a concert.
Successfully rebalancing the West and building a collaborative system
with Russia, China, Europe and America probably requires more wisdom
and skill from the world’s leaders than we have any reason to expect. But
Europe, having suffered so much from its own selfish divisions and come
such a long way in learning to control them, may now have something
special to teach the rest of the world. We can hope that a stronger Europe can
settle its differences with America, that it can embrace Russia and help it to
find a worthy new version of itself. And we can hope that the pan-Eurasian
system that follows can find an honoured place for China, at long last restor-
ing itself as a great force in the world. We can hope that all the great powers
of our time can together find the moral imagination to redefine their social
and economic ideals to suit a more equal world. If the human experiment is
to continue, the world’s great civilisations must find a way to concert their
ideals and forces. As scholars, we have a not inconsiderable responsibility to
imagine and promote this concert. 
Notes
1 Playing the China card also favoured reform in China. By 1978, China was
launched on its great attempt to reconcile itself with capitalism and to enter the
world economy.
2 For my own extended discussion, see David P. Calleo, ‘Strategic Implications of
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the Euro’, Survival, 41:1 (1999), pp. 5–19.
3 For my own extended analysis of Europe’s ambitions and prospects, see David P.
Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2001).
4 Using a standard based on purchasing power parity. Otherwise, based on
current exchange rates, it is seventh – after the United States, Japan, Germany,
France, Italy and the United Kingdom. See World Bank statistics, at www.
worldbank.org/data/databytopic/keyrefs.html. For growth projections see Angus
Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run (Paris: OECD, 1998), p. 97.
5 In his recollections of the Bosnia negotiations in 1995 and 1996, Richard
Holbrooke argues that the Bosnian tragedy and the resulting Dayton accords
marked a shift in US foreign policy. It became, in his words, ‘more assertive, more
muscular’. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998),
p. 359. This, in his view, was in large degree a reaction to the failure of the
Europeans to deal with a major crisis in their own backyard: ‘While both the U.S.
and the EU initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem, the
Europeans chose not to take a strong stand, restricting themselves to dispatching
U.N. “peacekeepers” to a country where there was no peace to keep, and with-
holding from them the means and the authority to stop the fighting’. Ibid., p. xv. 
6 In 1994, the Contact Group was established among the five major powers
involved – the United States, Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom –
thereby reducing the cumbersome decision-making processes characteristic of
the EU, NATO and the UN. Creating the Group reflected a western desire to
accommodate Russia in its perceived sphere of influence in the Balkans and in the
light of already strained relations over NATO enlargement. The actual work of
the Contact Group reflected a deepening of the NATO–Russia working relation-
ship. While the success of the Contact Group’s proceedings (and more specifically
Russia’s unsuccessful attempt to restrain the Bosnian Serbs) was ambivalent, it
did lay the groundwork for substantial cooperation in implementing the peace
agreement in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the West and Russia continued to see distinct
geopolitical interests in the Balkans. For the creation of the Contact Group see
David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), pp. 275–8.
For a critical appraisal of the role of the Contact Group in the Balkan conflicts
and in NATO–Russia collaboration, see Carsten Giersch, ‘Multilateral Conflict
Regulation: The Case of Kosovo’, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
Working Paper No. 00–04 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, August 2000).
7 By an agreement signed on 15 June 2001, the heads of state of Russia, China and
four Central Asian republics established the SCO. This organisation will work to
promote political, military and intelligence cooperation among the six signatory
countries. In theory, the SCO has impressive resources. It covers approximately
1.5 billion people, has access to a large contingent of strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons, and combines conventional forces of over 3.6 million soldiers.
Mongolia, Turkmenistan and Iran are supposedly ready to join the organisation
soon. In addition, China would like to see Pakistan join, whereas the Russians
promote the entry of India. The creation of the SCO was followed by the signature
of a cooperation treaty between Russia and China on 15 July, aimed at improving
military and political cooperation between the two countries and at promoting a
‘new international order’.
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8 Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, Chs 1 and 2.
9 Ibid., pp. 14, 19.
10 Ibid., p. 97 (adjusted for purchasing power parity). Maddison’s projection, where
China surpasses the US GDP in 2015, assumes an average per capita growth rate
of only 4.5 per cent. The IMF figures for overall real growth, adjusted for popula-
tion growth, show China’s real GDP growth per capita since 1995 to have been
as follows: 9.6 per cent (1996), 8.8 per cent (1997), 7.8 per cent (1998), 7.1 per
cent (1999). IMF estimates are 7.5 per cent (2000) and 7.3 per cent (2001). For
the unadjusted real GDP growth figures, see IMF, World Economic Outlook
(Washington, DC: IMF, October 2000), p. 22. Of course, these projections also
assume that China will be able to manage the structural flaws of its current
economic system, in particular a reform of the highly volatile and unstable
banking system as well as an effective reorganisation (and privatisation) of ineffi-
cient and oftentimes corrupt state-owned companies.
11 Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore have surpassed western per capita income
levels. Most of the Asian ‘little tigers’, however, have a GDP per capita that is still
low by western standards, even if several times greater than in China or India.
But Asia’s tigers have comparatively small populations. Even Japan, with 126
million people, is smaller than France and Germany put together.
12 In 1999, for example, Chinese per capita income, adjusted for purchasing power,
was 14.9 per cent that of Japan, 47.1 per cent that of Malaysia, 22.7 per cent
that of Korea and only 11.5 per cent that of the U.S. See World Bank,
www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/keyrefs.html. China’s population of
1.267 billion probably still exceeds India’s (see World Bank, World Development
Indicators Database (16 July 2001), www.worldbank.org). China’s birth rate and
natural population growth rate have decreased spectacularly – from 33.43 per
cent and 25.83 per cent in 1970 to 15.23 per cent and 8.77 per cent in 1999.
Nevertheless, China’s population is still growing at a rapid pace (see China
Population Information and Research Center, White Paper China’s Population and
Development in the 21st Century, Internet edition (2001), www.cpirc.
org.cn/whitepaper.htm). 
13 According to Maddison’s data and data projections, the US GDP in 1995 was
$6,150 billion. Chinese GDP in 1995 was $3,196 billion. The projected Chinese
GDP for 2015 is $9,406 billion (figures in 1990 US$). Maddison, Chinese
Economic Performance, p. 97. 
14 Indeed, from 1980 to 1997, China’s energy use was up by one third. By 1997,
China had become an oil importer. See International Energy Agency, Energy
Balances: Non-OECD Countries (Paris: IEA, 2000). Overall, China’s energy use is
expected to grow exponentially. Consumption of fuels is likely to quadruple by
2015. The continuously rising demand indicates daily oil imports of 8.6 million
barrels by the same year. Total energy consumption is likely to redouble by 2006
from a 1996 base, and again by 2015. See Verne W. Louse and Ian McCreary,
‘China’s Energy: A Forecast to 2015’, Los Alamos National Laboratory
International Economics Reports LA-UR-96–2972 (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos
National Laboratory, 1996).
15 China’s use of coal as a source of energy has increased exponentially and this trend
is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. At the moment, China’s per capita
pollution is small by comparison with that of the US (see n. 16 below). Nevertheless,
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experts predict that by the year 2025, China will emit more carbon dioxide and
sulphur dioxide (products from coal burning) than the United States, Japan and
Canada combined. For consequent concerns about the environment, see Louse and
McCreary, ‘China’s Energy’, pp.1–9, as well as World Resources Institute, A Guide to
the Global Environment 1994–95 (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute,
1995). China’s future pollution would contribute substantially to climate change
(see World Resources Institute, The Environment and China: Climate Change, Internet
edition (2001), www.wri.org/china/climate.htm). 
16 Between 1971 and 1998, China’s per capita emission of CO2 has more than
doubled, from 1.02 to 2.30 tons. US per capita emissions of CO2 actually
decreased, but remained at a very high level (having fallen from 20.7 to 20.1
tons per capita). International Energy Agency Data Services (2001),
www.iea.org.
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